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PREFACE 
The Florence School of Banking and Finance at the European University 
Institute’s Robert Schuman Centre of Advanced Studies and the Brevan 
Howard Centre at Imperial College London, in cooperation with BAFFI 
CAREFIN at Bocconi University, organised on 27 April 2017 a confer-
ence entitled ‘The Changing Geography of Finance and Regulation in 
Europe’. 
The event was held at the European University Institute campus in 
Florence, Italy. The conference is a high-level debate convened every year 
since 2011 at the EUI’s Villa Schifanoia, on the hills of Florence. It gathers 
a limited group of leading economists, lawyers, political scientists and 
policy-makers to review selected contemporary challenges related to 
Europe’s economic and financial governance.
This year’s discussion focused on the rapid evolution of the geography 
of finance, particularly taking into account the sudden shifts in the reg-
ulatory framework caused by the profound changes which are currently 
happening in the sector. 
In fact, the advent of innovative technologies, collectively known as 
FinTech, is revolutionising the modus operandi of the global financial 
infrastructure. The introduction of novel elements such as cryptocurren-
cies, big data, block-chain and the proliferation of distributed ledgers are 
only a few illustrations of a wider financial technology industry build-up, 
which has already had an impact on several different activities in banking 
and finance. FinTech is now offering advantages in terms of speed, ease of 
access and simplicity. However, despite these benefits, the quick disrup-
tion of traditional practices and the decentralisation of the sector have 
also created an environment where new risks could arise. 
xiv
Yet, technological changes are not the sole factors causing transfor-
mations in the geography of finance, which are also forced by shifts in 
political priorities. ‘Brexit’, i.e. the decision of the United Kingdom to 
leave the European Union following the referendum in June 2016, is now 
unsettling the continent’s economic and financial landscape, due also to 
a general uncertainty of what form the exit will ultimately take and what 
will be its long-term consequences.
Furthermore, the different regulatory approaches taken by individual 
countries, either in response to these shifts or caused by internal eval-
uations, have encouraged individual actors to relocate to jurisdictions 
where the most favourable regulatory framework are in place, resulting 
in even deeper changes in the geography of financial regulation.
Today, regulators must respond to those challenges in order to turn 
them into opportunities. The conference was precisely conveyed with the 
aim to foster the discussion on how the regulatory framework should be 
adapting to these changes. With this goal, the conference was divided in 
three panel discussions, focusing respectively on the new world of Fin-
Tech, on regulatory arbitrage across jurisdictions and on Brexit as a case 
study for changes in the geography of finance and regulation. Discus-
sants and conference participants engaged actively in the debate, which 
was guided by the following leading questions: how regulation should 
respond to digital transformation and innovation? Is regulatory arbitrage 
and the reliance on more decentralised regulatory regimes a possible 
solution or is the top-down central model resilient enough to sustain 
these changes? What will be the impact of Brexit on regulation? 
The event follows a 2016 conference entitled ‘Filling the Gaps in Gov-
ernance: The Case of Europe,’ a 2015 conference entitled ‘The New Finan-
cial Architecture in the Eurozone,’ a 2014 conference entitled ‘Bearing the 
Losses from Bank and Sovereign Default in the Eurozone’, a 2013 confer-
ence ‘Political, Fiscal and Banking Union in the Eurozone,’ a 2012 confer-
ence, ‘Governance for the Eurozone: Integration or Disintegration, and 
that of 2011, ‘Life in the Eurozone With or Without Sovereign Default.’ 
As with all the previous conferences, the debate after each panel and 
was lively and thoughtful. We prefer not to take a stance here on any of 
the issues but simply provide in this book the contributions by individual 
speakers and let the reader draw his or her own conclusions.
Preface
1Executive Summary 
THE CHANGING GEOGRAPHY OF 
FINANCE AND REGULATION IN 
EUROPE
Pierre Schlosser & Agnieszka Smolenska
Entering the heart of the matter and opening the Fintech session, 
Franklin Allen explained that in the past the geography of finance was 
very clear: there was a transaction and where the transaction originated 
was also where the settlement would be registered. With the advent of 
cloud-computing however, it is questionable where locations of transac-
tions are, which rules should apply and who is the responsible regulator. 
Strict separations between markets and institutions divided firmly by 
functional and jurisdictional lines become obsolete. This is only one of 
the examples of the ways in which Fintech will revolutionize the financial 
services industry and how it will increase the level of uncertainty. 
Eva Micheler focussed her remarks on the nexus between technology 
and the current financial infrastructure, insisting on the fact that the full 
effects of the transition from paper-based settlement to computer-based 
settlement systems still need to be understood. This is the case, in par-
ticular of the chain of intermediaries, where custodians remain at liberty 
to appoint sub-custodians notwithstanding information losses that this 
entails. Eva Micheler concluded by underscoring that technology should 
help to reduce transaction risk but should also contribute to reducing 
holding risk. Andrei Kirilenko stressed that technologies are penetrating 
financial markets at a rapid pace and flagged in particular the high interest 
in Fintech of Venture Capital. Expecting structural changes to unfold fol-
lowing this disruption, he wondered whether one should assume, going 
forward, that banks are becoming utilities. He also brought up the issue 
2of the future of human capital in those financial services that are most 
routinized. The rationale of the reasoning is that ‘computers are better 
than humans at doing repetitive optimization actions’. Algorithms are the 
best solutions to perform those functions. Speaking from the perspec-
tive of a practitioner, Stuart Hoegner presented a case study on bitcoin 
trading and illustrated the extent of the damage that cyber security intru-
sions can represent. 
Departing from the above topics, Jean-Pierre Landau’s keynote 
speech focussed on the positive role that public debt can play in an envi-
ronment where there is a shortage of safe assets. While debates on who 
should be issuing the safe asset are likely to be raging for some time, it 
should be recognised in principle that safe assets have a key role to play in 
supporting financial stability. A problem that currently affects Europe is 
that there is no safe financial cross-border intermediation meaning that 
‘all cross-border flows are risky’. Therefore, there is scope for a higher 
supply of safe assets, a market that Mr Landau suggests could be animated 
and liquefied by the ECB. A possible alternative could be to develop a pri-
vate safe asset in the form of a plain vanilla Asset Backed Security whose 
design would be conditional on diversification. 
The remaining two sessions focussed on the shockwaves that the 
changing physical geography will send through the EU’s regulatory land-
scape, both in the context of broader considerations of regulatory arbi-
trage across jurisdictions as well as the specific case of UK withdrawal 
from the EU. The common thread to those two topics was that there 
can be no common market without common rules since harmoniza-
tion though common rules as well as prevention of harmful regulatory 
arbitrage have been the driving force behind much of EU financial reg-
ulation. Brexit will mark a reversal of this process – repartitioning the 
market previously integrated to some extent under the common system. 
Notwithstanding risks of increased competition between the EU and 
the UK following Brexit, emphasised by the chair Mitu Gulati of the 
session “Regulatory Arbitrage across Jurisdictions”, its panellists, some-
what provocatively, gave evidence of that which will not change following 
Brexit, begging the question to what extent – in the specific context of 
banking and finance – Brexit can be considered a case of “everything 
having to change so that nothing changes?”
Executive Summary 
3Despite its bad press, “regulatory arbitrage” is a complex matter – 
choices are after all made not only by market actors but also by author-
ities themselves. Even if driven by different objectives, both are fallible. 
Lachlan Burn discussed positive sides to regulatory arbitrage, including 
that of competition between systems, where EU passporting system can 
be considered as encouraging arbitrage – even as EU legislation makes 
explicit provisions for withdrawal of authorisations for financial insti-
tutions which have opted for the legal system of a particular Member 
State for the purpose of evading stricter controls elsewhere. Yannis 
Manuelides emphasized the prominent role played by English law and 
its courts in international finance, likening it to an international public 
utility. Preference for common law is driven by its principles of party 
autonomy in contract, as well as legal certainty combined with flexibility 
in particular commercial cases. Banks are unlikely to abandon common 
law even after UK leaves the EU - though it remains to be seen under 
which law EU institutions or ESM will choose when issuing financial 
instruments in the future. Jeromin Zettelmeyer investigated the causes 
of regulatory arbitrage in the EU in terms of a lack of adequate financial 
integration. Brexit will enhance this problem by increasing systemic risk 
and raising the cost of capital across the EU. While some steps have been 
taken towards cutting the sovereign debt-bank loop, which is ultimately 
at fault for the walls between Member States, factors hindering further 
integration include: differences in strength of bank balance sheets (espe-
cially levels of non-performing loans), continuing home bias, as well as 
prevailing asymmetries between safety nets and regulation of wholesale 
markets. In the context of broader EU economic recovery, addressing 
these underlying stumbling blocks to financial integration, a key question 
to be posed concerns possibilities to create safe debt in the EU.
The second key controversy raised in the discussion of whether reg-
ulatory arbitrage necessarily leads to a race to the bottom or not was 
picked up by in the next session, this time specifically dedicated to Brexit 
in the broad sense: its impact on regulation and the economy, future rela-
tions with the EU, as well as the negotiation’s political context. Simon 
Gleeson offered a forward-looking approach to the impact of Brexit on 
the changing landscape of finance, coupling its ground-shaking effects 
with global trends in finance – rise of automation as well as mobility and 
high frequency of financial markets. Brexit is unlikely to halt the scale of 
capital movements we witness today, while capturing financial activity 
Pierre Schlosser, Agnieszka Smolenska
4through regulation becomes ever more challenging in the context of 
complex, global institutions. The key question which we must ask there-
fore is not where to regulate, but what to regulate. David Miles offered an 
interpretation which emphasised Brexit as a choice resulting from a com-
plex cost-benefit analysis. In the context of the assessments of economic 
impact of Brexit he pointed to the fact that many of the short-term pro-
jections overestimated the immediate negative impact of the referendum 
result, even as the final scale of the costs of UK’s withdrawal remains 
uncertain. The impact on the banking sector is likely to be different than 
for other industries, where bulk of UK’s financial exports are destined for 
third countries. Jonathan Faull raised the issue of the future “docking” 
mechanism, which would allow the UK and EU to work together: this 
requires not only an equivalence mechanism, but also a system for 
resolving inevitable differences. Brigid Laffan provided a political per-
spective on Brexit, including on the priorities of both sides of the nego-
tiations as red lines crystalize. The EU should focus on its own cohesion 
and survival in this respect – EU membership must matter, regardless of 
the final shape of the deep and special relationship with the UK. 
The lively discussion followed, raising many a contentious issue, such 
as the incidental nature of many issues related to Brexit negotiations, as 
well as its broader context - the impact on Northern Ireland and distribu-
tional consequences. It is not the geography of finance only after all that 
will shift with Brexit: there are many underlying tectonic movements at 
play, while the future remains uncertain. 
Executive Summary 
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7EXPLAINING THE INFRASTRUCTURE 
UNDERPINNING SECURITIES  
MARKETS: MARKET FAILURE AND THE 
ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY 
Eva Micheler1
1. Introduction
In this paper I am going to develop explanations for the distinctive 
characteristics of the infrastructure underpinning securities markets. 
I am going to advance the thesis that this infrastructure is the product 
of market failure. This market failure has resulted in investors/issuers 
paying too high a price for the services underpinning securities markets. 
The government is subsidising this by providing retail investors with tax 
breaks that make it attractive for them to invest pension savings in secu-
rities markets rather than save for retirement in other ways. The paper 
will conclude by pointing towards options available to the government 
for intervention. 
The infrastructure underpinning financial markets is important. It 
affects us individually as pension investors. It is also important from a 
macro-economic perspective. Financial markets and their infrastructure 
underpin capitalism – the fundamental idea which our society is built 
on. In this system it is the role of investors to provide finance to issuers. 
Financial markets support this by providing an exit route for investors. 
They supply issuers with open-ended equity finance, termed debt finance 
1 I am grateful for comments to Jason Roderick Donaldson, the participants of the Sec-
ond Workshop on Intermediated Securities held at LSE on 25 March 2016 and the 
participants of the Bank of England/LSE Financial Markets Infrastructure workshop 
held at LSE on 9 May 2017. The paper can be downloaded from https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2941643.
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or something in between and, at the same time, enable investors to flex-
ibly determine their own time horizon. 
The financial markets infrastructure also supplies plumbing. Payment 
systems transfer money. Custodians ‘look after’ assets. They keep records 
of who owns what. They organise lending and that opens up an addi-
tional source of income for investors. It also enables borrowers of securi-
ties to obtain finance.2 
In addition the infrastructure supports the provisions of pensions. 
With good reasons governments have retreated from providing state 
pensions and are instead encouraging the private provision of pensions. 
They, however, continue to fund this by granting workers tax breaks that 
make it attractive for them to invest their pension savings in financial 
assets. 
All of this is good and worth having. This paper is written firmly on 
the basis that capitalism and securities markets are beneficial. The crit-
icism is that the current infrastructure is too expensive and risk prone. 
It is possible that this has happened because the incumbent providers of 
that infrastructure have disabled market forces. 
Infrastructure-related cost is a longstanding problem troubling secu-
rities markets. The cost of settlement was lamented in the Lamfalussy 
report in 2001.3 This triggered the Giovannini process and informed the 
work of the Legal Certainty Group. Most recently Benos, Garratt and 
Gurrola-Perez have analysed the economics of distributed ledger tech-
nology and also referred to the cost associated with securities settlement.4 
There are estimates that the revenue from settlement, custody and collat-
eral management amounts to 13 % of the total trade value chains (from 
execution to settlement). That is a high price for the processing of trans-
2 Joanna Benjamin, ‘The law and regulation of custody securities: cutting the Gordian 
knot’, (2014) 9 (3) Capital Markets Law Journal, 327; Philipp Paech, ‘Securities, inter-
mediation and the blockchain - an inevitable choice between liquidity and legal cer-
tainty?’ (2016) 21 (4) Uniform Law Review 612.
3 http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/docs/lamfalussy/wisemen/final-report-
wise-men_en.pdf.
4 Evangelos Benos, Rod Garratt and Pedro Gurrola-Perez, ‘The economics of distributed 
ledger technologies for securities settlement’, Bank of England Working Paper Series 
(18 August 2017) page 5.
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actions. In addition to the cost associated with the process spanning from 
execution to settlement there is cost associate with holding securities. 
Benos, Garratt and Gurrola-Perez mention the cost of reconciliations 
and other compliance processes that need to be carried out in custody 
chains.5 These are reflected in the fees that investors pay for the holding of 
assets. Adding to this visible service charge custody chains have an effect 
on assets and their value that has been analysed from a legal perspective 
elsewhere and that will be further examined in this paper.6 
In the remaining sections of this paper I am going to develop a first 
attempt at an explanation of why the current infrastructure has emerged. 
I will start out by briefly describing the characteristics of this infrastruc-
ture (section 2). I will then analyse four recent examples where these 
characteristics have affected the value of assets (section 3). Section 4 will 
explain the perspective of the providers of the current infrastructure. 
In section 5 the perspective of investors will be analysed. The problems 
analysed in this paper only arise because investors permit custodians 
to outsource custody and accept that they bear the risk associated with 
sub-custodians. There are alternatives. UK securities can be held directly. 
At an international level custody chains do not need to be as long as they 
currently are. It will be shown that there are good reasons to assume that 
there is a market failure and that behavioural patterns can explain that 
investors do not appreciate the implications of the current framework and 
are also not able to put in place a more cost effective contractual frame-
work that better suits their financial interests. The role of technology will 
be addressed in section 6. The paper will conclude by pointing towards 
options available to the government. 
2. Characteristics of the current infrastructure
At a positive level the current infrastructure is characterised by com-
plexity. This has been explained in more detail elsewhere.7 For this paper 
a quick summary of the points made there will be helpful. 
5 Evangelos Benos, Rod Garratt and Pedro Gurrola-Perez, ‘The economics of distributed 
ledger technologies for securities settlement’, Bank of England Working Paper Series 
(18 August 2017) page 6.
6 Eva Micheler, Custody Chains and Asset Values [2015] Cambridge Law Journal 505, 
also available on http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/62609/.
7 Micheler, above.
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The current infrastructure for transferring and holding securities 
operates on the basis of custody chains. There are frequently several cus-
todians inserted between issuers and investors. Only one of these has an 
immediate connection with the investor. 
Investor
 Custody Contract
Custodian 1
 Custody Contract
Custodian 2
 Custody Contract
Custodian 3
 Custody Contract
CSD
Issuer
The effect of this structure is that investors are exposed to a number 
of risks. By having accepted this form of holdings the terms offered by 
the issuer are reduced by the terms that operate between the custodians 
that form part of the chain. Investors do not receive the benefit of the full 
terms associated with the instrument they have bought. 
A custody chain can make it impossible for investors to sue an issuer 
for reasons of mis-selling.8 Investors are hindered from exercising voting 
rights and including rights to object to the company being delisted.9 The 
rights of investors are affected by charges that are contained in contracts 
between custodians.10 They are also affected by securities financing trans-
actions such as lending and repos that are organised by sub-custodi-
ans.11 Their interests are diluted by shortfalls that may occur at the level 
of sub-custodians.12 The accountability for negligent services is under-
minded by a custody chain.13 Custodians are fully liable for the negli-
8 Secure Capital SA v Credit Suisse AG [2015] EWHC 388 (Comm) 25 Feb 2015.
9 Eckerle v Wickeder [2013] EWHC 68 (Ch), [2014] Ch 196.
10 Micheler, above; pages 519-521.
11 Micheler, above; pages 521-523.
12 Micheler, above; pages 523-525.
13 Micheler, above; pages 525-528.
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gence of their own staff. For the negligence of sub-custodians they are 
only liable if they have not adequately selected the sub-custodian or not 
adequately overseen his performance. There is no liability for sub-custo-
dians further down the line. 
The risk emanating from this holding structure falls on investors who 
are deemed to have accepted this risk. This is because they give permis-
sion to their custodians to delegate custody.14 They also allow their cus-
todians to: 
- instruct sub-custodians ‘upon such terms as may be customary’
- ‘from time to time, determine the terms and conditions of the  
 arrangement’ with sub-custodians
In addition a custodian is not liable for the acts or omissions of the 
staff of a sub-custodian in the same way as it is liable for its own staff. 
When custody is outsourced, the custodian is only liable for having inap-
propriately selected or inadequately supervised a sub-custodian.15 Exam-
ples of terms limiting liability for sub-custody can be found in the stan-
dard terms of Euroclear and Clearstream Banking Luxembourg (CBL). 
Euroclear is ‘not liable for the acts or omissions of … any … sub-custo-
dian’.16 CBL also excludes liability for the ‘acts or omissions of … any of 
CBL’s … Sub-custodians’.17 
3. Implications of current outsourcing arrangements for asset 
values
The effect of the investors giving extensive permission for the outsourcing 
to their custodians is a reduction of the rights of investors. Their rights 
are reduced in a way that has an effect on the value of assets. They are also 
14 Micheler, above; pages 509-511.
15 In the UK, the new CASS rules on shortfalls specify that a firm does not need to make 
good a shortfall when it concludes that another person is responsible (CASS 6.6.54(3) 
R FCA). The firm must take all reasonable steps to resolve the situation without undue 
delay with the other person. It must also consider whether it would be appropriate to 
notify the affected clients (CASS 6.6.54(3) FCA).
16 Euroclear Terms and Conditions, art. 12(d); see also art. 17: For securities that are mu-
tilated, lost, stolen or destroyed Euroclear has no obligation to but can “elect” to obtain 
reissuance. If instructed by a participant they will obtain reissuance, but only “to the 
extent practicable”; see also CBL Terms and Conditions, art. 48.
17 CBL Terms and Conditions, art. 48, sentence 5.
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saddled with custody risk which accumulates as the chain grows longer. 
Both points have been set out more fully elsewhere.18 For this paper it suf-
fices to refer to four recent examples where custody chains have reduced 
the value of securities. 
1. 2008: When Bear Stearns was restructured an excess of 28% of  
 shares compared to the shares issued by the company   
 was discovered.19 
2. 2017: Dole Foods was reorganised. There were 36,793,758  
 shares issued. 49,164,415 shareholders registered facially  
 valid claims.20 Excess of 33.6%. 
In both of these cases we can observe that the excess arose on a self-re-
ported basis. This amplifies the importance of the result. The issuers 
made a public announcement and invited investors to come forward and 
identify themselves. Assuming that not all investors can be reached by/
will respond to such an announcement, one would expect the result to be 
that not all issued shares are claimed by investors. Instead a shortfall of 
securities revealed itself. 
Shortfalls are not a phenomenon limited to the US market. The FCA 
fined Bank of NY Mellon and Barclays Bank in 2015 because they failed 
to keep sufficient assets for their customers.21 Barclays Bank was fined in 
2014 because they had not adequately restricted the rights of third party 
sub-custodians which exposed client assets to the risk of being used by 
sub-custodians without the clients’ agreement.22 
18 Micheler, above; pages 515-519.
19 Commission Staff Working Document Impact Assessment accompanying the docu-
ment ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
improving securities settlement in the European Union and on Central Securities 
Depositories (CSDs) and amending Directive 98/26/EC /* SWD/2012/0022’ – COD 
2012/0029 para 8.9.Annex 9.
20 In Re Dole Food Company, Inc Stockholder Litigation Consolidated C.A. No. 8703-
VCL Memorandum Opinion of the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware Feb-
ruary 15, 2017 available from http://courts.delaware.gov/Opinions/Download.aspx-
?id=252690.
21 FCA Final Notice, The Bank of New York Mellon London Branch (122467) The Bank 
of New York Mellon International Limited (183100) 15 April 2015, paras. [4.8] - [4.10] 
and [2.3].
22 FCA Final Notice, Barclays Bank PLC (122702) 23 September 2014, para. [4.11].
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3. 2013: Eckerle – no remedy for the loss of value caused by a del  
 isting.23
4. 2015: Secure Capital – litigation on the question of standing.24
4. Explaining the infrastructure from the perspective of 
custodians
To understand why this complex structure has emerged it is useful to 
remember that complexity suits custodians. Custody chains enable each 
of the custodians to operate a relatively simple regime. This saves each 
custodian’s cost. But these savings do not add up to benefit investors.25 
On the contrary the savings of the custodians are passed on to investors 
as cost. At the beginning of the paper I mentioned that custody chains 
reduce the liability exposure of custodians. I made the point that for in 
house custody custodians are liable for the full range of custody services 
provide for by their staff. For delegated activity they contractually limit 
their liability to overseeing their immediate sub-custodian and thereby 
benefit from a reduction in liability exposure. For the individual custo-
dians this is attractive and a benefit associated with the existing infra-
structure. Investors experience the reduction of liability as an increase 
in risk. 
Complexity also hinders competition. This infrastructure is held 
together by a web of bilateral contracts that custodians have set up 
between them. Neil Flingstein has put forward a theory that explains 
markets from a political-cultural perspective.26 He writes that the social 
structures of markets are best viewed as an attempt to mitigate the effects 
of competition between firms. The main goal of firms is to ensure their 
own long-term survival. To this end they strive to be internally efficient. 
They also act politically by creating relationships and networks with other 
firms and customers. Market participants such as custodians operate 
with a view to reducing their exposure to competition with other firms. 
23 Eckerle v Wickeder [2013] EWHC 68 (Ch), [2014] Ch 196.
24 Secure Capital SA v Credit Suisse AG [2015] EWHC 388 (Comm) 25 Feb 2015.
25 For more detail on this see Micheler, above pages 508 and 531-532.
26 Neil Flingstein, ‘Markets as Politics – A Political-Cultural Approach to Market Institu-
tions, (1996) 61 (4) Amercian Sociological Review, 656-673 at page 657.
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It is easy to understand why custodians would benefit from operating 
in a complex environment that makes it difficult for customers to view 
and therefore compare services provided and the income generated by 
the participating firms. What is more difficult to explain is the perspec-
tive of investors. 
5. Explaining the infrastructure from the perspective of 
investors
Why do investors accept this? Intermediation and outsourcing are 
common in many industries. In construction, main contractors operate 
on the basis of sub-contractors to whom they outsource elements of 
the project. In manufacturing, products are assembled with parts that 
are sometimes sourced through long and complicated supply chains. In 
both examples, however, the main contractor/vendor of the final product 
assumes full liability for the contributions made by the members of the 
chain. 
In custody chains this is different. The terms referred to above have 
an - compared to other industries - unusual effect. Investors not only pro-
vide custodians with permission to use sub-custodians. They also agree 
to be affected by risk that operates at sub-custody level. This is unusual. 
The vendor of a product would not normally have a contractual right 
to reject liability because a defect was caused by a part supplied by a 
sub-contractor. 
Also alternatives exist. UK domestic securities can be held directly 
with the CSD. For international securities economies of scale may explain 
why some intermediation exists. In the Eckerle case, for example, the cus-
tody chain consisted of:
Mr Eckerle
Postbank
Clearstream Banking Luxembourg
Bank of NY Mellon
Crest (Euroclear)
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Mr Eckerle held his shares through Postbank. It may not be econom-
ical for Postbank to have a direct link with Crest. Economies of scale 
may therefore explain why Postbank uses Clearstream. What scale does 
not explain, however, is the presence of BoNY Mellon. Does Clearstream 
Banking Luxembourg really not have enough UK connected business to 
pay for a direct link with Crest? 
In the Secure Capital case the chain consisted of:
Secure Capital
RBS Global Banking (Luxembourg) SA
Clearstream Banking Luxembourg
Bank of New York Mellon
The bond was a bespoke re-insurance product. Secure Capital held 
all units. Access to a trading facility was presumably not important. The 
amount of money invested was substantial. It would have been possible 
for the investor to be issued with one paper certificate which they could 
have kept with one custodian. 
Market for lemons
Neoclassical economics assumes rational actors. Resources are allocated 
through price. In this world asset prices reflect all risk associated with an 
asset. They reflect issuer risk and also custody risk. 
We all know that actors are not rational, but the neoclassical perspec-
tive can nevertheless provide us with an explanation for the current infra-
structure. 
This infrastructure is not only complex, it is also opaque. Investors 
do not know who the sub-custodians are. The do not know how many 
there are. They do not know the terms that they are affect by. They cannot 
evaluate the infrastructure risk that affects their investment.27 
Under such circumstances a market for lemons emerges. This is a type 
of market failure. Because they are unable to evaluate the infrastructure 
27 Micheler, above; pages 509-511 and Eva Micheler and Luke von der Heyde, ‘Holding, 
clearing and settling securities through blockchain/distributed ledger technology: cre-
ating an efficient system by empowering investors’, Journal of International Banking 
and Financial Law (2016) 11 JIBFL 652 at 656.
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risk for individual assets rational investors assume a ‘worst case’ risk dis-
count. In this framework investors are aware of infrastructure risk, care 
about it and protect themselves. The mechanism through which they 
look after their interests is price. 
From the perspective of this framework there is no need to worry about 
investors. There is nevertheless a problem. Infrastructure risk reduces the 
price that rational investors pay for assets. That has a knock-on effect on 
issuers for whom the cost of borrowing increases accordingly. Resources 
are allocated inefficiently. Issuers pay too much for plumbing. They sub-
sidise an inefficient infrastructure. 
The classical remedy is transparency/disclosure. To be able to ade-
quately price infrastructure risk rational investors need to know who the 
sub-custodians are and on what terms securities are held in sub-custody. 
Once transparency is established resources are allocated efficiently and 
issuers no longer have to swallow the cost associated with the infrastruc-
ture.
Imbalances of bargaining power
Even in an economy with rational actors market friction can occur. One 
example of market friction is an imbalance in bargaining power. Such an 
imbalance can be found here.
According to a survey published by the Department for Business 
Innovation and Skills in January 2016, there are 6 types of investors (two 
individual and four institutional28):
1. Individual equity investors
2. Individual equity investors with an association to an interest   
group such as ShareSoc and UKSA
3. Pension funds
4. Insurance companies
5. Open-ended and closed funds offered to both retail and 
institutional investors
6. Charities, sovereign wealth funds and foundations. 
28 Department for Business Innovation and Skills, Exporing the Intermediated Share-
holding Model, BIS Research Paper 261, available from https://www.gov.uk/govern-
ment/publications/shareholding-the-role-of-intermediaries, for individual investors see 
pages 27- 37; institutional investors are listed on page 86.
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The bargaining power of individual equity investors is limited. 
For institutional investors it is worth pointing out that these are not 
necessarily ultimate investors. For funds, including pension funds, the 
ultimate investors are pensioners and savers. They delegate the adminis-
tration of their assets to trustees or asset managers. They authorise these 
service providers to appoint custodian and accept custody terms at which 
point they connect to custody chains and accept the inherent erosion of 
their rights. The bargaining power of these investors is limited in the 
same way as the power of individual equity investors. 
To restore efficient allocation of resources the law can help overcome 
imbalances in bargaining power. Rules that require custodians to ask for 
the signature of retail investors to be able to engage in lending arrange-
ments are an example of such an intervention. I have pointed out else-
where that even where a retail investor has not explicitly approved such 
transactions, the opacity of the chain and the terms used to authorise 
delegation make it possible for sub-custodians to use retail securities for 
lending.29 The delegation terms referred to above facilitate the erosion of 
legal requirements such as the requirement for a signature. The inves-
tor’s main custodian, having authority to delegate and on terms as they 
think fit, only needs to adequately oversee the one custodian they appoint 
as a sub-custodian. There is no requirement for the investor’s custodian 
to oversee that any arrangements that operate below their immediate 
sub-custodian are in compliance with legal requirements. 
Agency problems
Retail investors who buy funds not only have limited bargaining power, 
they are also exposed to an agency problem. Their connection to the cus-
tody chain is established and managed by asset managers who, in the 
case of pension funds, will have been appointed by trustees. It has been 
pointed out that this structure incorporates multiple agency conflicts.30 
These affect investors as well as issuing companies. Pension trustees and 
asset managers are positioned to analyse and predict the effect of terms 
29 Micheler, above; pages 521-523.
30 Alicia Davis Evans, ‘A requiem for the retail investor?’ (2009) 95 Virginia Law Review 
1105; Kathryn Judge, ‘Intermediary Influence’, (2015) The University of Chicago Law 
Review 573; Ronald J Gilson and Jeffrey N Gordon, ‘The agency cost of agency capital-
ism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights’ (2013) 113 Colum-
bia Law Review 863.
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of custody contracts in circumstances where their economic effect does 
not concern them individually but is rather borne by investors. In addi-
tion back office is often only an afterthought. It is possible that the agents 
acting for investors focus their attention on the terms that set out invest-
ment decisions and that custody contracts do not receive a sufficient 
amount of scrutiny.  
Tax
It is also worth remembering that investment strategies of both individual 
equity investors and fund based pension investors are also informed by 
taxation. The government subsidises pension investments through tax 
breaks. When all qualifying investments instantly produce a return of 
20% or more in tax savings, investors would be forgiven for placing less 
of a focus on investment return and fees. This would have to be tested 
empirically, but it is possible that government subsidies have the unin-
tended effect of discouraging investors to oversee the financial market 
infrastructure. 
Behavioural explanations
It would be wrong to end the analysis here. Actors are not rational and 
there are several behavioural factors that may help to explain why the 
current infrastructure has emerged. 
In a world of bounded rationality investors are affected by certain 
biases. Some of these may operate here. 
Careful consideration and evaluation of custody terms takes time. 
Human actors are time poor and tend to prioritise short term problems 
and suffer from a bias of underestimating the likelihood of long term 
risks factors materialising. This also applies to those investors who, in 
principle, are able to appreciate the effect contractual terms have on their 
investment. 
Perhaps retail investors accept the currently prevailing outsourcing 
arrangements because they habitually do not invest the time required to 
evaluate the risk associated with current market infrastructure? The BIS 
study provides some empirical evidence pointing towards the conclusion 
that the investment chain and its effect is poorly understood. 
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There are also limitations on the cognitive ability of human actors to 
anticipate problems. It is impossible to anticipate all future events that a 
contract will have to absorb. In addition the human mind has limited ana-
lytical power. Investors or their lawyers are unable to fully appreciate all 
problems that will arise when terms that allow for a sub-custody arrange-
ments are applied in those future events that are foreseeable. Legal like all 
human analysis is limited by past experience. We suffer from a bias that 
assumes that the future will be like the past. It is possible that lawyers who 
advised investors on custody terms before Eckerle and Secure Capital may 
not have place sufficient weight on the question of enforcement. This may 
help to explain why even investors who are rich in time and resources 
would not have been aware of the effects highlighted by these two cases. 
Market failure
A lot more can be and needs to be said about the causes for the current 
infrastructure.31 On the basis of this paper the preliminary conclusion is 
that it is possible that the infrastructure is the product of a market failure. 
Behavioural considerations may explain that investors are unaware of 
nature and scale of custody risk. We can also conclude that even if they 
were aware of them, direct and indirect retail investors do not necessarily 
have the bargaining power to protect themselves through contract law. 
6. The role of technology
I have suggested elsewhere that technology may help to overcome the 
problems currently troubling the infrastructure for securities markets.32 
I continue to believe that computer scientists are able to develop and 
deliver solutions that connect investors better with issuers while at the 
same time ensuring that investors are unaffected by the terms prevailing 
in sub-custody arrangements.33 One example would be to colour/elec-
tronically earmark securities to associate them with individual investors 
or to identify them as securities that must not be subject to lending or 
chargers by sub-custodians. It would seem that this can be done with 
standard database technology. 
31 The custody industry is also highly concentrated and interconnected. On this, see for 
example: Nikolaus Hautsch, Julia Schaumburg and Melanie Schiele, ‘Financial Net-
work Systemic Risk Contributions’ (2015) 19(2) Review of Finance 685.
32 Micheler, above. 
33 Philipp Paech has explored the regulatory reasons that will make it difficult for finan-
cial markets to adopt blockchain/distributed ledger technology.
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To predict the impact of new technology it is worth looking back at the 
effect that technological changes have had in the past. A recent example 
is computerisation in the UK. In many areas of our lives computers have 
provided us with better direct connections. A little more than ten years 
ago the author of this paper used a highly intermediated postal network 
(not to mention the intermediated structure that operated to develop the 
film and print the pictures) to send photographs of her children to family 
members abroad. Now she posts on social media and grandma can and 
does immediately send her likes and comments. 
Yet for securities the arrival of direct and electronic links has coin-
cided with intermediation. Easy direct connections have created a web 
of intermediaries. By providing better links intermediation has become 
easier and the providers of the infrastructure for financial markets have 
used the technology to organise the services that they provide. This is not 
a result that those setting up the computerised settlement system would 
necessarily have predicted.
With blockchain/DTL technology a new method for maintaining 
securities registers has become available. The technology has been said 
to make it possible for trading, clearing and settlement to merge into 
one real time process that does not involve relationships with multiple 
intermediaries. There is no need for separate trading, clearing and settle-
ment venues. There is no exposure to the risk of any one central provider 
failing. Buyer and seller can interact directly with each other. They can 
exchange securities and cash directly and in real time. The cost of securi-
ties settlement could be reduced as a result.34
In terms of user interface not much needs to change. Investors would 
access their portfolio like they are now electronically or through paper 
statements. But while at present they receive part of an asset kept by an 
intermediary who is connected to another intermediary who is con-
nected to yet another intermediary, what they could see in a distributed 
ledger/blockchain environment would be the master record. The same 
could become true on the money side. At present investors view a balance 
of an account held by a bank. In the future their view could be of a master 
record of money held at the central bank. 
34 Evangelos Benos, Rod Garratt and Pedro Gurrola-Perez, ‘The economics of distributed 
ledger technologies for securities settlement’.
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Luke von der Heyde and I have said elsewhere that the providers of 
the incumbent market infrastructure will struggle to fund such a devel-
opment.35 They are limited by the boundaries of their current business 
model.36 
Moreover it is worth observing that a blockchained distributed ledger 
can also be operated on an intermediated basis. Bitcoin is an example.37 
The main Bitcoin blockchain has yet to be hacked. Nevertheless bitcoins 
have been lost and stolen. The vulnerable point are the private keys. These 
are necessary for users to send bitcoins to other users. Like passwords 
these need to be kept safe and can become the subject of a hack. 
In addition not all bitcoin holders download the main bitcoin block-
chain to their computer. For users that are not interested in becoming 
nodes, wallet providers have emerged. These providers connect individ-
uals to the main software. There are two options: hosted and non-hosted 
wallets. The holder of a non-hosted wallet stores her private key: on a 
computer that is connected to the internet (hot storage and perhaps not 
the safest option), on a computer that is not connected to the internet 
(safer but a backup is recommended) or perhaps even on a piece of paper 
that she keeps in a vault or under her mattress (cold storage and the safest 
option?). A hosted wallet is an intermediated option where the client 
does not have access to their private key. At a functional level hosted wal-
lets operate in a way that is similar to intermediated securities. A wallet 
provider promises to hold private keys for users. It is then, of course, 
possible for wallet providers to make too many promises to customers 
and not to have enough private keys. This is what happened in the insol-
vency of Mt Gox where wallet holders discovered a shortfall of bitcoin (or 
better private keys). There is no evidence of wallet chains in the bitcoin 
environment. 
35 Eva Micheler and Luke von der Heyde, ‘Holding, clearing and settling securities 
through blockchain/distributed ledger technology: creating an efficient system by em-
powering investors’, Journal of International Banking and Financial Law (2016) 11 JIB-
FL 652.
36 Evangelos Benos, Rod Garratt and Pedro Gurrola-Perez, ‘The economics of distributed 
ledger technologies for securities settlement.
37 For are more detailed analysis of this see Eva Micheler and Luke von der Heyde, ‘Hold-
ing, clearing and settling securities through blockchain/distributed ledger technology: 
creating an efficient system by empowering investors’, Journal of International Banking 
and Financial Law (2016) 11 JIBFL 652.
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Against this background it is possible to predict that a blockchained 
distributed ledger environment will not necessarily lead to less interme-
diation. 
7. Pointers towards a solution
A situation where investors are exposed to infrastructure risk that they 
are unaware of is unappealing. The current arrangements prevent the 
ultimate bearers of the risk inherent in the infrastructure from effectively 
overseeing this infrastructure. This creates moral hazard for the service 
providers. It has led to a situation where service levels are so poor that 
shortfalls of 30% come to light in the restructuring of blue chip compa-
nies listed in the United States. 
The complexity of the infrastructure also prevents competition. Gov-
ernments need to consider if and how to intervene. This is particularly 
true in circumstances where the government subsidises investments in 
financial markets. 
The solution to the problems analysed in this paper is remarkably 
simple. To avoid the diluting effect of custody chains investors can reject 
certain delegation clauses and opt to hold assets directly. This can be done 
for the domestic UK market without a change of the current framework. 
Custodians sometimes point out that direct holdings are more costly. This 
argument had significant force when securities were held through nego-
tiable paper certificates. Individual holdings required a manual sorting 
process. It has less force in an electronic environment. Is it possible that 
a chain of accounts maintained by several service providers, who all have 
a cost base, need to comply with regulation and pay their shareholders, 
can be provided at a lower cost than one electronic account maintained 
by one provider? 
Disclosure of who the sub-custodians are and on what terms they 
operate will help investors who are rich in time and resources and who 
have the bargaining power to operate a strategy that is rational if only in a 
bounded way. It will put the ball in the court of pension trustees and asset 
managers who in light of the relatively recent case are well advised to take 
a closer look at the custody contracts they accept on behalf of investors. 
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Disclosure, however, does not assist investors who are time and 
resource poor nor those with limited bargaining power. Rules that limit 
the contractual freedom of custodians would help from this perspective. 
This strategy has been applied in relation to AIF and UCITS where in cer-
tain circumstances custodians bear the risk associated with outsourcing 
custody. I do not have space here to say more about this. I have shown 
elsewhere that the current rules have been drafted in a way that gives 
them limited effect.38 It may be worth revisiting these. 
At present the law does not limit the ability of custodians to seek 
authority for out-sourcing.39 This has created a situation where any provi-
sion - including those that are required by law to have a signature - that is 
contained in the investor’s custody contract can be eroded by delegation. 
Perhaps we need to limit the ability of custodians to outsource at their 
convenience? Perhaps we need to give up on the idea that custody chains 
supply property rights? Maybe computerisation has made delegation so 
easy and lending has made it so attractive that property rights in interme-
diated securities no longer exist? 
Regulators could also intervene at an operational level requiring com-
puter systems in custody chains to operate on the basis of an earmarking 
facility. Earmarking of client assets along the custody chain should cer-
tainly be part of any new technological solution. 
One important point needs to be made from the perspective of policy 
making. Policy makers tend to consult with market participants through 
an open tender process. They invite all to contribute. This works well 
for the custody industry. They are well funded and organised. They can 
research and articulate their points with a high degree of sophistication. 
This makes it possible for service providers to be over-represented in 
policy making processes. The phenomenon of intermediary influence has 
been observed across a number of areas of the financial services indus-
try.40 One example is worth mentioning here. The Legal Certainty Group, 
which assisted the European Commission in developing legislation for 
intermediated securities, had a significant number of representatives 
38 Micheler, above; pages 528-530.
39 Micheler, above; pages 512-513.
40 Kathryn Judge, ‘Intermediary Influence’, (2015) The University of Chicago Law Review 
573.
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from custodians/law firms advising the custody industry. They also had 
independent experts including academics. It did not have any member, 
however, that was associated with a shareholder association or an associ-
ation of pension fund trustees.41 Perhaps regulators need to adopt a more 
proactive approach on consultation and reach out beyond the custody 
industry, the legal profession and academia to facilitate contributions 
from individuals who are closer to the retail perspective. 
My thinking on this is not yet fully developed but let me conclude 
by saying that it may be worth rethinking this area at a more funda-
mental level. Perhaps custodians by participating in lending markets are 
becoming increasingly similar to banks? Perhaps we have reached a point 
in time where client asset rules no longer suffice to ensure financial sta-
bility in the sector? 
41 http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=groupDetail.groupDe-
tail&groupID=1444.
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AN INTRODUCTION TO FINTECH
Andrei Kirilenko
Introduction
Digital technologies have fundamentally changed such service industries 
as communication, travel, hospitality, entertainment, and retail trade. 
The financial service industry is next. For a long time, customers used 
to be loyal to traditional financial institutions because they thought that 
bigger institutions were safer. However, the soundness of traditional pro-
viders of financial services has been questioned after the global financial 
crisis. The crisis began in the US subprime mortgage market in 2007, 
then turned into a full-blown global banking crisis in 2008 and 2009, 
and was followed by a massive regulatory overhaul of the global financial 
system during 2010-2012 that continued into 2016.  
While dealing with the crisis and its regulatory aftermath, financial 
institutions of all shapes and colors, but especially massive global banks 
were too busy trying to survive and failed to internalize three para-
digm-changing digital technologies. These three digital technologies— 
cloud computing, mobile phones, and blockchain—were all released 
during 2006-2008 and made it possible for a swarm of tiny companies to 
offer modern, cost-effective, and secure solutions across the whole spec-
trum of financial services, including opening and managing accounts, 
obtaining loans, facilitating payments and transfers, trading securities, 
and getting investment advice, to name a few. 
Financial services built on new technologies from scratch ended up 
being way slicker, faster and cheaper, yet often more reliable and secure 
than those offered by the incumbent financial institutions. Technology 
investors smelled a new opportunity and channeled loads of funds and 
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“mentoring” advice into hundreds of Fintech startups in the hope that 
one of them will become the next Google, Amazon or Facebook of 
finance. London emerged as the Fintech capital of the world because it 
was the first to really put the global financial crisis behind and get down 
to business of serving customers using new technologies.
Algorithmic Trading and Cloud Computing
In the modern trading environment, a trading strategy is typically exe-
cuted by one or several algorithms. Such algorithms are responsible for 
the initiation of trading instructions, communication with one or more 
trading platforms, the processing of market data, and the confirmation 
of trades. 
Cloud computing was first offered to the public by Amazon in 2006. 
Cloud computing allows for the use of computing power and memory 
capacity on demand via access to remote servers. Cloud computing 
service has dramatically lowered the barriers of entry into algorithmic 
trading and made it much more democratic and competitive. Prior to 
the availability of cloud computing, development and operation of algo-
rithmic trading strategies required significant spending on the acquisi-
tion and maintenance of computing power and memory capacity. With 
cloud computing, small teams of quantitative traders could focus on the 
development of strategies and only use computing power and memory 
capacity when needed. The use of open source programming languages 
like Python and the widespread availability of historical market data at 
very low prices further lowered barriers to entry into algorithmic trading.
Using cloud computing, a number of companies, including Quanto-
pian, Quantsketch, and Quantconnect are offering open API platforms 
for the design and use of algorithmic trading strategies. For a small fee or 
a possibility of revenue sharing, these platforms provide a wide range of 
financial and non-financial data, block of code, a back testing engine, risk 
management layers, and some optimal execution solutions. With this an 
individual or a small team can start a quant fund from scratch right away.
At the same time, technology that supersedes human abilities often 
brings unintended consequences, and algorithmic trading is no excep-
tion. While technology has advanced tremendously over the last decade, 
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human cognitive abilities have been largely unchanged over the last sev-
eral millennia. Thus, due to the very success of technological advances 
in trading, humans have been pushed to the periphery of a much faster, 
larger, and more complex trading environment.
Originally, algorithmic trading came with the promise of using 
faster and cheaper technologies to drastically lower execution costs and 
improve price discovery for fundamental market participants. For small 
infrequent investors who want to buy or sell one hundred shares of a stock 
or a couple of futures contracts, this promise seems to have been realized 
– they can trade at narrower bid-ask spreads, greater market depth, and 
prices that can be discovered around the clock. For everyone else, market 
quality has become an ongoing concern. High frequency and low latency 
traders take advantage of anyone trying to trade in size. Liquidity is being 
fragmented into divergent pools operating under different matching pro-
tocols. And flash events rattle major markets on a regular basis. 
These concerns have been met with a wide range of proposed policy 
and regulatory responses: do nothing; impose additional safeguards; 
change the rules regarding who can be a designated intermediary 
and what responsibilities this designation entails; force all trading on 
exchanges to occur at fixed discrete intervals of time; or, instead of tink-
ering with market structure just introduce a tax on financial transactions.
In fact, all of these regulatory and policy proposals are addressing 
the only the symptoms of a much deeper problem – the fact that global 
financial regulatory framework has become antiquated and obsolete in 
the face of rapid technological advances that drastically reduced costs 
to intermediation, but have not correspondingly increased or distributed 
the benefits of greater immediacy. 
What’s needed is Financial Regulation 2.0 – a set of cyber-centric 
regulatory principles that promote transparency, enable the creation of 
additional risk safeguards, and encourage the implementation of risk 
management processes and workflows that allow human knowledge to 
complement the computational abilities of machines, especially as the 
use of machines in trading has become so widespread.
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Mobile money and digital payments 
Digital communication makes it possible for an e-mail to reach any 
address on the Internet within seconds and at no cost. A question then 
arises as to why it takes several days and costs tens of dollars, euros or 
pounds to send electronic payments, which presumably go over the same 
networks as e-mail and text messages. 
This is the area where a number of commercial solutions and proto-
cols have already been offered and some of them have succeeded. Exam-
ples of the latter include Alibaba (groups payment platform), ApplePay 
(contactless mobile payments), Google Wallet (peer-to-peer payments), 
M-Pesa (mobile money transfer), Stripe (an app to accept payments) and 
others.
Payment solutions that offer a much faster speed at a much lower 
cost could have major effects at both micro and macro levels. Remit-
tances may both increase and respond faster at times of stress. Small and 
medium enterprises may be able to receive payments much faster from 
large clients, which would result in fewer emergency credit solutions and 
outright bankruptcies. Fiscal performance may improve as well. 
At the same time, incumbent financial institutions are concerned as 
they notice that within mobile and digital solutions offered by the Fintech 
challenges, it is the challengers who create the customer experience and 
collect customer data. Meanwhile, established institutions operating tare 
stuck with paying for operating the “pipes” and shouldering the regula-
tory burden, while dealing with much-compressed fees. 
Furthermore, application of digital technologies to payments may 
enable malicious behavior at a much higher speed and of a much larger 
scope. Data breaches that result in stolen identities and unauthorized 
access to accounts happen very fast and take days if not months to miti-
gate, nearly always at a loss. Optimal solutions on speed versus protection 
would need to involve the customers, providers of services, and regula-
tory authorities.
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Cryptocurrencies and Distributed Ledger Technology 
Distributed ledger technology also knows as blockchain enables the cre-
ation and sharing of a chain of records that are so well protected by cryp-
tographic technology that they cannot be altered. This technology is open 
to anyone to use, based on proven cryptographic principles, easily imple-
mentable and truly global. It has the potential to be applied in a multitude 
of ways including clearing and settlement, recordkeeping, market design, 
trade finance, borrowing and lending to name a few.
A blockchain is really a computer: a finite-state machine. Currently, 
it is not a very good computer. It is very slow – it takes minutes to com-
plete a change of state. It is not exact – the change of state is probabilistic. 
It is also very expensive – it uses a lot of power to complete a change of 
state. Yet, it is a truly global computer that does not reside in any par-
ticular physical or virtual machine. And – crucially – it allows anony-
mous users to share their private computing power and memory capacity 
for a reward.
Many such computers currently exist: Bitcoin, Ethereum, and Ripple, 
to name a few. Reminiscent of the earliest computers, such as ENIAC 
(Electronic Numerical Integrator and Computer), they are not very good 
finite-state machines; they are more like calculators than computers. The 
biggest problem with ENIAC was that it was not designed to store both 
data and program in memory, so any additional operation had to start 
with reloading the original data along with the execution code.
In contrast, a blockchain relies on the brilliant concept of object-ori-
ented programming. The main premise of object-oriented programming 
is that both data and execution code are stored together in the same place, 
which is called an object. For example, an object in Bitcoin or Ethereum 
blockchain consists of data (user profile) and code (commands to send 
and receive payments). And – most importantly – objects have IDs, but 
once they are created, what’s inside them can be kept completely anon-
ymous and immutable – a black box. Originally this was done to reduce 
the number of bugs in the code, so an object could not be mistakenly 
altered by a sloppy programmer. 
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But what engineers have created to keep the code reliable had been 
rediscovered after the global financial crisis in a much more general 
incarnation – trust. One of the definitions of trust is a “firm belief in the 
reliability, truth, or ability of someone or something”. This is exactly what 
financial institutions have lost after asking to be rescued with hundreds 
of billions of taxpayers’ money, but what objected-oriented programming 
provides by its very design.
Here is how it works. Once an object is defined, it is only allowed 
to do things that are defined by its communication interface – messages 
that it can send to or receive from other objects. For Bitcoin or Ethereum 
blockchains, messages are transactions. Transactions involve the 
exchange of “value” quantified in cryptotokens or cryptocurrencies like, 
for example, Bitcoin. Transactions then become available for “mining.” 
Mining involves solving a crypto “hash” puzzle – a Sudoku-type exercise 
that’s very difficult to complete (that’s why it takes minutes), but easy to 
check. Thousands of competitive miners use “gigahashes” of computing 
effort to brute-force their way through these puzzles in the expectation 
of getting valuable rewards. Mining a single transaction is typically not 
rewarding enough, so each miner composes several transactions into a 
block and then mines that block.
As miners compete, often several of them arrive at a solution at about 
the same time. When that happens, there is a need to achieve consensus 
among the miners about who exactly mined the last block and, thus, who 
gets to keep the reward. This consensus protocol is also what makes the 
change of state probabilistic – the state of a blockchain gets modified as 
another block is “sealed” and attached to the chain, but which miner’s 
solution to the crypto hash puzzle – and, thus, which transactions end up 
being included in the next block – is not known in advance. This is why 
blockchain is a probabilistic finite-state machine.
This is how the trust in a blockchain comes from its native object-ori-
ented architecture. Users inside objects can remain anonymous; they 
do not need to know or “trust” each other. Transactions between them 
only execute if it is confirmed that the users possess the funds that they 
claim they do. There is no need for “trusted” gatekeepers, validators or 
reconcilers. The processing of transactions and the validation of blocks is 
outsourced to a distributed network of fiercely competitive miners, who 
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hack their way through crypto hash puzzles to chain blocks together for a 
reward, which they receive in the form of crypto tokens – irrespective of 
the identities of the users.
To sum up, a blockchain is a quite trustworthy, but not a very good, 
computer. ENIAC was also not a very good computer in 1946; yet we 
know how fundamentally computers have changed the world since. So, 
the question is: Does blockchain have the potential to fundamentally 
change computer-based economic interactions by connecting buyers and 
sellers of computing resources?
There are still major issues that need to be resolved for the blockchain 
to really become a mature, scalable technology. For example, operation 
of public, fully open blockchain requires a significant amount of energy 
being spent by computers conducting certain brute force calculations 
that are supposed to make an attack on the blockchain impossibly costly. 
However, all this energy is effectively being wasted. Solutions to this 
problem include changing the governance protocol of a blockchain from 
fully public to permissioned. This reduces the possibility of an attack on 
the blockchain, but, at the same time, introduces other IT architecture 
and governance issues.
Furthermore, cryptocurrencies, which are an integral part of block-
chain technology, have attracted additional attention. There have been a 
number of privately issued digital monies, most well known of which is 
Bitcoin. Central banks and regulators around the world have also been 
laying the groundwork for the issuance of central-bank issued digital 
currencies. Various technologies are rapidly changing what is considered 
valuable in the digital space and what regulators might support.
Fintech in a Broader Context
The rise of Fintech manifests a structural shift in the financial services 
industry. It is driven by a confluence of several factors. The first factor 
is the availability of paradigm-changing digital technologies right at the 
time when financial institutions were in survival mode after the global 
financial crisis. Cloud computing, mobile phones and the blockchain are 
designed as digitally-native technologies with the Moore’s Law built in 
from the very start. 
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The second factor is the growing dissatisfaction of customers with the 
experience they get from the providers of financial services compared to 
they experience provided by technology firms. Financial services built 
on new technologies from scratch ended up being way slicker, faster and 
cheaper, yet often more reliable and secure than those offered by the 
incumbent financial institutions (think of your life before and after the 
smartphone). 
The third factor is the availability of ample financing for Fintech com-
panies in a zero-interest-rate environment by investors seeking both the 
return and risk properties of technology start-ups in the financial services 
industry. Over the last several years, technology investors have channeled 
billions of dollars and loads of valuable advice into hundreds of Fintech 
startups in the hope that one of them will become the Google, Amazon or 
Facebook of finance. London emerged as the Fintech capital of the world 
because it was the first to really put the global financial crisis behind and 
get down to business. And then Brexit happened.
The outcome of the Brexit referendum also takes us back to the finan-
cial crisis. The financial crisis, which was preceded by political denial 
and followed by taxpayer bailouts, led to a worldwide rollback of liberal 
free-market policies. These policies were replaced by global economic 
interventionism and national political populism. In the UK the main 
such populist gesture was the political decision to hold a referendum 
on whether Britain should continue to remain in or leave the European 
Union (EU), which gave rise to Brexit.
Irrespective of how they voted in the Brexit referendum though, pretty 
much everyone in the UK, Europe and the rest of the world has been 
living through the digital revolution. Past industrial revolutions relied on 
mathematical thinking, linguistic interpretation and logical reasoning. 
The digital revolution we are living through right now relies on computa-
tional thinking, digital representation and algorithmic reasoning. 
Yet, the dominant majority of people who currently work in the UK 
financial services industry were not educated in these skills when they 
went to universities. It was not through any fault of their own. They paid 
for and received training that allowed them to conduct financial services 
tasks that have been in the firm purview of human operators for hundreds 
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of years. However, over the last decade, these tasks became essentially 
data processing operations, which increased the economic value of dig-
ital technologies. At first, digital technologies provided human support 
functions (think of an Excel spreadsheet), but over the last decade dig-
ital technologies, for which data processing tasks are native have become 
better and cheaper processors of information required to make financial 
decisions than the humans.
This is not a trend that’s likely to reverse. To stay competitive, humans 
operating in the financial services sector must prove their superior eco-
nomic value with respect to managing data flows and conducting data 
processing tasks. To do that humans will need to be educated quite dif-
ferently than they are now. Meanwhile, paraphrasing Georg Lichtenberg, 
the witty experimental physicist from 18th century, we cannot say whether 
Fintech and Brexit will change how many people will be working in the 
UK financial services sector; what we can say is that those people must 
change if they are to persevere through Fintech and Brexit. 
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Keynote Speech
DEBT AS MONEY: IMPLICATIONS FOR 
FINANCIAL STABILITY
Jean-Pierre Landau
We live in a period when the economic and political discourse is domi-
nated by debt. The financial crisis was caused by an accumulation of debt. 
The current regime of low growth is frequently attributed to some debt 
overhang and the unwinding of a ‘debt super cycle’. Debt fuels anxiety and 
erodes confidence. Debt also amplifies existing concerns on fairness and 
income distribution. Political compromises on fiscal adjustments become 
more difficult to reach and, overall, the willingness to repay debts dimin-
ishes as the amounts accumulate. 
It easy to forget, in such an environment, the role that public debt 
plays in developed financial systems. Government bonds are backed by 
the power to tax and, therefore, are uniquely placed to park and transfer 
wealth from one period (or one generation) to another. They fulfill an 
essential function as the ultimate riskless asset. In addition, the debt 
markets of advanced economies are the most liquid in the world and, 
for the short end of the curve, treasury bills act as very close substitutes 
to money. Only some government bonds of advanced economies jointly 
possess these two characteristics: safety and liquidity.
The safety and liquidity attributes of sovereign debt are increasingly 
emphasized in academic and market literature. In parallel, a policy debate 
on the debt regimes is developing, with many policymakers promoting 
state contingent – easy to restructure – debt. Those two debates are dis-
connected from each other. Although this is not infrequent, it may lead to 
difficulties down the road. The purpose of this paper is to try and connect 
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the two debates, illustrate the tradeoffs, and draw some preliminary con-
clusions regarding the policy implications. 
The functions of public debt
The primary function of sovereign debt is to help financing the govern-
ment. Public budgets are not always in a balance, nor should they be. It 
makes sense to let the budget fluctuate with the economic cycle as part of 
the so-called automatic stabilizer effect. This introduces a cyclical element 
into the dynamics of public debt, which, in principle, ultimately cancels 
out. Debt may also exhibit an increasing trend beyond the cycle. This may 
be virtuous, if debt efficiently serves as tool for inter-generational transfer. 
Debt may also increase as a result of shocks, as happened in most advanced 
economies following the financial crisis. Debt to GDP ratios have risen 
significantly, fueling concerns about debt sustainability. 
It is also important to look at public debt from the point of view of its 
holders. Public debt in most advanced economies is perceived as liquid 
and safe - a concept that will be further refined later. As such, it can serve 
both as a medium of exchange and a store of value. It plays a crucial role 
in the financial system in helping to provide and allocate liquidity, thereby 
eliminating financial frictions. 
Public debt underpins and supports a great number of transactions 
between financial intermediaries. Short-term debt is almost a perfect sub-
stitute to cash and banks’ reserves held by the central bank. Both short 
and long-term public debt serve as collaterals in money markets (repos) 
and derivatives transactions. A repo is a ‘debt on debt’. Public debt ‘is vital 
to the functioning of the financial system, analogous to the function of 
money in the real economy’ (Coeuré). Because it is essential to transac-
tions between financial intermediaries, the need – and demand – for public 
debt structurally grows as financial intermediation shifts from banks to the 
non-bank sector.
Safe public debt also serves as a reliable store of value. By holding 
public debt, economic agents can protect themselves against economic and 
financial shocks. Debt allows to safely transfer value across periods and 
generations. It also eliminates financial frictions linked to liquidity. Agents 
are liquidity-constrained to the extent that they cannot pledge their future 
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income in order to obtain money at the present time. Public debt allevi-
ates this constraint: ‘increased government borrowing can benefit [them], 
insofar as they effectively receive a highly liquid asset, government debt, 
in exchange for giving the government an increased claim on their future 
income [...] A higher public debt, insofar as it implies a higher propor-
tion of liquid assets in private sector wealth, increases the flexibility of the 
private sector in responding to variations in both income and spending 
opportunities, and so can increase economic efficiency.’ (Woodford)
So, inside and outside the financial system, public debt carries two 
main attributes of money: its ability to serve as a medium of exchange and 
a store of value. There is an element of ‘moneyness’ in (safe) public debt. It 
is especially true for short-term debt but also exists for longer maturities 
(through collateralization). Government debt is the money used inside the 
financial system to underpin or effect transactions. And, just as money, it 
serves to all economic agents to safely park their wealth. 
Consequently, there is a ‘demand for debt’ akin to the demand for 
money. That demand is independent of the needs of the borrower or the 
intrinsic characteristics of debt, as long as it can be considered safe. In 
particular, short term safe instruments appear to carry a money premium 
(sometimes called a convenience yield) that lowers their yield: ‘That pre-
mium stems from their liquid, short term and safe nature – their mon-
ey-like attributes.’ (Del Negro et al.)
While debt is instrumental in allocating liquidity and capital, it is not 
the purpose nor the function of debt to share and distribute risk. There is 
an inherent contradiction in the concept of ‘risky’ debt. It is in the nature 
of debt, as opposed to equity, that its nominal payoff should be stable and 
predictable. Obviously, there is always the possibility that the borrower is 
unable to meet its obligations and defaults (i.e. the credit risk). There is 
also the possibility that higher-than-expected inflation might reduce the 
real value of the stream of cash flows associated to debt. Those risks cannot 
be eliminated: to some extent, all debt is risky by nature. The question is: 
should it be risky by design? Should the structure of debt contracts make it 
ex-ante easier, or more difficult, to restructure of default according to cir-
cumstances? In that case, there would be an element of equity embedded 
into debt instruments. Would it be desirable from a financial stability point 
of view? This is the question at the center of this paper. 
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Should debt be designed as risky? 
There is a long history of international efforts to create risky – state con-
tingent – sovereign debt instruments and associated procedures. That 
approach has inspired the ill-fated Sovereign Debt Reduction Mechanism 
(SDRM) and the generalization of Collective Action Clauses (CACs) in 
sovereign debt. It also partially drives the current G2O agenda, as well as 
IMF work on debt sustainability. It offers numerous advantages.
1. It fosters market discipline. In the ideal model of efficient finan-
cial markets, it is desirable that risk is permanently reflected in 
the price of debt and the interest rate. Risk premia make it more 
(or less) costly to issue new debt and create incentives for the 
Sovereign to adjust if necessary. A debt regime that allows for 
easy default also imposes burden sharing on imprudent lenders. 
2. It avoids moral hazard. To the extent that it comes from (explicit 
or implicit) guarantees given by a credible third parties, safety 
creates asymmetric incentives: the beneficiary Sovereign has no 
incentive to ensure fiscal soundness and sustainability. Those 
considerations of moral hazard are central to the debate on the 
treatment of Sovereign debt in the Euro area.
3. Only, if debt is risky can the independence of monetary policy be 
assured in all circumstances. Over the last decades, all advanced 
(and most emerging) economies have adopted a monetary 
regime based on the independence of central banks. This regime 
relies on the ability of central banks to control effectively infla-
tion and, more significantly, on the perception that they will be 
able to do so in all circumstances. Such ‘monetary dominance’ 
implies that fiscal policy can always be adjusted to meet the gov-
ernment’s inter-temporal budget constraints, whatever action 
the central bank may have to take. With moderate levels of debt, 
there is no doubt that fiscal authority will meet that constraint. 
When public debt reaches high levels there is more uncertainty. 
First, high primary surpluses are needed, which may prove diffi-
cult or even impossible to achieve. Second, any monetary tight-
ening, in the form of higher interest rates, will aggravate the debt 
service burden and make it less likely that the budget constraint 
will be met (the so-called ‘unpleasant monetary arithmetic’). At 
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very high debt levels, there is no ‘state of the world’ where both 
the budget constraint and the objective of price stability can 
be satisfied simultaneously. Long-run inconsistencies between 
monetary and fiscal constraints will result in either inflation or 
sovereign default. So, if a default is excluded, ‘fiscal dominance’ 
on monetary policy becomes a real possibility. The existence of 
such a dilemma might be sufficient to trigger expectations of 
future inflation which, in turn, could translate into higher infla-
tion today.
4. Finally, sovereign default acts as an insurance against shocks 
because, under pre-defined conditions, it engineers a transfer 
of resources from the lenders to the sovereign debtor. GDP 
index-linked bonds are specifically designed for that purpose, as 
an instrument to share the economic risk between resident tax 
payers and foreign investors. 
It should be noted, however, that alternative mechanisms for coun-
tries to insure against economic or financial contingencies do exist. One 
of them consists in accumulating buffers in the form of assets that can be 
liquidated and drawn upon in case of adverse shocks. When debt is held 
by non-residents, foreign exchange reserves play specifically that role. 
There is one striking difference between advanced and emerging econo-
mies: while advanced economies do not hold much of foreign reserves, all 
emerging economies keep accumulating them. This behavior contributes 
to increasing the demand for safe debt issued by advanced countries. By 
acting this way, countries ‘reveal’ their preferences and those are indic-
ative of the subjective costs associated by borrowers with debt default. 
Should debt be designed as safe? 
It is difficult to make a case for debt to be safe when it is considered only 
as a funding instrument. The case becomes much stronger when debt is 
viewed as a financial asset and a store of value, for which there is a specific 
– and growing – demand. 
The evidence for a growing trend for the demand of safe debt comes 
from three sources. 
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First, the evolution of regulatory requirements since the financial 
crisis. Banks are now required to hold ‘high quality’ assets to meet their 
liquidity ratios. New rules also demand that most derivatives contracts 
be cleared and settled through CCPs, which would likely increase the 
demand for collateral, especially in times of stress. 
Second, contemporary events illustrate the inflexibility of the demand 
for safe assets. US authorities implemented in 2016 a reform of money 
market funds (MMF) whose central piece was the compulsory intro-
duction of a floating net asset value (NAV) for ‘prime funds’. Holders of 
shares in those funds became exposed to possible nominal losses. After 
the reform was enacted, those funds registered an outflow of 1 trillion 
US dollars. Placements were mostly redeployed towards funds that still 
guaranteed full redemption value. 
 
Finally, an important body of recent research documents strong reg-
ular patterns in the demand for safe assets (both privately and publicly 
issued) over several decades. According to Gorton et al. (2012), ‘the 
share of safe assets in the U.S. economy, including both U.S. Treasury 
debt and privately-created near-riskless debt has remained constant as a 
percentage of all U.S. assets since 1952.’ Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jor-
gensen (2012) demonstrate an inverse relationship between privately and 
publicly issued safe debt with private debt expanding or retreating as if to 
offset the movements in public debt. 
Looking forward, a good rule of thumb to predict the demand for safe 
assets would incorporate three components: 
• a constant share of safe assets in overall financial portfolios over 
the very long run; 
• a trend increase in the ratio of financial wealth to GDP; 
• cyclical or temporary fluctuations in the demand for safe assets 
depending on risk aversion - with possible ‘jumps’ triggered, for 
instance, by regulatory changes. 
Together, those demand dynamics require a supply of safe assets that 
would be growing (in % of GDP) and sufficiently ‘elastic’ to meet tempo-
rary surges or decreases in the use of safe assets in the financial system.
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How would the economy adjust if the evolution of safe public debt 
does not parallel the need and demand for safe assets, therefore creating 
a ‘shortage’? From a financial stability perspective, several potential dan-
gers and dilemmas would arise. 
The first relates to the prevalence of risky public debt in the financial 
system. Risky debt carries uncertainty on its future payoff and higher risk 
premia, being therefore more costly to issue. More importantly, however, 
uncertainty creates the possibility of multiple equilibriums. In times of 
trouble, sovereigns – like financial institutions – can be either illiquid, 
insolvent, or both. In many cases, the distinction is blurred. There is a 
substantial endogeneity  in the way markets assess sovereign risk. For 
instance, the sole perception of insolvency can create insolvency, because 
it leads to an increase in risk premia and, ultimately, to unsustain-
able interest rate levels. When uncertainty is high, sovereigns also face 
liquidity shortages, as expiring debt may be difficult to roll over. They 
can only issue new debt at constantly higher interest rates. In turn, higher 
interest rates create doubts on solvency, triggering a spiral of increasing 
interest rates and illiquidity. The interaction of credit and liquidity risk 
creates powerful feedback loops that may destabilize the financial system. 
A shortage of safe assets may also be conducive to overall financial 
fragility as it would encourage the (ultimately unsafe) production of (per-
ceived) safe assets by the private sector. The search for safe ‘parking spaces’ 
may lead to an unrestricted demand for assets whose value is perceived 
as protected, hence fueling bubbles and creating financial fragility. The 
abovmentioned inverse relationship between the production of public 
and private safe assets validates this assumption. The 2008-2009 finan-
cial crisis is widely attributed to misguided attempts by private financial 
intermediaries to manufacture risk free assets through the structuration 
and securitization of housing loans. 
There is a deep logic in this process, which may lead to a repetition 
of crises in the future, albeit in different forms. The economy ‘demands’ 
safe assets, because it also ‘demands’ maturity and risk transformation. 
With an abundance of safe assets, that transformation can be achieved 
with minimum fragility. If there is shortage, the system will adjust and 
produce less safe short term assets, at the price of an increased fragility. 
Greenwood et al. (2016) have proposed to use that complementarity 
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between private and public safe assets as a tool for financial stability 
interventions: by issuing public safe assets that would crowd out private 
ones, the government could enhance the robustness of financial interme-
diation when necessary. 
Finally, a shortage could prompt central banks to step in and produce 
– or facilitate the production of – safe assets. For instance, the purchase 
of private bonds or mortgage-backed securities (MBS) from the private 
sector amount to swapping a safe asset (Banks’ reserves) for a risky one, 
thereby increasing the net supply of the former. In the Euro area, the so 
called Target II balances (which are held by National Central Banks at the 
ECB and used to settle payments between then) usually expand in times 
of uncertainty. This occurs because private financial intermediaries are 
using their accounts at the central banks – rather than private bilateral 
ones – to settle cross border transactions. By offering an elastic supply of 
safe payment instruments, the Target II system immunizes cross border 
payment flows from episodes or risk aversion. Central banks may also 
want, by guaranteeing the liquidity of Sovereign bond markets, to elimi-
nate roll over risks and increase the perceived safety of public debt
While most of those interventions remain somehow contentious, 
they will likely remain debated in the future as central banks consider 
the exit from Quantitative Easing and the future size and shape of their 
balance sheets. 
What makes debt ‘safe’? 
There are many definitions of safe assets. Significantly, market practi-
tioners tend to have different views from professional economists. In 
short, safety can be seen as ‘relative’ or ‘absolute’. In the first case, there 
is a continuum of mutually-substitutable assets, with increasing level of 
risk and spreads adjusting to changes in fundamentals and risk percep-
tions. Most market participants would take such a view and show some 
skepticism toward the concept of a pure ‘safe’ asset. They also take an 
optimistic vision of the equilibrium mechanism, where relative prices 
of assets would adjust so as to satisfy the equally relative aspiration to 
safety. 
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Economists tend to take another view, where safety is ‘absolute.’ An 
asset (or debt) is either safe or risky. Safe assets are not substitutes to any 
other category. Imbalances between supply and demand trigger adjust-
ments in other markets (i.e. assets and good). An ‘asset shortage’ there-
fore has direct macroeconomic consequences.
The validity of each approach may depend on the overall environ-
ment. In tranquil times, the relative view may be valid. In periods of 
increased financial frictions, there is a ‘flight to quality’: asset substitut-
ability diminishes, arbitrage is constrained and safety becomes more 
absolute. Consequently, the distinction between safe and unsafe assets 
becomes starker. 
Among economists themselves, there is a plurality of definitions. The 
most appropriate when looking at financial stability implications has 
been developed by Dang et al. (2009). For a safe asset to provide a reli-
able store of value, its value (and payoffs) must remain the same in all (or 
most) states of the world. A safe asset is therefore ‘information insensi-
tive’. Its value does not change in reaction to ‘news’ about the economy 
or the issuer’s solvency 
Debt is especially suited to meet that requirement of information 
insensitivity, as its payoff is predictable and fully determined in most 
states of the world. The following graph is reproduced from Holmstrom 
(2012). It shows the payoff of a debt instrument in relation with the 
intrinsic value of the underlying claim or asset. Most of the states of the 
world are in the ‘information insensitive’ region: the lender is certain to 
get paid back whatever happens to the economy and the borrower. On 
the left of the ‘default boundary’, however, debt becomes ‘information 
sensitive’: since the value of the underlying asset is too low, the borrower 
may default and any information becomes extremely relevant.
Dang et al. (2009) and Holmstrom (2015) emphasize one major ben-
efit of information insensitivity for the working of money and debt mar-
kets. Information insensitivity is conducive to greater trade and liquidity. 
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When a security (debt) is information insensitive, there is no need or 
incentive for the buyer to incur the costs of price discovery. All episodes 
of illiquidity in debt and money markets have been brought by surges in 
information asymmetry: when one side of the trade knows more than 
the other about the underlying value of the security, exchanges come 
to a halt. The standard response to those liquidity freezes is to increase 
transparency and reestablish information symmetry. Dang et al. demon-
strate that there is another way: eliminating any need for information by 
exchanging securities that are information insensitive. This is why ‘igno-
rance is bliss.’ Both the buyer and seller possess the same (zero) degree 
of information relative to the underlying value. There is no information 
asymmetry. 
Safety, coordination of beliefs, and commitment
As developed in previous sections, financial market participants and 
intermediaries hold (sovereign) debt for the same reasons and motives 
that they hold money: as a store of liquid value. Just as for money, 
‘backing’ is not essential when the decision to hold debt is made. Money 
is not held because it is backed by any tangible or in tangible assets or by 
flows of income. Each participant in the economy believes that money 
will be accepted as a medium of exchange in the future. The same is true 
for debt as long as it is considered as safe. To some extent, safe assets 
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of those we decide should be safe. ‘Admittedly, the definition is partly 
self-referential. In the end, assets are just as safe as they are expected to 
be and as a consequence they are prone to abrupt shifts in confidence’ 
(Coeuré). 
While safety results from a coordination of beliefs (in addition to 
fundamentals), it becomes fragile when that coordination breaks down. 
Even a solvent borrower may be stricken by coordination failures, for 
instance if some lenders start to have doubts and trigger a ‘run on the 
debt’. Solvency is therefore not ‘absolute.’ It can be seen as depending 
on three parameters: the intrinsic creditworthiness of the borrower, the 
state of the economy, and the coordination of beliefs. Because of possible 
multiple equilibriums, the interaction between those three parameters is 
essential.
Commitments are very important: a credible commitment to pay back 
debt in full has positive effects on financial stability, because it reduces 
the probability of coordination failures. Looking at the graph above, a 
credible commitment can be seen as reducing the region of information 
sensitivity by shifting to the left the boundary between the information 
sensitive and insensitive regions. It makes debt safe in a greater number 
of states of the world and, overall, less information sensitive. 
There is, obviously, a trade off. While the region where debt is infor-
mation sensitive becomes smaller, inside that region the value of debt 
moves very strongly with any new information. The slope of the payoff 
curve gets steeper. In fact, it may be that, once the frontier has been 
reached, debt will lose all its value in the eyes of investors. Strong com-
mitments unavoidably come with the tail risk of occasional disruptive 
shocks, if they are ultimately breached. In fact, one can think of several 
examples of fixed exchange rate regimes that collapse, creating huge 
damages to the economy. Commitment should certainly not be seen as a 
substitute to fiscal soundness but, rather, as an instrument to maximize 
the benefits of good fiscal policies and protecting them from exogenous 
financial shocks. 
Authorities can signal their commitments through their actions (in 
this case through fiscal policies) but also, through their willingness to 
accept (or not) a binding legal framework. Commitment depends (par-
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tially) on institutions and debt structure. Legal regimes that make it easy 
to restructure or forgive debt , send a message of weak commitment. 
  Sustainability, therefore, is partly endogenous to the debt regime 
implemented by the authorities. ‘Safety is, in other words, is an outcome 
of an institutional and legal framework.’ (Coeuré). Obviously, the credi-
bility of fiscal consolidation is crucial when debt is high. However other 
policies, such as the legal treatment of debt and the willingness to repay, 
will determine how the fundamentals of debt interact with financial mar-
kets to produce – or not – a sustainable and stable equilibrium. In other 
words, the structure of debt matters. It is a legitimate policy objective to 
aim at a debt structure that would favor a stable coordination of beliefs 
through commitment.
 
If investors are living into a ‘binary’ world, where assets are either 
safe or unsafe, then the debt structure should mirror that distinction 
and create a clear division between safe and unsafe debt. It should also 
minimize the disruptions that would occur when debt suddenly loose 
its safe status as a result of a deterioration of fundamentals or a collapse 
in the coordination of beliefs. Altogether, governments should aim at 
institutions and debt structures that would (1) make default extremely 
hard to trigger, but (2) once triggered make it very easy to implement 
. Current international efforts may go in the opposite direction as they 
seek to make debt more state contingent, while leaving unchanged the 
existing complexity in implementing cross border defaults. If successful, 
those efforts would potentially limit the amount of safe assets available 
in the future. 
The ‘Triffin dilemma’ on public debt
Safe debt is issued by governments. Unless there is overfunding of gov-
ernment needs, the net issuance of debt closely matches government 
deficits. If liquidity needs are high, an important stock of debt is needed. 
But, over time, the stock of public debt – the supply of safe assets – only 
grows if the issuer’s underlying fiscal position deteriorates. The resulting 
tension is described as a ‘Triffin dilemma’: to meet increasing demand for 
safe debt, sovereigns have to run constant deficits. Their solvency deteri-
orates and the safety of the debt can ultimately be compromised. Fiscal 
consolidation will further restrict the net supply of such assets. There is 
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no evading this dilemma as long as safety exclusively depends on scarcity. 
 
A strong commitment, backed by an appropriate debt regime, helps 
to relax, if not eliminate the Triffin dilemma. This happens because, with 
strong and credible commitment, a larger share of the existing debt stock 
may be considered as safe. Put differently, it is possible to issue a greater 
amount of safe debt for the same amount of total debt, without compro-
mising the sovereign’s solvency. 
Debt and the international monetary system 
Debt is central to the workings of the international monetary and finan-
cial system. While equity flows have been important, it is difficult to 
imagine any progress in financial integration that would not mainly be 
based on debt (Obstfeld, 2015). Existing debt regimes have important 
consequences because they determine the conditions for the issuance of 
global safe assets. 
There is, first, a question of stability. In a truly global financial system, 
domestic and foreign assets should be perfect substitutes for all asset 
classes. This is obviously not the case. Since only a few countries can issue 
safe debt and assets, cross-border portfolio flows, especially between dif-
ferent currencies, mainly involve risky securities. This is a major differ-
ence from domestic flows, where safe debt can be exchanged or serve as 
collateral. It is also one reason why, in aggregate, cross-border flows are 
more volatile than domestic ones. 
Another question relates to the symmetry of the system. If one or a 
few countries have a monopoly in the issuance of safe debt, they have 
a dominant influence on overall financial conditions. In periods of ten-
sion, a flight to quality naturally generates capital flows from the risky 
‘periphery’ to the safe ‘center’, exacerbating local liquidity problems and 
balance-of-payments difficulties (Brunnermeier et al. 2016). This has 
been apparent both globally – with outflows from Emerging Economies 
– and inside the euro area. During the euro crisis, the so-called prin-
ciple of private sector involvements (PSI) was decided in October 2010. 
It explicitly made government debt sate contingent, and a large chunk of 
(peripheral) government debt instantly lost its status as a safe asset. 
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Indeed, there is a close relationship between the global discussion and 
the debate taking place inside the euro area on debt structure, especially 
on PSI and the regulatory treatment of sovereign debt held by banks. 
The tensions between the core and the periphery in the Eurozone largely 
mirror those that periodically appear in the international monetary 
system. Both at the regional and global level, it is hard to see how a more 
stable, resilient and symmetric monetary system could emerge from a 
situation where only a couple of countries would issue debt that is con-
sidered as safe. 
For the euro area, in the framework of the Capital Market Union 
(CMU) it should be a primary objective to create safe debt instruments 
that allow robust cross border financial intermediation. Such debt 
instruments should be backed by a geographically diversified portfolio 
of claims. They could be both public (i.e. the European Safe Bonds dis-
cussed earlier) and private . A failure to construct a truly euro-wide safe 
asset would burden the single capital market with a permanent threat of 
disruption and instability
Finally, there is a close relationship between debt and international 
liquidity provision. Safe government debt is the asset in which much of 
foreign exchange reserves are invested. Thus the public component of 
‘global liquidity’ is mainly comprised of debt. A diversification of foreign 
exchange reserves would necessitate that more countries issue safe and 
liquid debt. 
Keynote Speech
49
References 
- Brunnermeier, M.K., Langfield, S., Pagano, M., Reis, R., Van Nieuwerburgh, 
S. and Vayanos, D. (2016) ‘ESBies: Safety in the tranches’, European Systemic 
Risk Board Working Paper, 21.
- Bruno, V. and Shin, H.S. (2015) ‘Capital flows and the risk-taking channel of 
monetary policy’, Journal of Monetary Economics, 71, pp. 119–132
- Coeuré , B, ‘Sovereign debt in the euro area: too safe or too risky?’, 3 November 
2016
- Dang, Tri Vi, Gary Gorton and Bengt Holmström ‘Opacity and the Opti-
mality of Debt for Liquidity Provision’, November 30, 2009
- Del Negro, Marco , Domenico Giannone Marc Giannoni and Andrea Tamba-
lotti, ‘Safety, Liquidity, and the Natural Rate of Interest’, Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York Staff Reports N° 812, May 2017
- Gorton G, Stefan Lewellen, Andrew Metrick, ‘The Safe-Asset Share’, NBER 
Working Paper No. 17777, January 2012
- Greenwood, Robin , Samuel Hanson, and Jeremy C. Stein, ‘The Federal 
Reserve’s Balance Sheet as a Financial-Stability Tool’, September 2016 
- Holmtrom Bengt, ‘The Nature of Liquidity Provision: When Ignorance is 
Bliss’, ASSA Presidential Address, Chicago, January 5, 2012
- Holmstrom, Bengt, ‘Understanding the role of debt in the financial system’, 
BIS Working Papers No 479 - January 2015
- Krishnamurthy Arvind and Annette Vissing-Jorgensen, ‘The Aggregate 
Demand for Treasury Debt’, Journal of Political Economy Vol. 120, No. 2 
(April 2012), pp. 233-267
- Landau, Jean-Pierre, ‘Capital flows, debt and growth: Dilemmas and tradeoffs 
in the global agenda’, Vox.eu - 24 November 2016
- Landau, Jean-Pierre, (2013) ‘Global Liquidity: Public and Private’, in Global 
Dimensions of Unconventional Monetary Policy. Jackson Hole: Federal 
Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pp. 223–259.
- Obstfeld, M. (2015) ‘Trilemmas and tradeoffs: living with financial globalisa-
tion’, BIS Working Papers, 480. 
- Woodford, M, ‘Public Debt as Private Liquidity’, American Economic Review, 
Vol. 80, No. 2, (May, 1990), pp. 382-388
Debt As Money: Implications For Financial Stability - Jean-Pierre Landau
50 Keynote Speech
51
PART II
Regulatory Arbitrage Across 
Jurisdictions 
52 PART I I - Regulatory Arbitrage Across Jurisdictions
53
ENGLISH LAW AND JURISDICTION 
POST BREXIT
Yannis Manuelides1
Introduction
Throughout the United Kingdom’s 44-year membership of the Commu-
nities and Union established by the European treaties, many sectors of 
the UK’s economy have prospered. Few have flourished more than the 
legal profession and legal institutions of England and Wales, one of the 
UK’s three legal jurisdictions2. According to evidence presented to the 
House of Commons Justice Committee “the UK’s legal services sector 
contributes £25.7 billion to the UK economy, generates £3.3 billion in 
annual export revenue and employs some 370,000 people”.3 A survey by 
Portland Legal Disputes on judgements issued by the English commer-
cial court in the 12 months to the end of March 2016 shows that 66% of 
the total number of litigants were foreign nationals, 19.8 % of whom were 
from continental Europe.4 
1 I want to thank the European University Institute (EUI), the Brevan Howard Centre at 
Imperial College and BAFFI CAREFIN at Bocconi University and in particular Frank-
lin Allen, Elena Carletti, Joanna Gray and Mitu Gulati for inviting me to participate 
in the conference entitled “The Changing Geography of Finance and Regulation in 
Europe” hosted at the EUI in Florence on Thursday, the 27th of April 2017. Some points 
made in this paper were presented at the conference. I acknowledge the helpful discus-
sions with Karen Birch, Lachlan Burn, Kate Dew, Richard Farnhill, Richard Fentiman, 
Sarah Garvey, Simon Gleeson, Mitu Gulati, Jason Rix and Philip Wood and beg their 
forgiveness for not understanding them fully or accurately. The views set out in this 
paper are strictly personal and do not represent the views of Allen & Overy LLP.
2 References to “English law” and “English courts” should be understood to be references 
to “law of England and Wales” and all courts of England and Wales.
3 Implications of Brexit for the justice system, House of Common’s Justice Committee, HC 
750, 22 March 2017, page 19, copy https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/
cmselect/cmjust/750/750.pdf.
4 A summary of Portland Legal Disputes’ findings can be found: https://portland-com-
munications.com/pdf/Portland’s%208th%20Commercial%20Courts%20report%20
(2016).pdf.
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Most of the cases before the courts relate to what could broadly be 
described as finance matters.5 The CityUK, in its submissions to the 
House of Commons Justice Committee, quotes Mr Justice Blair saying 
that “of the cases commenced during 2015 … 69.26% were claims par-
ticularly in the fields of banking, finance, commodities, shipping, mari-
time disputes and insurance and reinsurance”. More broadly, legal work 
(including non-litigious work) on financial services “between 2009 and 
the first half of 2015 … accounted for 43% of the total value of deals 
on which the top 50 UK ’City’ law firms advised” according to the Law 
Society of England and Wales.6 
The figures show both a prosperous domestic industry and the 
important role that English commercial law and the English courts play 
internationally, particularly in the area of finance. The English legal 
system is not, of course, the only system of law which serves as an inter-
national utility. It shares this role with New York’s legal system. The laws 
and courts of other financial centres also act as non-domestic utilities. 
A number of these systems also provide the appropriate framework for 
international arbitration, which, as a private alternative to public dispute 
resolution, acts as another important international utility.
The UK’s decision to leave the European Union has brought to the 
fore discussions on the future of English law and courts. Will it follow 
the fortunes of the financial services sector in the City of London? Will 
its client base move or be lured elsewhere? Crucially, will reasons emerge 
for which clients will have to stop using English law, especially in finance 
transactions? Will banks and corporates have to start replacing the Eng-
lish governing law and jurisdiction clauses in their bonds and loans? 
The competition for dispute resolution, already vigorous with the 
rise of the various international arbitration centres, has further increased 
with Germany7 and the Netherlands8 offering English language hearings 
5 “Finance matters” is used here as a shorthand for “finance and related commercial mat-
ters”, including banking, finance, commodities, shipping and insurance.
6 Implications of Brexit for the justice system, House of Common’s Justice Committee, 
ibid, page 16.
7  See Lexis Nexis summary: http://blogs.lexisnexis.co.uk/dr/english-courts-abroad-ger-
many-waits-to-move-forward/.
8 See Netherlands Commercial Court announcement: https://netherlands-commer-
cial-court.com/.
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in their courts. France will also offer the adjudication of contractual dis-
putes of English law governed contracts in its courts with “credible judges 
who know the common law”.9
In addition to the understandable commercial competition from 
other European Union centres (and, indeed, New York, Singapore and 
Hong Kong) to get part of London’s financial and legal work, the debate 
on the future of English law and courts will undoubtedly be influenced 
by the wider debate and outcome regarding the role of European law and 
of the CJEU in the UK post-Brexit. On this, the Prime Minister, Theresa 
May, was very categoric: “[w]e will take back control of our laws and bring 
an end to the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice in Britain. … 
we will not have truly left the European Union if we are not in control of 
our own laws”.10 The statement emphasises a perceived nexus between 
a sovereign state, its laws and its courts, a debate that is arguably at the 
heart of Brexit. However, by doing so it exposed English commercial law 
and courts to charges of national preference: if the UK will not accept the 
European Union’s laws and courts, why should European Union entities 
accept English law and courts?11 
The retreat to some kind of legal nationalism and the commercial 
competition for legal work risk clouding the understanding of the fea-
tures which have made English law and courts an international utility, 
especially in finance matters. These features deserve to be understood. 
Brexit should not be used as a pretext for the introduction of regulatory 
barriers which would make the choice of English law and courts less 
desirable for international commercial parties. It would be most unfor-
tunate if uncertainties were introduced into a system which has evolved 
and operates as an international public utility and facilitates a large pro-
portion of our finance transactions. This, of course, does not mean that 
other legal systems should not seek to compete for the work. Such com-
petition, however, should not rely on barriers or prohibitive directives, 
9 Financial Times “Paris turns to English law to lure City business”, 19 May 2017: https://
www.ft.com/content/113f6c78-3bdd-11e7-821a-6027b8a20f23.
10 Theresa May MP, Speech on The Government’s negotiation objectives for exiting the 
EU, 17 January 2017: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-governments-negoti-
ating-objectives-for-exiting-the-eu-pm-speech.
11 It is to be noted however that the manifesto of the Conservative Party has failed to 
make any references to the CJEU, something interpreted by some as a tacit acknowl-
edgment that the CJEU will continue to play some role post Brexit.
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but rather on open competition which promotes commercial life and 
the rule of law. If a discussion on what makes English law attractive to 
commercial parties can contribute to such open competition, then this 
discussion will be very welcome. 
Two points are in order at this stage. First, most - if not all - of the state-
ments made in the part of this paper on the features that make English 
law attractive, may appear as mere assertions with no detailed supporting 
evidence. I have not been able to find much that is directly relevant on 
the subject, other than the discussions on the freedom of contract by P.S. 
Atiyah,12 his and R.S. Summers’ comparative study of Anglo-American 
Law13 and the jurisprudential discussions on the common law, legal rea-
soning and legal systems by H.L.A. Hart14 and A.W.B. Simpson.15  Some 
of my statements may, therefore, run the risk of being dismissed as 
unsupported pontifications. My plea is that, even if these statements are 
so dismissed, a better understanding of English law and its role in inter-
national commerce and finance is required and indeed overdue.
The second charge I face is that the statements in this paper are simply 
a marketing exercise by yet another English lawyer fearing for the future 
of his profession. I can only point out that I am an Amsterdam-born 
Greek of parents hailing from the Ottoman Empire, that my first foreign 
language was French, that I qualified and worked in France as a lawyer for 
several years before settling in London and that fairly recently, I woke up 
to discover that I was not a cosmopolitan, but a citizen without a country. 
I can also point out that at the age of 60, working at a firm with such wide 
and deep European and, indeed, global presence, my own commercial 
interests are hard to define, but they are certainly not as intimately tied 
with the future of the narrowly construed English profession. Ultimately, 
I can only beg the reader to consider the points I make about English law 
at face value. 
12 P.S. Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract, Oxford 1985 and An Introduction 
to the Law of Contract, Oxford 1989.
13 P.S. Atiyah and R.S. Summers, Form and Substance in Anglo-American Law, Oxford 
1987.
14  H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, Oxford 1961.
15 A.W.B. Simpson, “The Common Law and Legal Theory” in A.W.B. Simpson, (ed), Ox-
ford Essays in Jurisprudence (Second Series) (1973), 77-99.
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The rest of this paper considers (a) some of the likely consequences 
of a Brexit on the recognition in the EU of English law as a valid choice 
of law and of English court judgements and the possible mitigating steps 
which can be taken and (b) a discussion of the features which give Eng-
lish law its enduring appeal and make it so important for modern com-
merce and finance. 
Immediate consequences of Brexit for English law and 
jurisdiction 
The immediate consequences of Brexit for English law and jurisdiction 
clauses has been widely discussed and commented upon. Given the 
wealth of existing detailed material, I will just summarise the points 
made in the notes and reports referred to in the footnote16.
“Brexit”, we were told, “means Brexit”,17 which in turn means that we 
still have to discuss all the particulars and the details. For our purposes, 
the discussion on possible outcomes is thankfully limited. The most 
benign Brexit outcome for contracts with English law and jurisdiction 
clauses would result in the current EU Regulations on governing law 
16 Implications of Brexit for the justice system, House of Common’s Justice Committee, 
ibid.
 Brexit: justice for families, individuals and businesses?, House of Lords European Union 
Committee, 17th Report of Session 2016-17 - published 20 March 2017 - HL Paper 134 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201617/ldselect/ldeucom/134/13402.htm and 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201617/ldselect/ldeucom/134/134.pdf.
 Allen & Overy, “English governing law clauses – should commercial parties change 
their approach?”, http://www.allenovery.com/Brexit-Law/brexit-law-the-way-ahead-
macro/Pages/English-governing-law-clauses-should-commercial-parties-change-their-
approach.aspx and “English jurisdiction clauses – should commercial parties change 
their approach?”, http://www.allenovery.com/Brexit-Law/brexit-law-the-way-ahead-
macro/Pages/English-jurisdiction-clauses-should-commercial-parties-change-their-ap-
proach.aspx and a more detailed transcript of a presentation during a call http://www.
allenovery.com/Brexit-Law/Documents/Misc/AO_BrexitLaw_Client_call_2-_English_
law.pdf.
 Clifford Chance, “Brexit and jurisdiction clauses: choice of English law following the 
EU referendum”, https://www.cliffordchance.com/briefings/2016/06/brexit_and_juris-
dictionclausespost-referendu.html.
17 Prime Minister’s Theresa May’s famous statement and a discussion of it by Mark Mar-
dell in BBC News http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-36782922.
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(Rome I18 and Rome II19) and jurisdiction (Brussels I Regulation recast20 
(the “Recast”) remaining in place (or being replaced by equivalent mutu-
ally agreed provisions). In such a case, Brexit would obviously make little 
difference to commercial parties who still wanted to choose English law 
and jurisdiction for their contracts. 
If, in a different Brexit outcome, these EU Regulations were not to 
remain in place as between the UK and EU member states, the posi-
tion would be somewhat different, but not materially so, at least in most 
cases. English governing law clauses would continue to be recognised by 
the courts of EU member states as a result of Rome I. This Regulation 
respects the contracting parties’ autonomy to select their own governing 
law provision, whether it is that of another EU member state or any third 
jurisdiction such as England or New York. On the UK side, the prin-
ciple of party autonomy, which existed in English law even before Rome 
I, would continue to apply and so English courts would recognise the 
contracting parties’ choice of law. So commercial parties can continue to 
choose the governing law that they believe to be the most appropriate for 
their circumstances and commercial arrangements. 
Matters become slightly more complex with jurisdiction clauses. 
Commercial parties are interested not only in choosing the rule-book 
(the governing law) but also the field and the referee for their game (the 
jurisdiction that will hear and adjudicate any dispute between them). 
This matters for two reasons. First, different dispute resolution fora have 
different procedural rules, timelines to adjudication, capacity to issue 
interim rulings, specialist judges etc. But choice of jurisdiction and an 
appropriate judgement from the chosen dispute resolution forum are a 
Pyrrhic victory if the jurisdiction clause is not respected or the judge-
ment  can be re-opened or eventually re-litigated by the courts of another 
18 Regulation No 593/2008 of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obliga-
tions (Rome I) OJ L 177/6, 4 July 2008: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/
ALL/?uri=CELEX:32008R0593.
19 Regulation No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and the Council of 11 July 2007 on 
the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II) OJ L 199/40, 31 July 2007: 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A32007R0864. Rome II 
permits parties to choose in their contracts the law that will govern non-contractual 
obligations arising between them.
20 Regulation 1215/2012 of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and en-
forcement of judgements in civil and commercial matters, OJ L 351, 20 December 2012: 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A32012R1215
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jurisdiction when it comes to recognition and enforcement particularly if 
either step requires substantive re-evaluation of the merits of the dispute 
or is simply procedurally difficult and lengthy. Recognition and enforce-
ment of judgements coming out of the contracting parties’ chosen forum 
is just as important as recognition of their choice of forum and governing 
law.
The Recast is the latest iteration of an effort which seeks to require 
member states to respect jurisdiction clauses in favour of other member 
states and to ensure that recognition and enforcement of judgements 
obtained in another European Union country happen as automatically as 
reasonably possible. So how will a prospective litigant ensure that their 
English jurisdiction clause is respected and how will a victorious litigant 
in the English courts ensure that their English London-court judgement 
is recognised and enforced in the court of a European Union member 
state in a post-Brexit, non-Recast world?
The answer depends on the actions that the United Kingdom itself 
may take to mitigate the loss of the Recast. There are several non-mu-
tually exclusive options that also depend on whether the jurisdiction 
clause is “exclusive” (specifies one forum only) or “asymmetric” (specifies 
one forum only for some parties and, for the benefit of other parties, the 
option of other fora as well), or “mutually non-exclusive” (specifying a 
forum but allowing all parties the option of alternative fora). 
The UK can choose unilaterally to ratify the Hague Convention,21 a 
convention to which the European Union has acceded on behalf of its 
members (other than Denmark). EU member state courts must ‘suspend 
or dismiss’ proceedings before them in breach of an exclusive jurisdic-
tion clause in favour of another Hague Convention contracting state and 
enforce related judgements. English exclusive jurisdiction clauses would 
therefore be respected and judgements will be enforced in EU member 
states (other than Denmark) under the Hague Convention (albeit subject 
to one potential wrinkle if all parties are dominated in a member state). 
Recognition of both exclusive and non-exclusive clauses and enforce-
ment of related judgement may be facilitated if the UK accedes to the 
21 Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, signed in Hague, The Netherlands, on 30 
June 2005:  https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/full-text/?cid=98.
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Lugano Convention22, whose members include all of the EU member 
states (including Denmark) as well as Iceland, Norway and Switzerland. 
However, accession to the Lugano Convention depends on the agreement 
of the existing members. 
Courts of EU member states may also recognise English jurisdiction 
clauses either by giving the Recast a “reflexive effect”, i.e. treat the Recast 
rules as applying to “third state” (i.e. non EU member state) jurisdiction 
clauses, or by applying their national rules which, on the whole, recog-
nise non-domestic court jurisdiction clauses. 
Finally, enforcement, absent either accession to the Hague or the 
Lugano Conventions, will still be possible in most EU member states fol-
lowing each such EU member state’s rules for the enforcement of judge-
ments from “third states”, an approach already followed for the enforce-
ment of other “third state” judgements such as one from New York. 
In short, in most cases, respect for jurisdiction clauses and recogni-
tion and enforcement of judgements in a post-Brexit, non-Recast (and 
non-Hague, non-Lugano) world will still be possible in the majority of 
cases, albeit that enforcement may require more time and cost more 
money. The important point is that it can be done and this will be done in 
much the same way as applies to judgements from other major commer-
cial centres outside the EU, like New York or Singapore.23 
It is important to add that certainty in relation to jurisdiction clauses 
and recognition and enforcement of judgements is of extreme impor-
tance not only for commercial matters but also for the affairs of indi-
viduals. If Brexit occurs without a successor to the Recast, commercial 
parties may well be prepared to put up with the extra time and cost to 
have their judgements recognised and enforced. Matters will, however, be 
very different for the vast majority of private individuals whose lives will 
be adversely affected without some sort of equivalent successor regime.24 
22 Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgements in civil 
and commercial matters, signed in Lugano, Italy, on 30 October 2007: http://ec.europa.
eu/world/agreements/downloadFile.do?fullText=yes&treatyTransId=13041.
23 As noted above, this is a technical matter and details are important. The references 
given earlier provide further details for those interested.
24 See Brexit: justice for families, individuals and businesses?, House of Lords European 
Union Committee, ibid, where the point is made vividly and persuasively.
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Given the statements in support of those Europeans (including British 
nationals) who, relying on the promise of a common working area for all, 
built their lives and careers in countries other than their own, it would  be 
very unfortunate if at, or following, Brexit some type of successor to the 
Recast were not put in place.
Institutional response post-Brexit
Brexit is a deeply political choice and can only be perceived as the United 
Kingdom’s profound disagreement with the course that its treaty partners 
and geographical neighbours have set for themselves. It is therefore inevi-
table that the EU institutions will react and will want to be seen to react in 
a political way towards the United Kingdom. The reaction may vary from 
a decision to avoid English law and/or jurisdiction for their own borrow-
ings, to not allowing English law debt instruments to be used for central 
bank collateral, to other regulatory restrictions having (directly or indi-
rectly) an adverse impact on the inclusion of English law and jurisdiction 
clauses by parties wishing to do business with, or in, the European Union. 
Although the political reaction is understandable, it is hoped that this 
reaction will be tempered by the recognition that both law and courts are 
international public utilities for international commercial matters with 
an inevitable geographical seat, in existence to facilitate cross-border 
trade rather than as the instruments of power of an adverse sovereign. 
The enduring appeal of English law and courts
 The concern that Brexit may adversely affect London as a legal hub, 
raises a number of interesting questions about English law and the Eng-
lish courts. Why do non-UK commercial parties choose it? Why do they 
choose and trust English courts to adjudicate their disputes? Is there 
some quality in either the law or the courts that makes them appealing, 
or are they both the beneficiaries of something much less interesting and 
more accidental?
It is both understandable and entirely unsurprising that English law 
would expand and develop in the globalised world of the 19th century. 
At the time, the British Empire was co-extensive with a substantial part 
of that globalised world, accounted for over half of global trade, and 
gold-convertible sterling was the overwhelming currency of trade and, 
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hence, the reserve currency of necessity. If one traded with London 
entities, or had to clear large payments, one had to go through London. 
English law and courts at the time were, therefore, widely used for inter-
national commercial transactions as there were few real options. They 
became an international public utility because one was needed to service 
the trade and capital flows of the Empire and the globalised world. 
Subsequently, however, the Empire went into decline and was ulti-
mately dismantled, sterling lost its place to the dollar as the reserve cur-
rency and Britain, once a mighty creditor nation, had to ask the IMF to 
come to its rescue in 1976.25 Why is it, then, that English law and courts 
continued to be widely used by non-UK commercial parties and evolved 
to be the modern international public utility they are? 
Part of the enduring success of English law and courts is due to “first-
mover advantage”. Having assumed a leading role in the 19th century, the 
English legal system succeeded in preserving it, greatly assisted by the 
enduring ties of the commercial community established by the Empire 
and by the fact that the decline of British fortunes was mitigated by the 
successor global leader being another English speaking country with a 
judicial tradition originating in England. 
Still, today’s consumers of English law and courts do not choose them 
because of history. These consumers, principally non-UK commercial 
parties, make their choice on grounds of self-interest. When they are 
asked to justify their choice, their answer is likely to include one or more 
of the following: the law is predictable and certain, will give effect to the 
contractual bargain struck by the parties and is flexible and commercial; 
litigation is unlikely to result in a surprise, will not take forever, the pro-
cess is clear and will encourage commercial settlement; and everything is 
conducted in the commercial lingua franca of the day.
There is much to be said about the English rules of civil procedure 
and the process followed by the courts. Much progress has been made 
since that 19th-century foggy November day where, in Lincoln’s Inn Hall 
25 For some headline numbers on trade and the use of the pound in the 19th century and 
a summary on the history of the decline of the pound as a reserve currency and its 
replacement by the dollar see “Taking a pounding” in The Economist 3 October 2015, 
a summary article with references to academic papers: http://www.economist.com/
node/21669969.
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at the very heart of the fog, sat the Lord High Chancellor in his High 
Court of Chancery and Jarndyce v. Jarndyce droned on26. Indeed, civil 
procedure has been much modernised and continues to be reviewed and 
streamlined. Even though its importance for the administration of justice 
cannot be overstated, I do not propose to discuss it much further here, 
focusing instead on the law itself.
So what evidence is there that English law is predictable and cer-
tain, that it will give effect to the contractual bargain struck by the par-
ties, that it is flexible and commercial? The uninitiated (which includes 
a student of the common law as well as accomplished lawyers with no 
knowledge of the common law) will desperately try to find these alleged 
virtues by pouring over books on contract law. However systematic the 
presentation, every aspect of the law quickly degenerates into a narra-
tive of cases and a discussion of the way these have been decided.27 Law 
students struggling to come to terms with the myriads of cases in search 
of something solid and certain will look at the elegant prose and clarity 
of thought of the French and Swiss Civil Codes28 and bemoan their fate. 
And yet it is exactly this apparently chaotic accumulation of cases, 
argued and re-argued, ordered and re-ordered, woven in narratives done 
and undone which provides one of the pillars of English commercial law. 
To understand better how this is done, it may be helpful to have a look at 
the types of rules which legal systems deploy.
Legal systems, and indeed most sets of rules, always face a key 
dilemma: should rules be drafted as broad substantive principles whose 
enforcement always allows the court/adjudicator discretion in deter-
mining how they apply to the facts, or should rules be more formal to 
give users more direct guidance and remove discretion from the court/
adjudicator when seeking to determine compliance? 
This distinction whilst slightly artificial reflects a point which is easy 
to recognise by example, best taken by reference to a game with simple 
rules. In a ball game, a substantive rule can be “playing in a way which 
26 May I commend Charles Dickens’ Bleak House, if not for its criticism of the English 
judicial system, then for its many other virtues.
27 See for example the, so called, “practitioners’ book” Chitty on Contracts, Chitty, Joseph, 
and H. G. Beale, London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2008.
28 No doubt other codes are just as clear and elegantly written.
English Law and Jurisdiction Post Brexit - Yannis Manuelides
64
risks injury to another player is prohibited”. Another substantive rule can 
set the penalties for breach of such dangerous playing, providing a range 
of consequences, depending on the gravity of the breach. These rules 
allow (and indeed, in the absence of any other rules, require the referee 
to use) wide discretion in determining (a) whether a particular way of 
playing does risk such injury and (b) the penalty for such play. Because 
each such determination will be unique, their justice and fairness will 
very much depend on the powers and abilities of that particular referee. 
The acceptability of the verdict by the players concerned, as well as by the 
fans, will in turn depend on the ability of players and fans to recognise the 
justice done. There will, no doubt, be extreme cases where the determi-
nation of the breach and the penalty imposed will be appropriate and will 
be accepted as such. The challenge, however, lies with the not-so-obvious 
cases - the difficult and challenging ones which will always be the over-
whelming majority of cases. It is not difficult to see that, in difficult cases, 
for the decision to be both appropriate and acceptable, the referee must 
be capable of achieving very high standards indeed, a sort of legal Her-
cules performing at a standard which most common mortals are unlikely 
to be capable of meeting. But even if the referee is such a Hercules and his 
decision is perfectly defensible from some absolute standpoint, it must be 
comprehensible and acceptable to the players and, perhaps at a different 
level, also to the fans. Without such minimal comprehension and accept-
ance, the high standards applied by our Hercules cannot help the players 
adjust their game so that it remains interesting, competitive and within 
the bounds of the rules. Lack of comprehension and hence acceptance 
also drives away the fans, as rules which are not understood by them are 
no rules at all and the very notion of a game without rules is no game at 
all. 
To ensure that the game is both interesting and comprehensible for 
players, an ordinary referee and fans, some guidance on how to comply 
and administer the rule must exist. This guidance can be given by a series 
of formal rules on how the substantive rule is to be applied. One such 
formal rule can specify, for example, the level of leg-to-ground angle 
over which there will be a breach of the substantive rule. The more such 
rules are introduced, the more the circumstances of engagement are for-
mally described, the more they are capable of giving guidance to players 
and referees alike, the more the game will be capable of being played 
interestingly and the more the game will be administered in a way that 
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players and fans alike recognise as fair and appropriate. 
English common law is nothing else than the cumulative build-up, 
from the bottom up, of these formal rules which together define the few 
substantive rules. A substantive rule of contract is that there has to be 
an offer and an acceptance. There will be many factual circumstances 
where determining whether an offer has been made and whether it has 
been accepted can be easily done by reference to the ordinary meaning 
of the words. There will be, however, instances (and the contract law 
books are full of them) where the concepts are stretched to breaking 
point. How the courts deal with these cases, how their reasoning binds 
them together in a narrative that seeks to explain all and to distinguish 
everything, is the wonder of the English common law. This cumulative 
build-up will be re-examined again when another unusual set of facts 
presents itself to the courts and the narrative will be rebuilt to address 
that as well. 
The common law addresses the challenge of assembling into unifying 
narratives the many separate decisions on matters with real or apparent 
similarities by relying on two overriding principles of process. The first 
such principle is that of precedent and stare decisis. Briefly this means 
that consistency of decisions is required and previously decided cases 
must bind courts of subsequent jurisdiction (courts of equal or lower 
ranking, though not ones of higher ranking). What binds a court of sub-
sequent jurisdiction is the core of the decision, the ratio decidendi, of 
the previous case. This ratio must be separated from what was just “talk”, 
obiter dicta in the earlier decision. The interpretation is invariably done 
by the court of later jurisdiction (at the behest, and with the assistance 
of, counsel) as it tries to establish the correct set of rules applicable to the 
facts before it. Such a re-telling results in the ever increasing focus of the 
ratio, the discarding a “mere obiter” of reasoning previously accepted as 
part of the core of the ratio, allowing for a new narrative to emerge out of 
the family of related cases cited to the court for its decision. Over many 
years this quest for the pragmatic has resulted in a very tightly knit and 
densely textured narrative of judicial opinion. On-going work continues 
at the edges of this narrative as the commercial world develops. Occa-
sionally, major work is done at the centre when higher courts weave in 
new threads which accentuate certain aspects of the narrative and hide 
others away. What is fascinating about this evolving narrative is that, 
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even when codifications of it are attempted29, it never ceases to be some-
thing which emerges from the living reality of the commercial people 
who bring their cases to the courts for adjudication.
The second overriding principle by which English common law 
abides is one by which all legal systems (or sets of rules) abide if they 
are to be and be recognised as such. This is the modest but fundamental 
principle of legality which requires that legal “rules must satisfy certain 
conditions: they must be intelligible and within the capacity of most to 
obey, and … must not be retrospective”.30 The legality principle is the 
necessary ingredient of the legal system (or of the set of rules) that per-
mits users to have certainty on what will be considered a breach of the 
rules, what the sanctions will be and, hence, how one is able to comply 
with the rules. 
Contract law, as developed by the English courts, eschews substantive 
principles which give wide discretion to the courts to determine the case 
before them. This is not to say that contract law evolves unaffected by 
substantive principles. But on the whole, these principles either emerge 
over some time from the tight narrative of case law or are grafted onto 
the body of the common law from the outside following the prevailing 
moral or political attitudes, or simply the current political balance of 
power. 
Nowadays, the courts believe that they have neither the authority 
nor the jurisdiction to propose any such principles and, on the whole, 
have studiously sought to point out that they are not the source of them. 
The source is Parliament and the grafting is done through statutes. If, 
for instance, contract law (being mostly developed by disputes between 
commercial parties) produces results which are inappropriate for con-
sumers in an age of mass consumption, standard form contracts, une-
qual bargaining power etc., then Parliament will intervene and will fix 
the “mischief ”.31 The “mischief ” is almost invariably fixed by adding 
to and/or replacing part of the closely knit texture of the common law 
with extremely detailed laws which aim to blend into the existing dense 
29 See Andrews, Neil, Contract Rules – Decoding English Law, Intersentia, 2016.
30 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, Oxford 1961, page 202.
31 As for example with the Trade Descriptions Act 1968, the Unfair Contract Terms Act 
1977 and the Consumer Credit Act 1974.
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narrative without holes or discontinuities.32 Even when the “mischief ” 
is motivated by prevailing moral principle (as for example the Debt 
Relief (Developing Countries) Act 201033 which aimed to limit excessive 
amounts creditors could otherwise legally claim from highly indebted 
poor debtor countries), the overall approach to the principle is cautious 
rather than triumphantly declaratory and the drafting is detailed and 
aimed to enhance certainty through clarity.34 
There are, of course, exceptions where judges do seek to intervene, 
but these are few and are always taught as exceptions or curious inci-
dents. The judgements of Lord Denning, a senior judge who had the ten-
dency to push the boundaries beyond what was always called for, were 
read in my day at University as such examples. He was expressly criticised 
by his colleagues as in the case of Magor and St Mellons RDC v Newport 
Corpn [1952] AC 189 where Viscount Simonds said of his proposal “[i]t 
appears to me to be a naked usurpation of the legislative function under 
the thin disguise of interpretation”. 
The avoidance and, indeed, suspicion of substantive principle by Eng-
lish common law is best illustrated in its approach to the role of “good 
faith” in commercial contracts. A principle of “good faith” can be found 
in the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts35, 
many civil law (continental European law) systems and, indeed, the 
USA.36 The principle of good faith in such systems (or in some places of 
32 Even these elaborate and detailed statutes do not always succeed in replicating the suf-
ficient certainty density.
33 The Debt Relief (Developing Countries) Act 2010 can be found at http://www.legislation.
gov.uk/ukpga/2010/22/section/1#section-1-6.
34 Intervention by Parliament on such matters is a not a recent matter. Acts of Parliament 
protecting employees were introduced as early as 1831 and wagers ceased to have the 
enforcement protection of contract law in 1845 (P.S. Atiyah, An Introduction to the Law 
of Contract, Oxford 1989, page 14).
35 See Article 1.7 (Good Faith And Fair Dealing).
36 Why the US is the only common law system which uses “high principle” is an inter-
esting topic. This may have to do with the country’s independence from Britain which 
required the grounding of its legitimacy on overriding principles which henceforth 
became part of the US system of laws, a system which requires not just the positing of 
consistent decisions, but the high principled perspective of a Herculean judge to take 
its justice seriously. Of course other factors are likely to have been important in the path 
of US law towards more principle and codification, such as the relative non-availability 
of law reports and the consequent need to rely on learned summaries such as Black-
stone’s Commentaries.
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reasonableness and fairness) is sometimes used to demonstrate pre-con-
tractual liability and is used to as a tool for interpreting the intention of 
the parties. The UNIDROIT Principles require that “each party must act 
in accordance with good faith and fair dealing” and that “the parties may 
not exclude or limit this duty”. In the eyes of an English lawyer the prin-
ciple seems to give too much of a discretion to the court in interpreting 
the actions of the parties and the terms of the contract. At the same the 
mandatory nature of it limits party autonomy. The reaction of a leading 
English judge to this principle is characteristic: 
“In many civil law systems, and perhaps in most legal systems 
outside the common law world, the law of obligations recognises 
and enforces an overriding principle that in making and carrying 
out contracts parties should act in good faith. This does not simply 
mean that they should not deceive each other, a principle which 
any legal system must recognise; its effect is perhaps most aptly 
conveyed by such metaphorical colloquialisms as “playing fair”, 
“coming clean” or “putting one’s cards face upwards on the table”. 
It is in essence a principle of fair and open dealing. … English law 
has, characteristically, committed itself to no such overriding 
principle but has developed piecemeal solutions in response to 
demonstrated problems of unfairness” [emphasis added].37
The approach could not be more different from that of Unidroit and 
civil law systems. English law and courts approach issues of good faith 
in a detailed manner and develop piecemeal solutions fitting the facts. 
It is not for the English courts and law to wield overriding principles 
without reference to the specifics or to import easily principles within the 
four corners of the parties’ contract. It is this difference of stance which 
provides the certainty that characterises English law and courts. Their 
message to the commercial parties is simple: “you can agree what you 
want and we will not seek to override it. This does not mean there are no 
red lines; there are. But these red lines are not many and you know what 
they are: either a statute has set them or we have decided on them in the 
past. Moreover, they are specific enough for you to see where and how 
we draw them”. 
37 Lord Bingham in Interfoto Picture Library Limited v. Stiletto Visual Programmes Limit-
ed, [1987] EWCA Civ 6.
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The dislike of broad substantive principle is also something that dis-
tinguishes English law from US law. In their book, P.S. Atiyah and R.S. 
Summers note that the big difference between US and English law is that 
the former has allowed the rules to become more substantive whereas 
the latter keeps the rules as formal as possible.38 Examples are provided 
on the calculation of damages and on the doctrine of consideration. The 
most telling example, however, is the different approach to exemption 
clauses in standard form contracts. Courts in the US looked beyond the 
formal aspects of the formation of a standard form contract and “rightly 
concluded that many [such] clauses are not read, understood, or in any 
real sense agreed to by consumers”. US courts therefore “rejected [these 
clauses] on various grounds such as unconscionability or for reasons 
of public policy”. English courts, on the other hand “floundered about 
the problem for many years unwilling to enforce … [and] also unable 
to depart from the formal effect of apparent agreement” only to be “res-
cued” by the Unfair Contract Terms Act (UCTA). What is interesting is 
the prediction of the authors (in 1987) that, even where the UCTA gives 
English courts broad and unfettered discretion “it is likely that, after a 
few more cases have been decided under it, lawyers will be able to predict 
how the discretion will be exercised in most circumstances”.39
Of course, the English courts do make what, for them, are substan-
tive leaps. But it is important to note how focused and restricted in scale 
and scope these leaps are. Here is how a senior Law Lord puts it, distin-
guishing the “appropriate cases” when it is “proper for the courts to go in 
adapting or adding to existing law” from the inappropriate ones: 
“Whatever views may have prevailed in the last century, I think 
that it is now widely recognised that it is proper for the courts 
in appropriate cases to develop or adapt existing rules of the 
common law to meet new conditions. I say in appropriate cases 
because I think we ought to recognise a difference between cases 
where we are dealing with “lawyer’s law” and cases where we are 
dealing with matters which directly affect the lives and interests 
of large sections of the community and which raise issues which 
are the subject of public controversy and on which laymen are as 
38 See generally P.S. Atiyah and R.S. Summers, Form and Substance in Anglo-American 
Law, Oxford 1987. The examples cited in this paragraph are on pages 84 and following.
39 Ibid, page 85.
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well able to decide as are lawyers. On such matters it is not for the 
courts to proceed on their view of public policy for that would be 
to encroach on the province of Parliament.”40 
This legal soul-searching over the proper boundaries between the 
judgements of the United Kingdom’s Supreme Court and its Parliament 
concerned the reversal of a presumption held by courts that when a hus-
band contributes to the household he does so with the intention of pro-
viding a gift to his wife - hardly a legal cliff-hanger! 
Courts are reluctant to step into the province of law-making which 
they consider to be the realm of Parliament; the courts’ own legislative 
forays are limited and confined to “lawyer’s law” cases as above. But how 
do courts approach contracts? 
Given the freedom commercial parties have they will usually prepare 
contracts which are sufficiently detailed. For complex matters they will 
seek the assistance of the first layer of the legal system’s “officials”, solici-
tors and barristers. But human communication is notoriously plagued by 
challenges such as situation novelty, term ambiguity and incompleteness 
of provision. Contracts whose terms are in dispute are likely to reach the 
courts where the second layer of the legal system’s “officials”, the judges, 
will take over and seek to resolve them. Certainly, they comply with the 
principle of legality and are guided by counsel in considering the rele-
vant precedents. But how do they fill the obvious gaps and resolve the 
misunderstandings whose presence brought the dispute before them in 
the first place? How do English courts determine the disputed terms of 
the contract? 
The current law of contract was developed during the heyday of the 
British Empire. It made two assumptions about human interaction which 
were characteristic of the age and of a powerful, open to trade creditor 
nation. The first is the assumption that adult humans (and corpora-
tions) are presumed to be autonomous and independent. Contract was 
an expression of the parties’ free will. If the parties have made a choice, 
evidenced in an agreement which otherwise satisfied the requirements 
for a valid contract, it was not for the law to rewrite the terms of the con-
tract and to change the bargain. Human (or party) autonomy was, and 
40 Lord Reid in Pettitt v Pettitt [1970] AC 777 at 794–795.
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is on the whole, not to be interfered with in commercial contracts. If the 
contract was not clear then all the court had to seek was the intention of 
the parties in entering such contract, so as to insert into it the necessary 
provisions which the parties would have inserted if they had considered 
the matter so as to give effect to their intentions. 
It was not just the end of Empire and the decline of the ideology of 
classical liberalism which put paid to the theory of the “parties’ inten-
tions”. As the law became more and more certain a certain standardisa-
tion and even statutory codification was possible. This in turn allowed 
the courts to free themselves from narratives which depended on the 
“parties’ intentions”.41 Standard-form contracts further undermined the 
notion that the parties’ specific intentions had much to do in shaping the 
particular “agreement” reached when buying a train ticket for the 4:50 
from Paddington. 
“Parties’ intentions” finally completely evaporated when the courts 
dealt with the most extreme cases of contract failure, frustration. Frus-
tration is by definition something to which the parties not only would 
not have addressed their minds at the time they concluded the contract, 
but could not have done so. In a landmark case the court noted that 
“the true action of the Court … consists in applying an objective rule 
of the law of contract to the contractual obligations that the parties have 
imposed upon themselves.” Instead of seeking to discern the intention 
of the actual parties to the contract the court must seek to see what “the 
fair and reasonable man” whose “spokesman … is and must be the Court 
itself ” intended.42
The standard of the “reasonable man”43 has not been used to allow 
wide discretion in the way courts interpret contracts. Their usual 
restrained attitude remains intact. The reasonable person whose spokes-
person the court becomes is someone operating in the specific commer-
cial context within which the contract and the dispute relating to it arose. 
The standards of fairness and reasonableness are all applied by reference 
to that specific commercial context and are connected to and bolstered by 
other decisions concerning the same type of disputes within that context. 
41 See P S Atiyah, An Introduction to the Law of Contract, Oxford 1989, page 15.
42 All quotes from the judgement of Lord Radcliffe in Davis Contractors v Fareham Urban 
DC [1956] UKHL 3.
43 One assumes also woman.
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By turning objective the courts have not allowed themselves more discre-
tion than before. Instead they have made their approach to contractual 
interpretation transparent, thereby further enabling commercial parties 
to craft their contracts with greater certainty as to the way they will be 
interpreted. 
If the first assumption is that adult humans (and corporations) are 
presumed to be autonomous and independent, the second one, which fol-
lows from it, is that they should therefore be bound to their contracts and 
be liable for the consequences. Healthy commerce cannot exist without 
certainty of performance, whether of the commercial contract or for any 
related finance arrangement. The presumption that agreements must be 
performed and that debts have to be paid flows, not only from the need to 
protect commerce and finance, but also from the belief that contracts are 
entered into by autonomous actors to be performed who should properly 
be held to their promises. As a result, English contract law is sometimes 
said to have a pro-creditor bias, a not inaccurate description if “creditor” 
is understood to include not only the certain-amount claimant, but also 
the commercial party who has performed its side of the contractual bar-
gain.44 
The importance of this “pro-creditor bias” cannot be overemphasised. 
Modern financial markets, with their need for matching positions and 
back-to-back arrangements and other settlements and clearances, cannot 
develop and function smoothly without an underpinning and unequiv-
ocal obligation for payment of debts, in full and on time. English law 
recognises and enforces these claims subject only to rights of set-off and 
onerous provisions on the debtor known as penalties. Set-off rights can, 
however, be contractually excluded, other than set-off in the context of 
the debtor’s insolvency, and the courts have provided sufficient guidance 
on what types of provisions are onerous and will be set aside as offending 
the public policy limits of adequate creditor compensation. Commercial 
parties are hence empowered to set their contract terms with very con-
siderable certainty from the outset as to how their contract will be under-
stood and enforced by the courts. 
44 This use of “pro-creditor bias” should be distinguished from the use of the same term to 
describe the manner in which insolvencies proceed, where again English law is said to 
have a “pro-creditor bias” simply because it allows the creditors, rather than the debtors 
to lead the insolvency process.
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Clarity and predictability for the commercial parties comes, there-
fore, through the certainty brought by the dense narrative of case law, 
well-woven together by the judges and the other “officials” of the legal 
system in a formal way of “objective” contractual interpretation which 
eschews substantive principle and discretion. 
The discussion so far must have made evident that the role of the 
“officials” of the legal system are central to the way the commercial law 
evolves, is interpreted and is enforced. In fact, it can be argued that the 
English common law itself is so inextricably tied with the acts performed 
by its “officials” in administering it, so as to be very difficult to talk about 
the one without the other. Indeed, it may be appropriate, at this stage, 
to quote extensively from one of the few texts [I have found] which 
addresses the peculiar creature comprised of these officials and their 
practices, English common law: 
“[I]t seems to me that the common law system is properly 
located as a customary system of law in this sense, that it consists 
of a body of practices observed and ideas received by a caste of 
lawyers, these ideas being used by them as providing guidance 
in what is conceived to be the rational determination of disputes 
litigated before them, or by them on behalf of clients, and in 
other contexts. These ideas and practices exist only in the sense 
that they are accepted and acted upon within the legal profession, 
just as customary practices may be said to exist within a group in 
the sense that they are observed, accepted as appropriate forms 
of behaviour, and transmitted both by example and precept as 
membership of the group changes. The ideas and practices which 
comprise the common law are customary in that their status is 
thought to be dependent upon conformity with the past, and they 
are traditional in the sense that they are transmitted through time 
as a received body of knowledge and learning. Now such a view of 
the common law does not require us to identify theoretical prop-
ositions of the common law – putative formulations of these ideas 
and practices – with the common law, any more that we would 
identify statements of the customs observed within a group with 
the practices which constitute the customs. … Formulations of 
the common law are to be conceived of as similar to grammar-
ians’ rules, which both describe linguistic practices and attempt to 
systematize and order them; such rules serve as guides to proper 
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practice since the proper practice is in part the normal practice; 
such formulations are inherently corrigible, for it is always pos-
sible that they may be improved upon, or require modification as 
what they describe changes.”45 
The analogy with linguistic practice is illuminating and indeed can 
be taken a step further. A language exists, lives and evolves within, and 
thanks to, the use its linguistic community makes of it. Anyone who 
assumes some responsibility for ordering, systematising and being crit-
ical of the way the language is the written and spoken assumes the posi-
tion of an “official” in that community. Some “officials” will be more cen-
tral depending on the degree to which the users of the language have 
organised themselves and have accepted specific practices and accorded 
to institutions special roles. So, where there are dictionaries and grammar 
books, these institutions and the persons who run them are likely to be 
accepted as more central officials in making formulations about the lan-
guage and its use. The more organised the linguistic group the more likely 
it is to have such institutions and officials. The more systematic it is, the 
more likely it is that these institutions and officials will operate in a close 
and mutually supportive role.46 
No wonder, then, that when it comes to English common law, it takes 
time for the hapless law student to master the narrative, to understand 
why certain turns were taken and others avoided, why the weave is denser 
here and more colourful there. A bottoms-up system built by practical 
exigencies and not because of some “grand plan”, a system which avoids 
wide substantive legal principles, which restricts with its specificity wide 
judicial discretion is not easy to comprehend without the “officials” of 
the legal system. Indeed, it may be impossible to understand it very well 
without being oneself socialised in the system as one of the “officials”. 
Here are some characteristics of the English legal system which are 
often ignored when discussing the common law, its evolution and deter-
mination. Barristers and solicitors who have obtained a University law 
45 A.W.B. Simpson, “The Common Law and Legal Theory” in A.W.B. Simpson, (ed), Ox-
ford Essays in Jurisprudence (Second Series) (1973), page 94.
46 “Languages are dialects with an army and a navy” goes an old quip. I would add that 
after the army and the navy those countries with languages seek to establish institutions 
which describe and otherwise comment on the linguistic process and introduce some 
degree of canonical (i.e. subject to rules) language. 
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degree become fully qualified after a further year of quasi-academic 
training and a further one or two years of vocational training working 
as apprentices (“pupils” and “trainees” respectively) for more senior law-
yers. A legal career is indeed also open to non-law University graduates 
at the cost of a further year of training. Vocational training almost never 
ceases after that. Litigators, especially, will spend a lot of time reading 
case law and learning and understanding the current narrative into 
which this is woven. Barristers who excel may be asked, after many years 
of practice, to become judges and adjudicate disputes. Judicial selection 
is made mostly out of the 1,600-strong most senior layer of barristers, 
the so-called Queen’s Counsel, though recently solicitors (who are also 
eligible to become Queen’s Counsel) are also selected. Their number is 
large enough to allow healthy competition but small enough to allow for 
a proper assessment amongst them for the most suitable. These experi-
enced practitioners staff the highest segment of the small judicial body. 
Barristers are organised into collegiate associations, the Inns of Court, 
which bind their sense of community and help with their socialisation 
as “officials” of the legal system. Historically, pupil barristers famously 
had to attend a minimum of 12 formal dinners at their Inn of Court, a 
practice which today has been broadened by other means of training and 
socialisation. 
Solicitors are trained and socialised within the firms that hire them. 
City law firms, who do the bulk of the contract work with which this 
paper is concerned, will often seek to agree common practices when 
major developments require it47 and will establish standing committees 
and associations together with industry members to consider standards 
for contracts and industry best-practice matters,48 or discuss legal risks 
and uncertainties and propose solutions.49
Solicitors may involve senior barristers whenever an issue of legal 
uncertainty arises, particularly in novel circumstances that challenge 
the sense of existing contract terms. These consultations and the role of 
barristers in advocating on behalf of litigants in disputes are very impor-
47 As for instance they did to agree a common approach to address contractual changes 
required by the dematerialisation of debt securities.
48 For instance the Loan Market Association http://www.lma.eu.com/or the International 
Capital Market Association  https://www.icmagroup.org/ .
49 For instance the Financial Markets Law Committee http://www.fmlc.org/.
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tant because they form a vital link between the active world of financial 
markets and the legal system “officials”, some of whom may in the future 
consider new issues coming out of these markets, but from the position 
of a judge. 
Interestingly, law as an academic discipline is very different from that 
in continental Europe. For practicing lawyers, post-graduate studies are 
rare, not really encouraged and, in some fields, viewed with benign indif-
ference. The higher academic part of the discipline, which on the Conti-
nent is pursued by practitioners with higher academic degrees and dis-
sertations, is pursued in England by a career in certain practices, mostly 
as a barrister but, more recently, as a solicitor as well50. 
The selection and make-up of the judiciary is another area where 
the difference with continental Europe is vast. Judges in England come 
from the ranks of the practitioners, mostly barristers and a few solicitors, 
whereas on the Continent judges are career civil servants mostly starting 
right out of University with no practical experience of the commercial 
disputes they will be called upon to adjudicate. 
The organisation of the courts hearing commercial matters enhances 
the unity of the “officials” serving the administration of the justice 
system. There is only one court hierarchy in England and Wales, with 
clear levels and with the highest ranks all sitting in London. This has to 
be contrasted with the systems of some continental countries which may 
have separate court hierarchies and decentralised systems. The difference 
highlights again the importance that the principles of precedent and stare 
decisis play in the English legal system. Without a unified court hierarchy 
application of these principles would be either meaningless or just cha-
otic. By contrast, systems where precedent plays less of a binding role and 
is indeed always subject to the rule book, do not require a fully unified 
court system.
The emphasis on the vocational training and the socialisation of its 
practitioners, the importance of the continuum between industry prac-
tice, legal commercial practice, advocacy and adjudication, and the uni-
tary and clearly set out court hierarchy, underscores the importance of 
the social organisation of the officials for the functioning of the legal 
50 I understand that this is the case mostly with certain types of Intellectual Property 
practices.
PART I I - Regulatory Arbitrage Across Jurisdictions
77
system. Ultimately, this body of similarly trained persons, operating 
together in functional unity, ensures that the common law delivers on its 
certainty and predictability and becomes itself the collective narrator of 
the common law narrative. 
Describing the legal system’s officials as the collective narrator of 
the common law narrative suggests that it is impossible to distinguish 
between the law itself and the manner in which it is administered and 
deliver by the officials. To see whether this is so, let us revisit quickly 
the elements of the commercial common law on which we have focused. 
The principles of precedent and stare decisis are principles which are best 
understood in practice by the actions of the system’s officials, without 
whose presence the narrative of the common law and its telling and 
retelling of what is ratio and what is obiter would not be possible. The 
emphasis of the incremental development of the law through narrow, 
mostly formal rules that enhance finality (and through finality, predict-
ability and certainty) would not be possible without the system’s offi-
cials. The siren songs of quasi-legislative steps and of grand principle are 
ignored thanks to the steadfast position of the officials. The unique way 
to interpret contracts is itself a practice developed and perfected (and still 
much debated) by the officials. 
Why do any of these things matter? Certainty and predictability 
of contract law is crucial for commercial and financial markets. Both 
markets need certainty so that they can price choices in contracts and 
outcomes of contracts. The greater the certainty, the more accurate the 
pricing. The more accurate the pricing and the outcome, the more com-
plex the system of transactions that can be assembled. 
Party autonomy provides almost infinite flexibility. Parties can design 
their contractual bargains as they wish. Flexibility in design, matched 
with certainty and predictability of choices and outcomes, makes the 
establishment of complex arrangements possible on a contractual basis 
and not necessarily through the medium of an organised firm. Indeed, 
English common law is suitable to document everything from the free-
wheeling, ad hoc and always unique arrangements of the souk to those of 
organised markets where parties enter and care only about matter traded, 
price, and quantity, with contract and regulation taking away even coun-
terparty risk. 
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Conclusion
 Having a utility such as the one provided by the English legal system, law 
and courts, serving the international commercial and financial matters is 
no small thing. No doubt other utilities exist and have their own advan-
tages and merits. 
Brexit, still subject to a number of rollercoasters till it fully plays out, 
will mark the political and economic life of the UK for a long time. The 
upheaval caused by Brexit inevitably raises the question of the future of 
the English legal system as an international utility. Seeking to explain 
what are the system’s special features and why it is important for com-
mercial and financial matters is one of the important debates in which 
the English system officials, the users of the system as well as the officials 
of competitor systems must engage. Limiting its use by regulatory fiat 
would be short-sighted and potentially prejudicial to the international 
commercial and financial world. Believing that it can or should be partly 
copied or otherwise easily emulated, runs the risk of not doing full justice 
to genuine efforts to modernise and upgrade other legal systems. Let us 
hope that the debate will be intense but fruitful and that the outcome 
will be a better understanding of the function and importance of judicial 
systems both for the running of commerce and finance and for the pro-
motion of the rule of law. 
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REGULATORY ARBITRAGE: SOME 
THOUGHTS
Lachlan Burn
“This is where firms take advantage of loopholes in regulatory systems to 
avoid certain types of regulation. This can be achieved by conducting busi-
ness, creating products and services in certain locations that are outside the 
purview of regulators.”
Financial Times Lexicon
“Regulatory arbitrage is a practice whereby firms capitalize on loopholes 
in regulatory systems in order to circumvent unfavorable regulation. Arbi-
trage opportunities may be accomplished by a variety of tactics, including 
restructuring transactions, financial engineering and geographic relocation. 
Regulatory arbitrage is difficult to prevent entirely, but its prevalence can be 
limited by closing the most obvious loopholes and thus increasing the costs 
associated of circumventing the regulation.”
Investopedia
1 Introduction
These attempts at definition are interesting, for several reasons. First, they 
both indicate that there is something faintly distasteful – indeed wrong – 
about regulatory arbitrage. It seeks to “avoid” or “circumvent” regulation. 
The definitions might avoid being pejorative in tone if they allowed that 
avoidance is sometimes caused by regulation being unfair or unjust in its 
application, or even just inappropriate; but that implication is difficult to 
find. The notion that both definitions seek to convey is that the person 
engaging in regulatory arbitrage is doing something that ought not to be 
done. It is something that needs to be “prevented”.
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Secondly, they both imply that there are two actors involved in the 
process, one legitimately trying to regulate and the other illegitimately 
trying to avoid or circumvent.
And, thirdly, there is a suggestion that the intention is to avoid regula-
tion whereas, as I will suggest later, there are forms of regulatory arbitrage 
that involve transactional shift from a less appropriate regime to another, 
more appropriate regime, often within the “purview” of the same regu-
lator.
In many respects, though, both definitions accurately describe one 
form of regulatory arbitrage. Regulated entities often resent regulation 
and seek to avoid it in the ways suggested, in order to maximise profit 
for themselves – and, sometimes, their clients. I have little to say about 
such practices, except to note that loopholes that allow them to occur 
are defects in regulatory structure and it is incumbent on regulators to 
close them down. And I might add that where such practices are lawful 
it is important to avoid demonising those that engage in them. Civilized 
societies are dependent on the rule of law. The rule of law depends on 
certainty as to what is, and what is not, lawful. Those that engage in lawful 
practices should not be pilloried for failing to observe morality or the 
“spirit” of the law because that leads to mob rule and the law of the jungle. 
“Avoidance” is not the same as “evasion” and to elide the two is to threaten 
the fabric of the rule of law and the society that depends on it.
The definitions are, however, too limited in scope and omit other 
aspects of regulatory arbitrage that are, to me, more interesting and (I 
believe) worthy of discussion. For example, is regulatory arbitrage wrong 
where the law or regulation in question expressly permits (or even 
encourages) it? What if the regulation that is avoided is simply inappro-
priate – or even unjust or unfair? Should market participants be able to 
choose between jurisdictions within which, or from which, to transact 
business where the law is unclear and one jurisdiction interprets it more 
sensibly than another? Is arbitrage something that is engaged in solely 
by those conducting business – or do regulators and states themselves 
encourage it by competing with each other? And, finally, are there occa-
sions where the same regulation needs to be interpreted differently in two 
jurisdictions, because of differing market conditions?
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I will try to look briefly at some of these questions, with some illustra-
tions, and I will end with some thoughts on some of the factors that make 
regulatory arbitrage an unavoidable feature of a global market place. 
2 Types of regulatory arbitrage
2.1 Regulatory inspired arbitrage
Regulatory arbitrage is on occasion built into regulation. Take, for 
example, the EU regime that regulates financial markets – the Markets 
in Financial Instruments Directive1 (MiFID). The fundamental concept 
that underlies the regime is that of the passport. Firms are authorised 
and regulated in one EEA jurisdiction but are able to operate in every 
other EEA country. Of course, this is only possible because the body of 
regulation that permits it is uniform across the EEA, so that it should not 
(and in theory does not) matter where a firm is established or regulated2. 
One size fits all. But the point here is that firms have choice of where 
to establish and be regulated. That choice is influenced by a number of 
factors, of which perhaps the most important is the desire of the EU to 
develop a single market. Separate markets, with different authorisation 
requirements and regulation for those operating in them, are inevitably 
less efficient and more costly than a single market. Financial markets 
fund the real economy and are fundamental to economic growth, jobs 
and prosperity, so it is in the interest of states and their regulators that 
the markets should be as cost effective and efficient as possible. This leads 
inevitably to the concept of the passport and the prospect of regulatory 
arbitrage that it opens up.
Choice is also important (and, I believe, necessary) due to other fac-
tors, which result in some EEA jurisdictions being better suited as the 
“home” of many financial institutions than others. In theory, it would 
be possible for there to be a financial centre in each EEA Member State, 
and for the financial institutions to be evenly spread throughout the 
EEA. In practice, that is not what works best. Financial markets benefit 
1 Directive 2004/39/EC.
2 This is expressly recognised in Recital 46 to the new MiFID (Directive 2014/65/EU) 
which requires a Member State to withdraw authorisation from firms that have chosen 
that State to evade the stricter standards in force in another State where they intend to 
conduct business. 
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from “clumping” – from the firms that operate in them being physically 
proximate to one another. This is partly due to human factors – human 
beings working in the same lines of business seem to congregate together 
and operate better when in large groupings. Think of Silicon Valley. Rel-
atively dull factors such as infrastructure (power stations to run the nec-
essary computers, transport and living accommodation for staff, support 
services such as accountants and lawyers and so on) also contribute to 
choice of location for a business. 
Choice of location for regulatory purposes is also partly influenced by 
favourable (or unfavourable) perceptions of the expertise of the relevant 
regulators. Some national regulators have more experience at regulating 
financial markets than others and firms naturally choose those that are 
more skilled over those that are less experienced. And politics also comes 
into play. It is no secret that some EEA jurisdictions look upon finance 
with a more jaundiced eye than others and it should be no surprise that 
firms avoid them if they can.
Interestingly, if regulatory arbitrage were something that regulated 
entities indulged in in a predatory way, one would think that choice of 
jurisdiction for authorisation would lead to gravitational pull towards 
the most relaxed and least powerful financial centre. The Machiavels in 
charge of the firms would locate themselves where they could out-smart 
the regulator and (perhaps) indulge in regulatory capture by becoming 
so important to their home jurisdiction that they can dictate the rules. 
But that is not what has happened. Rather the reverse. Some of the more 
strictly regulated jurisdictions appear to be the most attractive to regu-
lated firms. 
This point may benefit from a couple of illustrations. Take, for 
example, the authorisation regime under the Markets in Financial Instru-
ments Directive. I suspect that most people would accept that the UK is 
one of the world’s leading financial centres, but for those who doubt, per-
haps a few facts might demonstrate the point. According to The CityUK3 
the UK is the third largest banking centre globally, playing host to 250 
non-UK banks (more than any other financial centre) and providing 17% 
of international bank lending in 2016. Assets under management in the 
UK amounted to £6.8 trillion in the same year, of which about a third 
3 “Key Facts about the UK as an International Financial Centre”, November 2016. 
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was managed for non-UK clients. The UK accounted for roughly a third 
of foreign currency trading and hosted the largest insurance industry in 
Europe and the third largest in the world. And so on.
Who regulates all this? The UK’s Financial Conduct Authority. Do 
they represent the lowest common denominator? Views may differ, but 
as one who deals with FCA regulation on a daily basis, I think not. Rather 
the contrary. When there was a risk that hybrid bank capital instruments 
might be sold to retail investors, it was the FCA that stepped in and intro-
duced a ban on sales, using its market intervention powers. The product 
governance regime that is being introduced under MiFID II, to ensure 
that securities are better targeted at appropriate investors, is based on a 
regime introduced in relation to retail structured products by the FCA 
several years ago. In 2006, the FCA carried out a review of the retail mar-
kets in the UK and implemented tough new requirements for indepen-
dent financial advisers – so tough, indeed, that the resulting drop out 
from that sector led to an advisory “gap”, leaving anyone without signifi-
cant funds to invest without anyone to advise them4.
Are these the actions of a weak, market friendly regulator? Clearly 
not. Did market participants head for the UK’s airports in search of 
“lighter touch” regulation because of the tough approach of the regulator? 
Again, clearly not.
The UK’s listing regime provides another useful example. Any com-
pany seeking admission to the EU’s regulated markets has to comply with 
various directives and regulations. Prior to admission, a prospectus must 
be produced, complying with the prospectus directive. Following admis-
sion, annual and semi-annual reports must be produced, in accordance 
with the transparency directive. And so on. But the UK has its own “gold 
plated” regime, that sits alongside the EU’s. Companies seeking a listing 
of their shares on the UK’s regulated market have a choice between the 
EU’s regime (a “standard” listing) and the UK’s own “premium” listing 
regime, which takes the EU’s requirements and adds to them. The addi-
tions mainly relate to extra corporate governance requirements. One 
would think that companies seeking an easy regulatory life would go for 
a standard listing. But very many don’t.
4 See the Final Report of the Financial Advice Market Review, a joint FCA and HM 
Treasury paper of March 2016. 
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Why would regulated entities not seek the lowest possible level of reg-
ulation? Given that, in many cases, avoidance is possible, is the failure 
to avoid evidence of corporate masochism? Or is there a more rational 
explanation? I suspect the latter. Markets comprise buyers and sellers, 
issuers and investors, those who have funds to invest and those that need 
to use those funds. Not surprisingly, investors care about the safety of 
their investments and therefore take regulation very seriously. Issuers 
and intermediaries that operate under lax regulatory regimes will be less 
attractive than those that comply with sensible, more rigorous rules. It is 
therefore hardly surprising that those who need to attract investment are 
prepared to submit to higher levels of regulation.
The disclosure regime for new issues of securities provides another 
example of “built in” arbitrage of this sort. Again, there is a passport. 
Once the prospectus is approved in the home state, it can be used in all 
other states for admission to the regulated market or for a public offer. 
Again, one might think that the choice of approval jurisdiction that is 
given to issuers of many non-equity securities would lead to a flight to the 
lowest common denominator. The laxest, least experienced, approving 
authority would attract all the business. But, again, this is not what has 
happened. As we shall see, there is arbitrage – in the sense of issuers and 
their advisers switching from time to time between authorities – but the 
main approving authorities are the handful of main financial centres, 
none of which could be described as the bottom of the pile, in terms of 
regulatory rigour. Issuers and firms advising them are not searching for 
soft touch regulators. Rather, they look for regulators that have experience 
and knowledge and capacity to handle the prospectus approval process 
expeditiously. If it were otherwise, there are many regulators in the EU 
who might provide a better option. Firms operating in new issue markets 
much prefer to deal with regulators that are experienced and understand 
how markets work. A great deal of time can be spent dealing with inex-
perienced regulators, often with no guarantee of a successful resulting 
transaction – or, indeed, of greater investor protection as a result.
In conclusion, it is, in my view, wrong to assume that arbitrage 
inspired by regulation will always result in a “race to the bottom”. If that 
were the case, the UK would not host one of the leading global financial 
markets; and those listing international bonds in the EU would not focus 
on a mere handful of possible locations, but would seek out the laxest 
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regulator among the 28 member states. But this is not to say that, where 
market forces allow, the race will end up near the bottom. Sometimes 
regulation may be so misguided (in the view of the market) that there is 
no option but to avoid it. And, if investors accept that avoidance and will 
still buy, then the market will continue to prosper in spite of the reduc-
tion in regulation.
2.2 The human factor
Having said that, regulators (and, indeed, markets) are populated by 
humans; and humans sometimes make poor judgements. So, even though 
all authorities charged with approving prospectuses in the EEA operate 
under the same set of rules, not all of them use the same judgements in 
applying the rules. From time to time regulatory enthusiasm can wax or 
wane. And if as it waxes it becomes, from a market perspective, excessive 
then it can result in regulatory arbitrage. Market participants who have 
the ability to do so will move to another regulator.
This is less easy to do in relation to MiFID authorisation – although, 
of course, new market entrants may avoid draconian jurisdictions and, 
over time and if things get bad enough, established firms may decide 
to move their business elsewhere. But in relation to regulatory matters 
such as new issue prospectus approval, it does happen from time to time. 
Every so often, those charged with reading and approving prospectuses 
become over-enthusiastic. Comments on drafts increase in volume and 
decrease in relevance. Costs increase, as the process consumes more advi-
sory time, and frustrations mount. Eventually the pressure causes a move 
to another regulator. But this is not caused by a desire to avoid regulation; 
rather it is a result of a desire for better, more proportionate, regulation.
2.3 Regulatory over-reach
Sometimes regulators can over-reach themselves. This can take several 
forms. One form consists of gold plating. A minimum EU standard is 
implemented by a state, which then adds to it. This is not always bad. For 
example, as mentioned earlier, in the United Kingdom equity issuers have 
a choice of listing under a “gold plated” regime – premium listing – which 
subjects them to corporate governance and other requirements that are 
additional to the EU-wide listing requirements. And many issuers choose 
to use this regime, presumably because it attracts more investors. How-
ever, where the additional regulation is simply piling Pelion on Ossa, it 
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can amount to regulatory over-reach with more cost to firms than benefit 
to market users and can lead to avoidance by firms.
Another form of over-reach is where a market wide regulatory deci-
sion is taken inappropriately. An example of this arguably relates to con-
vertible bonds, where the European-wide regulator, ESMA,5 interpreted 
the EU prospectus disclosure requirements as requiring a working capital 
statement, on the basis that convertible bonds are close to equity (for 
which such a statement is required). The argument against this treatment 
included the fact that wholesale investors regarded convertible bonds as 
debt, not equity; that, even if this was wrong, a working capital state-
ment would be out of date and therefore useless by the time the bonds 
were converted into shares; and that wholesale investors (at whom such 
bonds were targeted) did not require such a statement. These (and other) 
arguments were rejected, with the result that convertible bonds are now 
largely issued without admission to a regulated market and to wholesale 
investors only, so that no prospectus at all is required. And, indeed, none 
is produced – which neatly illustrates the weakness of the regulatory case, 
given that wholesale investors have ample commercial strength to require 
whatever disclosure they want and appear happy to receive none.
Another developing example of regulatory over-reach may be the new 
EU regimes regulating retail packaged product disclosure and product 
governance. It is too early to say what effect these may have on markets 
but early indications are that they may result in non-equity investments 
being limited to wholesale investors, with retail investors only having 
access through managed funds or discretionary management. A move 
of target investor base from retail to wholesale, to take advantage of the 
different, less burdensome, regulatory regime applying to the latter, is an 
example of regulatory arbitrage. If it occurs, it will be as a result (unfor-
tunately) of well-intentioned consumer protection regulation having 
unintended consequences. Indeed, the consequences (if they occur) 
will defeat one of the declared objectives of the current EU Commission 
which, through its Capital Markets Union initiative, has recognised the 
need to provide a wider range of investment opportunities to retail inves-
tors.
5 The European Securities and Markets Authority.
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2.4  Regulatory competition
Regulatory arbitrage is sometimes the result of competition between reg-
ulators (or even states). For example it is no secret, in the context of the 
recent decision by the United Kingdom to leave the European Union, that 
several key EU states are jockeying for position in their eagerness to coax 
financial firms located in the UK into their arms. France, for example, 
has said that it would welcome refugee bankers from the soon-to-be iso-
lated UK, offering tax breaks and proposing to build a number of new 
office blocks in Paris to accommodate them. It is in competition with 
Ireland, the Netherlands and Germany, to name but three. Some within 
the United Kingdom have, in turn, suggested that the UK should turn 
itself into a light touch, low cost, off-shore financial centre, unless the 
EU accommodates demands for a degree of free market access. And, of 
course, some countries have used tax reduction very effectively to bring 
firms within their fold.
No doubt firms that succumb to these blandishments will be accused 
of regulatory arbitrage, even though the prime movers are the states 
rather than themselves.
Regulatory authorities also compete with each other. Until relatively 
recently, the UK Listing Authority had a statutory objective to do with 
maintaining the competitiveness of the UK’s markets. And even though 
this has now been removed, the UKLA is understandably concerned 
whenever there is a downturn in the volume of issues that it handles. It is 
currently consulting on whether it should set up a Multilateral Trading 
Facility, to sit along side the existing array of regulated and exchange reg-
ulated markets in the UK, influenced no doubt by the availability of such 
markets elsewhere in the EU. And under the same influence, the London 
Stock Exchange has recently set up its own MTF, to compete with similar 
markets in Luxembourg and Ireland.
Again, if the market responds by moving business to these new mar-
kets, it will be regulatory arbitrage inspired by competition between reg-
ulators rather than market participants.
Regulatory Arbitrage: Some Thoughts - Lachlan Burn
88
2.5 Market prestige
Regulatory arbitrage can sometimes depend on something as simple as 
perception and reputation. Some markets are seen as being the places 
to be; others are not. A listing on London is not the same as a listing 
(to pick a fictitious and therefore non-contentious example) the Rurita-
nian Exchange. Prestige counts and issuers and investors will seek it out. 
It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the financial intermediaries that 
facilitate deals base themselves in those centres. It may result in regula-
tory arbitrage, with some regulatory regimes profiting at the expense of 
others; but it is not regulatory arbitrage driven so much by the regulated 
as by those who are protected by regulation – the investing public.
2.6 Law
Rules do not exist in isolation. Even the best harmonised rulebook needs 
interpretation – by regulators and, ultimately, by the courts. In the EU, 
the ultimate legal interpretative power lies with the European Court of 
Justice. But, as the rules need to be interpreted in the light of individual 
cases, where a transaction is involved the ECJ’s interpretation will rely, 
to an extent, on the interpretation of the nature of the transaction under 
its governing law. European law gives the parties to a transaction, in a 
wholesale context, considerable freedom to choose their own governing 
law. That choice will influence the economic result of the transaction and 
may therefore affect the way in which the harmonised EU rules apply to 
it. So, for example, some EU jurisdictions give their courts greater lati-
tude to readjust the balance of contracts after they have been executed, 
to reflect changes in circumstances; others place greater emphasis on the 
contractual terms as written, to which they give effect regardless of any 
alleged unfairness due to such changes. Choice of law can, therefore, also 
be seen as a form of regulatory arbitrage, but one lacking any reprehen-
sible desire to avoid regulation because it is based on the free choice of 
the parties and without intent to avoid the regulations in question.
It will be interesting to see whether the departure of the United 
Kingdom from the EU will lead to a reduction in the use of English law 
for international financial transactions. Logic and reason indicate that it 
should not. There is no legal restriction imposed on commercial parties 
as to the choice of law to govern their transactions. It is true that it will 
be important that the current provisions that govern choice of law and 
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applicable jurisdiction under EU law are replicated in some form once 
the UK leaves the EU. But English law governs financial transactions 
that have nothing to do with the EU and has done so for several cen-
turies. With limited exceptions choice of English law and enforcement 
of English judgements have not given rise to any difficulties. And even 
in those limited cases, where enforcement of judgements might prove 
difficult, contractual arbitration provisions have provided an effective 
remedy.
There is therefore no reason why anyone should replace English gov-
erning law and jurisdiction of English courts with any other jurisdic-
tion. However, as we have seen in recent years, humans are influenced 
as much by emotion as by reason and there may be moves in some quar-
ters to change applicable law and courts. – whether to punish “perfid-
ious Albion” for its betrayal of the European Project or whether because 
of a resurgent nationalism. Whether such attempts will succeed in an 
international market, where investors hail not just the 27 remaining EU 
states but from the Near East, Asia and the Americas as well, will only 
become apparent in the course of time. I suspect not, though. Trust in a 
legal system and its courts develops over long periods of time. Investors 
care about this sort of thing and have been made even more aware of 
its importance by recent sovereign restructurings, where those owning 
bonds subject to the issuer’s own laws fared less well than others.
Will the English courts respond to any move away from the use of 
English law in financial transactions – say, by changing the way they 
interpret contracts to suit the market better? I would say absolutely not. 
Judges are not business people in search of profits. English common 
law, though heavily based on precedent, does adapt to changes in cir-
cumstances from time to time. The law relating to interpretation of con-
tracts in the 21st century bears little relation to that of the 17th century. 
But changes are incremental and designed to take acount of things like 
changes in technology or methods of doing business in the commercial 
world. No judge will deliberately promote a change in order to drum up 
more business for the courts or to persuade market participants to con-
tinue to use English law.
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3 Causes, remedies and the irredeemable
Regulatory arbitrage, therefore, has a much wider meaning than simply 
using differences between legal systems to avoid regulation or to make a 
profit. It may be interesting to move on, to look at why regulatory arbi-
trage (of every sort) exists and how the worst sorts might (in theory) be 
contained.
3.1 Exchange control
Perhaps the most important factor that allows regulatory arbitrage to exist 
is the absence (at least in the more developed economies) of exchange 
controls. This was a fundamental step without which the international 
markets and global economy that we have today could not have devel-
oped. Imagine financial markets where a company in Country A wanting 
funding to build a factory in Country B had to apply to its central bank 
for permission to borrow in Country B’s currency (or, indeed, to borrow 
at all). How would the EU’s single market work if investors had to get 
permission before buying securities in another jurisdiction? How could 
the euro exist?
The benefits of the abolition of exchange control, from an economic 
perspective, are well recognised (though by no means by all); but the con-
sequences, from a regulatory perspective, are much less well understood. 
Put simply, if you restrict the activities of your economic actors to your 
own jurisdiction, you can impose on them whatever regulatory regime 
you wish. They can go nowhere else (at least, not without your permis-
sion). If they want to invest, they must use your currency and invest in 
your economy, under your rules. Conversely, when you remove the con-
trols on the movement of money, you lose an important element of regu-
latory control. If you make the rules too onerous, money will simply flow 
elsewhere. 
3.2 Lock-down activity in a jurisdiction
Of course, money is only one aspect of any transaction. For any deal, you 
need several actors – a buyer and a seller, for example. Regulators can 
(and do) fasten on this fact, for instance by saying that anyone wanting 
to do business with anyone in their jurisdiction has to do so under their 
rules. Think of MiFID in the EU. This is a powerful tool; but it does not 
make the regulator omnipotent. You can require anyone who wants to 
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sell a bond to someone in the EU to do so under EU rules; but you can’t 
stop the investor boarding a plane in the EU and flying to another finan-
cial centre outside the EU, with a briefcase full of cash, to buy whatever it 
wants. Only exchange controls will do that.
3.3 Prevent investors from operating outside a jurisdiction
But what about imposing limits on what investors can buy? For example, 
many wholesale investors in the EU are regulated entities, such as pen-
sion funds. As a policy matter, it is important that they invest prudently 
and there are, therefore, prudential rules that apply to them as to what 
assets they can hold. In theory, it would be possible to curb regulatory 
arbitrage by requiring a substantial proportion of those assets to be 
bought, say, on EU markets. That would force issuers and their financial 
intermediaries into the EU regulatory net. And there is some force in that 
argument although, probably, little economic sense. It is difficult to see 
how EU pensioners would benefit from their funds having limited access 
to investment in those global companies that choose not to come to the 
EU’s markets.
3.4 Single rule book
Another way of limiting regulatory arbitrage is to develop a single rule 
book, which would make it irrelevant where one transacts business, as 
the rules everywhere will be the same. Examples of this include the devel-
opment of International Financial Reporting Standards (which, inter-
estingly, have developed some regional differences as a result of states 
indulging in regulatory arbitrage); and the efforts of the EU to develop 
detailed harmonised rules in relation to financial markets, involving the 
increased use of regulations, rather than directives, to ensure that the 
same rules apply everywhere.
The problem with this solution, though, is that there is no universal 
single rule book and it is unlikely that there will be one in the forseeable 
future. The nearest one gets to such a thing is the high level deliberations 
of IOSCO or, in relation to accounting, the efforts that resulted in the 
somewhat fractured International Financial Reporting Standards. And 
even if there were such a rule book, it would still need to be applied and 
interpreted in the same way everywhere, which is highly unlikely given 
the propensity of any two human beings to see things differently.
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4 The Future?
One thing that has become very clear in the past year or so is that pre-
dicting the future is a foolish occupation. However, I will venture two 
thoughts as to future possibilities in this area, if only to provide a couple 
of ducks for the sports enthusiasts to shoot at.
The first relates to the raising of capital. At present, this activity is 
fairly heavily intermediated and, as a result, increaingly heavily regulated. 
For example, we have rules on transparency of fees, on allocation policies, 
on disclosure, on behaviour (a lot to do with market abuse and insider 
dealing) and so on. I doubt whether intermediation will survive in the 
new issues markets, though – at least for the better rated issuers. Rather, I 
suspect that technology will eventually allow such issuers to raise capital 
from insitutional investors directly. A finance director will send an elec-
tronic message requesting indications of interest in providing a certain 
amount of funding to it. Investors will respond with the amounts they are 
prepared to lend and the other commercial terms. The most favourable 
options will be sorted by technology and, after a certain amount of toing 
and froing between the computers of investors and the issuer, a deal will 
be struck and the documentation will be produced and executed between 
the computers. All of this will take minutes. And there will be little to 
worry the regulators as the arrangements are pricipal to principal. No 
intermediaies. No regulation of intermediaries. No need for regulatory 
arbitrage.
The second tentative prediction tends in the other direction. It is 
based on the assumption that globalisation will continue (an assumption 
that declarations by President Trump might make unrealistic). However, 
if it does survive, we will see a continuation of the current trend towards 
greater complexity of markets and the instruments that are traded in 
them; and an increase in the size of those markets and the institutions 
that operate in them. “Too big to fail” may become (indeed, may already 
be) “too big to manage” or “too difficult to understand” and therefore 
“too hard to supervise”. This will not (and should not) stop attempts by 
regulators to regulate. We will see more rules. Will they be uniform across 
all markets? I doubt it. The rules for bank capital have been reasonably 
successful at achieving uniformity on the regulatory page but uniformity 
of interpretation and application has been somewhat wanting. And the 
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indications by the new US administration that it intends to dismantle 
some of the recent post-crisis bank regulation does not augur well for 
universal rule making. 
Nor, perhaps does the recent decision of the United Kingdom to leave 
the European Union. It remains to be seen whether that will lead to a 
marked divergence between UK and EU regulation or whether the desire 
for mutual market access will lead to some kind of continued conver-
gence between UK and EU regimes. Again, much will depend on which 
of head and heart rules the other. One would think that Europe, still 
rebuilding after the recent financial crisis and other shocks, will pursue 
growth objectives to restore economies, create jobs and prepare for the 
next wave of shocks (not least, the looming demographic shift that will, if 
we are not careful, overwhelm health, welfare and old age provision; and 
the threat to employment from the development of artificial intelligence). 
If so, logic would indicate that one should leave a funding engine such as 
the international capital markets alone – even though they happen to be 
based in London.
Some sort of regulatory equivalence arrangement will need to be 
reached, particularly in relation to retail markets, where consumer pro-
tection is paramount and, understandably, national and EU regulators 
will want to rule their own patch. But wholesale markets, which are huge 
both in volume and in economic importance, should be left alone. After 
all, European companies fund themselves, and EU institutional inves-
tors buy assets, in markets as far apart as New York and Japan and do 
so without any EU regulatory umbrella. Why should the UK as a “third 
country” be any different?
But then, more emotional reactions may prevail. There are some who 
detest “Anglo-Saxon” financial markets and consider them to be toxic, 
much as some enviormentalists have an absolute aversion to nuclear 
power. To them, the evisceration of the markets currently based in the 
UK would be a highly prized goal. Others believe in self-reliance. It is not 
safe they argue, to rely on funding from foreign markets. To them, Brexit 
may represent an excellent opportunity to build domestic markets.
It is far too early to predict how the debate may resolve itself. We 
are in a world of unknowns and not knowables and we can only hope 
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that intelligent people will eventually reach rational conclusions, thereby 
avoiding unnecessary pain and suffering.
Will uniformity increase over time? Again, I doubt it. National inter-
ests will continue to defeat attempts at global uniformity. And differences 
will create regulatory gaps that allow the unscrupulous (whether reg-
ulator or regulated) to take advantage. So market complexity will lead 
to more regulation and this will, absent regulatory uniformity, result in 
opportunities for arbitrage.
5 Conclusions
In conclusion, therefore, I am somewhat pessimistic about the prospect 
of elimination of regulatory arbitrage, in its narrow sense. Multi-jurisdic-
tional attempts to remove abuses tend to introduce increasing regulatory 
complexity, which is in many ways grist to the profit-seeking arbitrageur’s 
mill. To combat this, some regulators resort to legislative short cuts - for 
example, the use of overriding and all-encompassing general principles, 
such as requirements for firms to behave with market integrity or fair-
ness or in the best interests of their clients – all to be judged, of course, 
with the benefit of hindsight viewed through the eyes of the regulator. 
The problem is that neither legal complexity nor legislative short cuts will 
eliminate the evil; and, what is for me worse, both infringe the important 
principle of the rule of law, by making compliance difficult and enforce-
ment unpredictable.
I am also ambivalent about regulatory arbitrage in its wider sense. I 
am not at all sure that market choice of regulator or regulatory system is 
always a bad thing. Indeed, sometimes it is very positive, in that it gives 
markets flexibility without investor detriment.
And even if I thought otherwise, I do not believe that it is possible 
to change the way things work without restricting (or maybe even 
closing down) the global economy, which may, of course, happen. If it 
did, though, I suspect that debate about the benefits or disadvantages of 
regulatory arbitrage would be lost in the white noise generated by the 
resulting melt-down of the financial markets.
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AFTER BREXIT: REBOOTING EURO 
AREA FINANCIAL INTEGRATION 
Jeromin Zettelmeyer1
This essay deals with the impact of Brexit on the financial stability and 
integration of the EU-27 –particularly on the Euro area – and its implica-
tions for EU-27 financial reform. From the perspective of the Euro area 
financial system, should Brexit be regarded as a threat or an opportunity? 
The answer is “both”, for reasons that go beyond the obvious trade-off 
between losing the EU’s most important financial center while benefiting 
from the absorption of some of its activities into the Euro area. While it is 
unlikely to lead to market disruptions, Brexit will be unambiguously bad 
on impact for the EU-27 and Euro area financial systems, in part because 
it will raise the costs of financial intermediation, but mainly because it 
will bring the weaknesses of the EU’s incomplete banking and capital 
market union into even sharper relief. For this reason, however, it may 
spur reform. Therein lies the main opportunity. 
In what follows, this argument is developed in five steps. First, a brief 
description of the state of Euro area financial integration. Second, a sum-
mary of continuing obstacles to full financial integration, and how Brexit 
will likely interact with these obstacles. Third, how the ensuing problems 
should be addressed at both the EU-27 and Euro area levels. Fourth, why 
these reforms are likely to be difficult, particularly at the level of the Euro 
area. And fifth, how these difficulties could potentially be overcome.
1 I am grateful to Markus Brunnermeier, Gabriele Guidice, Sam Langfield and Nicolas 
Véron for helpful discussions on the topic of this paper.
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Incomplete Euro area financial integration: a tale of two charts2
In a financially perfectly integrated currency area, firms with iden-
tical firm-level creditworthiness should be able to borrow on the same 
terms, even when they are based in different member countries. A crude 
measure for the extent to which the Euro area fails to achieve perfect inte-
gration is hence the difference in average lending rates to non-financial 
corporates across countries, shown in Figure 1. This measure is crude in 
the sense that differences in average lending rates may reflect structural 
differences between the firm populations that relate to creditworthiness 
(for example, Germany having a larger share of medium and large enter-
prises than Portugal). However, structural differences of this type should 
not vary much over time. Therefore, large variations in the cross-country 
dispersion of average bank lending rates over time are likely to reflect 
country-level factors preventing full financial integration – such as sov-
ereign risk and the strength of the banking system – rather than changes 
at the firm level.
Figure 1 shows that, by this measure, the Euro area was financially 
well integrated prior to September 2008: the dispersion of average firm 
borrowing rates across Euro area countries was only about 150 basis 
points, and just 100 basis points if Greece, the country with the highest 
borrowing rates, is excluded from the sample. The overall dispersion then 
rose sharply after the collapse of Lehmann, stabilized briefly, and then 
resumed its rise in early 2010. Comparing the two definitions of disper-
sion used in the chart (i.e. the blue with the green line) shows that this 
reflects mostly a “Greece effect”. If Greece is excluded from the sample, 
the dispersion of bank lending rates in the Euro area is basically stable 
until mid 2011, even though the average bank lending rate (red lines) 
shows wild swings. In this sense, financial integration in the Euro area 
held up even in crisis times. Beginning in mid-June 2011, however, when 
the crisis spread to Italy and Spain, dispersion rose steadily even in the 
definition that excludes Greece, reaching a maximum of almost 300 basis 
points in early 2013. By the end of the year, it has fallen back to just 200 
basis points, and by mid 2015, to 100 basis points. Since then, dispersion 
excluding Greece has fluctuated between about 100 and 150 and is hence 
essentially back to pre-Lehmann levels. 
2 See ECB (2017) for a much deeper and more detailed assessment of financial integra-
tion in the Euro area.
PART I I - Regulatory Arbitrage Across Jurisdictions
97
Figure 1. Average level and dispersion of bank lending to non-
financial corporations 
Source: ECB and author’s calculations.
Note: Average and dispersion measures calculated for Austria, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain.
Based on Figure 1, one is tempted to conclude that “financial fragmenta-
tion” – the opposite of financial integration, and one of the hallmarks of 
the Euro area crisis – has been overcome for some time now. However, 
the chart also shows that until the start of the ECB’s public asset purchase 
programme in early 2015, dispersion was about twice as high – 2 per-
centage points – as it is today. Without ultra-easy monetary policy, the 
level of fragmentation is likely to be significantly higher than the current 
numbers suggest.
One reason for why this may be the case is illustrated in Figure 2. 
The vertical axis shows the most recent average sovereign credit rating 
of every Euro area country, expressed on a 22-point scale (1 denotes the 
highest possible rating, i.e. AAA; 22 the lowest). On the horizontal axis, 
the figure shows a measure of the geographic concentration of bank hold-
ings of sovereign bonds for countries in the Euro area, namely, the face 
value of sovereign bonds issued by the country held in its own banking 
system divided by the face value of sovereign bonds held in all banking 
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systems in the Euro area. For example, banks residing in Luxembourg 
hold a very small share (just 2.5%) of Luxembourg government bonds 
held in Euro area banks, whereas banks residing in Greece hold virtually 
all (98%) of Greek government bonds held in Euro area banks. 
Figure 2. Sovereign credit ratings and the geographic concentration of 
sovereign bond holdings 
Source: ECB, rating agencies, and author’s calculations.
Note: Sovereign credit rating computed on a 22-point scale, based on average 
of Fitch, Moody’s and S&P rating, where 1 is best (AAA) and 22 is worst. 
Sovereign bonds held by own banking system in % of holdings in Euro area banks 
computed by dividing series BSI.M.XX.N.A.A30.A.1.U6.2100.Z01.E from the 
ECB’s Balance Sheet Items database (Debt securities held, Total, Outstanding 
amounts at the end of the period, Domestic, General Government; where 
XX is a placeholder for the country code, e.g. for Austria: XX = AT) by series 
BSI.M.XX.N.A.A30.A.1.U2.2100.Z01.E (Debt securities held, Total, Outstanding 
amounts at the end of the period, Euro area (changing composition), General 
Government). The series can be downloaded from http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.
do?node=9691311 . 
Figure 2 illustrates three points. First, the dispersion of sovereign 
credit ratings of Euro area countries remains very high. It goes all the 
way from AAA (Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) to Greece’s 
sub-investment rating. Second, with few exceptions, Euro area bank hold-
ings of sovereign debt are concentrated in the country of the issuer, with a 
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median concentration of 68%. This is a legacy of the debt crisis (Battistini 
et al 2014, Brutti and Sauré 2016). Third, while the sovereign credit rating 
and bank holding concentration are uncorrelated for the countries with a 
relatively small share of sovereign debt in the balance sheet of their own 
banking system (< 50% of Euro area bank holdings), they are strongly 
correlated (for the reminder, banks in countries with relatively weak sov-
ereign credit ratings tend to hold relatively large amounts of sovereign 
bonds).
On this basis, it is fair to assume that the end of large-scale asset pur-
chases by the ECB will, ceteris paribus, bring a return to significantly 
higher dispersion of bank lending rates in the Euro area. Given large 
differences in the sovereign ratings, differences in sovereign yields are 
likely to widen. This will disproportionately hit banks in countries with 
relatively weaker credit ratings – since these are countries in which banks 
hold particularly large amounts of domestic sovereign debt. Conse-
quently, the funding costs of these banks are likely to rise, and some of 
this rise will be passed on to their borrowers. 
Brexit and Euro area financial fragmentation: the general logic3
Continued financial fragmentation in the Euro area relates to cross-
country differences in four major areas. First, the strength of bank balance 
sheets, due to legacy Non-Performing Loans and “home bias” towards 
sovereigns of varying credit quality. Both vary significantly across coun-
tries (as Figure 2 illustrates for the latter). Second, the strength of finan-
cial safety nets: deposit insurance, and the fiscal buffers backing it. Third, 
corporate and bank insolvency regimes, which continue to be based 
mostly on national law. Finally, non-bank/capital market regulation and 
supervision. While the EU-27 now have an – albeit incomplete – banking 
union, there is no equivalent union for the capital markets. The regulation 
and particularly supervision of capital market and investment banking 
activities such as issuing and trading of debt and equity securities, foreign 
exchange trading, and designing and selling derivatives products are still 
largely in national hands. 
3 This section and the next are based on Sapir, Schoenmaker and Veron (2017). For the 
impact of Brexit on the City of London, see Djankov (2017).
After Brexit: Rebooting Euro Area Financial Integration - Jeromin Zettelmeyer
100
Brexit will negatively affect the Euro area financial system mainly by 
interacting with the last of these four causes of financial fragmentation. 
The logic behind this is as follows. Because of the loss of “passporting” 
rights, a significant proportion of London-based investment banking 
activities – up to €1.8 trillion (or 17 percent) of UK banking assets and 
tens of thousands of bank-related jobs, which currently serve EU based 
clients, may move to the EU-27 – which in practice means, to the Euro 
area. If these activities were subsequently regulated and supervised by 
just one Euro area authority, this would not matter much (save for the 
direct cost of moving and having to build or expand financial and IT 
infrastructures on the continent). However, supervision and regulation 
of wholesale banking are still fragmented, even within the Euro area. As 
a result, the move will likely increase the EU-27 and Euro area cost of 
capital (in the order of 5-10 basis points according to Sapir, Schoenmaker 
and Veron 2017). It will also likely increase systemic risk.
To see why this is the case, consider the hypothetical case in which 
capital market and wholesale banking regulation and supervision were 
unified across the EU-27, or at least across the Euro area. In that case, the 
wholesale banking activities that are currently based in London would 
spread to several Euro area financials centers, resulting in a new geo-
graphical allocation that reflects differences in local costs, human capital, 
physical infrastructure, existing financial infrastructure, and proximity to 
clients. Because of unified regulation and supervision, the fact that these 
banking activities would be spread across (say) half a dozen countries 
would be irrelevant to systemic risk. Systemic risk would be the same as 
if all activities were in just one location. And depending on the quality 
of the (assumed) unified regulation and supervision, it may be higher or 
lower than it is now.
Compared to this benchmark, the lack of unified regulation and 
supervision will have two effects:
• First, it will increase systemic risk, both because it introduces 
inconsistencies, and because it increases the chances of regula-
tory capture - just like local banking supervisors are more sus-
ceptible to capture than supervisors that are geographically and 
politically more remote, as staff members of an international 
organization. 
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• Second, it will increase costs, due to both the need to comply 
with differing local requirements and the higher geographical 
concentration that this may induce in reaction. The greater the 
fragmentation of supervision, the bigger the incentives of con-
centrating in one jurisdiction – which will tend to increase costs 
because of the increasing marginal costs of supplying infrastruc-
ture, offices and housing in a confined geographical space (Bat-
saikhan, Kalcik, and Schoenmaker 2017, Sapir, Schoenmaker 
and Veron 2017).
Through both of these channels, the objective of a financially inte-
grated Euro area is likely to suffer a setback. The increase in costs and 
systemic risk will affect financially weaker Euro area countries – coun-
tries with smaller fiscal buffers, less credible deposit insurance, and more 
concentrated sovereign bond holdings – more than financially stronger 
countries. This, in turn will amplify existing financial fragmentation. 
To summarize, Euro area policy makers need to worry both about the 
direct implications of Brexit cost of capital and systemic risk in the EU-27 
and their interaction with the existing financial fragmentation in the 
Euro area. As a result, the policy reaction should stand on two legs. First, 
reduce the direct impact, mostly by shutting off its main channel, which 
is the lack of unified capital market and wholesale banking supervision. 
Second, tackle the factors that drive continuing financial fragmentation, 
and with it the financial vulnerability of the Euro area to a shock such as 
Brexit.
Enhancing the European Securities and Markets Agency 
(ESMA) 
A critical step toward mitigating the impact of Brexit – and more gener-
ally, reducing systemic risk and the cost of capital in the EU-27 – would 
be to create a single supervisor for capital markets and wholesale banking 
activities. The most straightforward path to this is to expand the role of 
ESMA, one of the three European financial agencies created in 2011, 
prior to banking union, to strengthen regulatory and supervisory con-
vergence (see Schoenmaker and Veron, 2017 for details).
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ESMA already has some supervisory authority, but it is very limited 
(to credit agencies and trade repositories). This should be extended to 
investment banks, securities firms, clearing houses and audit firms and to 
the enforcement of international financial reporting standards IFRS. As 
argued by Schoenmaker and Veron, ESMA should also be given super-
visory responsibility over non-EU financial infrastructure that is system-
ically important for the European Union, and act as a “single point of 
contact” on matters related to securities markets supervision with parties 
outside the EU. The latter should include membership in relevant inter-
national organizations and fora such as the International Organization of 
Securities Commissions and the Financial Stability Board. 
To enhance its independence and enable it to effectively play this role, 
ESMA’s governance will need to be reformed along the lines of the ECB 
and SSM, in particular, by creating a full time executive board. Also in 
analogy with the ECB model, ESMA should be allowed to generate reve-
nues levied directly on the activities its supervises (e.g. a very small levy 
based on capital markets activities) rather than depending on the EU 
budget. 
Completing banking union: why is it so hard?
Aside from creating a single supervisor for wholesale banking and secu-
rities markets, reducing financial fragmentation in the EU-27 area and 
protecting the EU financial system from shocks such as Brexit requires 
tackling a set of reforms that are sometimes referred to as “completing 
the banking union” (see European Commission 2015, 2017). Most promi-
nently, this includes proposals to create a European deposit insurance and 
a fiscal backstop to Single Resolution Fund created in 2014, which is being 
gradually built up. Although one can argue about design – for example, 
whether European deposit insurance should consist of a single tier system 
or a Euro-area fund or mechanism reinsuring national systems – the basic 
rationale for these proposals is sound: achieving financial integration 
in the Euro area requires levelling the cross-country differences in the 
strength of the financial safety nets that back national banking systems. 
At the same time, however, Germany and other fiscally stronger (“sur-
plus”) countries are concerned that new common safety nets may have to 
absorb risks which currently vary greatly across Euro area member coun-
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tries. Apart from differences in non-performing loan levels, which are 
slowly receding, the most important is the exposure of national banking 
systems to sovereigns of greatly varying credit quality (see Figure 2). Short 
of full fiscal union, a levelling of these differences is nowhere in sight. 
Hence, from the point of view of the “surplus” countries, measures that 
reduce cross-country differences in financial risks, and specifically steps 
to reduce the exposure of banks to their national sovereigns, are the quid-
pro-quo for moving towards stronger common safety nets. And of course, 
these steps also make sense regardless of any political quid-pro-quo, as 
high exposure to national sovereigns is an important factor contributing 
to financial fragmentation and systemic risk in the Euro area. 
In principle, reinvigorating financial reform in the Euro area should 
hence be straightforward. It requires a “grand bargain” that both 
strengthens risk sharing – most prominently, via some form of common 
deposit insurance – and reduces some sources of systemic risk – most 
prominently, the sovereign exposures of Euro area banks. In practice, 
however, making and implementing such a grand bargain is all but 
straightforward. This partly has to do with domestic politics: for example, 
there is a clear element of populism, unhelpful to Euro reform, in both the 
denunciations of European deposit insurance by German politicians and 
the denunciation of European bail-in rules by their Italian counterparts. 
For the most part, however, the fact that the banking union debate 
appears to have deadlocked relates to post-crisis fragility. In a situation of 
high sovereign debt and still weak bank balance sheets, forcing banks to 
rid themselves of sovereign exposures can lead to sharp rises in sovereign 
yields, higher funding costs, and weaker balance sheets, to the point that 
it could trigger a new crisis. This is true for any measure that enhances 
market discipline, since this will, by definition, lead to a higher differ-
entiation of risk premia, in line with country and bank fundamentals. A 
case in point is the famous “Deauville beach walk” of October 2010, at 
which the French and German leaders agreed both to the creation of the 
ESM and the principle that private sector creditors should be allowed to 
take losses in deep debt crises. Although this compromise was sensible in 
substance, announcing it in the middle of an unfolding debt crisis led to 
turbulence in the bond market and contributed to the geographic spread 
of the crisis.4
4 See Brunnermeier et al (2016) and Weder di Mauro and Zettelmeyer (2017) for details.
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As a result, the Euro area remains caught in a “Catch-22”. Strength-
ening the financial architecture of the Euro area in a way that would ben-
efit particularly the financially weaker countries requires a reduction in 
the exposure of Euro area banks to their own sovereigns. At the same 
time, regulatory changes that incentivize that reduction will, ceteris 
paribus, increase rather than decrease the short-term risk of a new finan-
cial crisis. 
Engineering a safe reduction of Euro area bank exposures to 
national sovereigns
There are two ways to deal with the Catch-22 described in the pre-
vious section. One is to wait with significant new reforms to the Euro-
pean financial architecture until sovereign debt levels have declined and 
banking systems have strengthened. But this means living with financial 
safety nets of unequal strengths and the risk of continued bank-sovereign 
vicious circles for a potentially very long time. Another is to try to break 
out from the Catch-22. Based on the logic of the previous paragraph, 
this means combining a change in the regulatory treatment of sovereign 
exposures with an additional reform that would neutralize the short-
term destabilizing effects of the latter – without, however, upsetting the 
“grand bargain” between greater risk sharing and “risk reduction”.
One approach that might conceivably meet these requirements is to 
combine a gradual change in the regulatory treatment of sovereign expo-
sures – that is, subjecting sovereign debt holdings to a capital charge, or 
introducing tough exposure limits – with the introduction of a Euro area 
safe asset that would inherit the current regulatory privileges bestowed 
on sovereign debt. To be a solution to the economic and political prob-
lems described in the previous section, this would have to meet at least 
four conditions. 
1. The asset must be genuinely safe – not just to merit its privileged 
regulatory treatment (zero risk weight) but also to reassure fiscally a 
stronger Euro area that they will not be called upon to bail it out. 
2. The safety of the asset must not rely on guarantees or other 
mechanisms that would give rise to redistribution from the stronger 
to the fiscally weaker Euro members. If this condition is not satisfied, 
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the fiscally stronger members will view the safe asset as just an addi-
tional “risk sharing” scheme, and reject it.
3. The asset must be generated in a way that does not lead to sharp 
drop in net demand for sovereign debt issued at the national level, 
and hence avoids increases in borrowing costs on impact, partic-
ularly in the fiscally weaker countries. Simply assigning safe asset 
status to sovereign debt issued by AAA-rated Euro area sovereigns, 
for example – that is, imposing a capital charge on all but AAA rated 
sovereign debt -- would obviously fail this condition. 
4. Finally, it must be “scalable” to a degree that would allow it to 
replace sovereign holdings currently on bank balance sheets. 
To see what 3 and 4 imply in practice, Table 1 shows current Euro 
area-wide as well as national banking system holdings of sovereign debt. 
Euro area sovereign debt securities holdings range from below 5% of 
national GDP (Estonia, Luxembourg) to about 30% of national GDP 
(Italy). Hence, if the objective is to avoid a brusque change in average 
national borrowing costs, and the safe asset is constructed in a way 
that creates a net demand for national sovereign issues in proportion 
of national GDPs, a volume of about 30% of GDP would be required. 
This would be just enough to replace Italian bond holdings in Euro area 
banks and more than enough to replace holdings of remaining Euro area 
sovereign bonds, leaving a “surplus” of safe assets of about 15% of Euro 
area GDP (about €1.6 trillion, slightly higher than the outstanding total 
volume of German general government bonds, and substantially higher 
than German federal tradable bonds, which according to the Germany 
Finance Agency currently stands at about €1.1 trillion). 
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Table 1. General government debt in the Euro area, by issuer 
(end-2016 stocks, in percent of issuer GDP)
Source: European Central Bank
Note: “Bonds” refer to debt securities with original maturity of more than one year. 
“Debt securities” refers to all original maturities (i.e. bonds plus short-term bills)
Zettelmeyer (2017) sketches three ways of creating a safe asset that 
might meet these conditions. One of them could be a version of the 
Brunnermeier et al (2011, 2017) proposal to encourage private financial 
intermediaries that would purchase Euro area sovereign bonds in the sec-
ondary market, financed by issuing sovereign bond-backed securities in 
several tranches, the most senior of which would assume the role of the 
safe asset. Alternatively, a public financial intermediary could be set up 
and given seniority over other creditors by treaty (as was done for the 
ESM). The intermediary would issue debt, use this to fund purchases of 
member bonds at face value up to 30 percent of GDP – hence meeting 
conditions 3 and 4 – and passing its funding costs on to the sovereign 
issuers. Unlike the closely related “Blue bond” proposal (Weizsäcker 
and Delpla, 2010, 2011) there would be no joint and several guarantee. 
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Instead, the safety of the asset would be protected only by seniority and 
– if needed – by capitalizing the intermediary. To the extent that the 
combination of seniority and capitalization leads to a AAA rating, this 
construction would meet conditions 1 and 2. The safe asset would hence 
be produced without any cross-country risk sharing except through the 
equity of the intermediary. 
Once a legal and institutional infrastructure for producing the safe 
asset has been set up and tested, it could be used to gradually replace 
sovereign bond holdings in Euro area balance sheets. To create the right 
incentives, Euro area bank holdings of newly issued sovereign debt would 
become subject to a capital charge (or an equivalent regulatory or super-
visory disincentive). The capital charge would not apply to (1) holdings 
of previously issued sovereign debt; (2) the safe asset. The implication 
is that, as the national bond holdings of Euro area banks mature, Banks 
would have an incentive to replace these holding by Euro area safe assets 
rather than freshly issued national bond holdings. Annual issuance of 
safe assets would be calibrated to meet this demand. This would avoid an 
adverse shock both to bank balance sheets and to the yields of Euro area 
sovereign issuers. The transition phase would continue until all national 
sovereign bonds owned by Euro area banks have matured and been 
replaced by the Euro area safe asset.
Conclusion
Except for the migration of some financial sector jobs – and possibly 
rents – to the Euro area, the direct consequences of Brexit are unequiv-
ocally bad for the EU-27. Compared to the status quo, the move of Lon-
don-based wholesale banking activities to the Euro area is likely to raise 
both the cost of capital and systemic risk. But at the same time, Brexit 
should be seen as an opportunity. By bringing weaknesses of both the 
EU-27 and Euro area financial architecture brought into (even) sharper 
relief, Brexit could accelerate reforms that are already ongoing, but too 
slowly, such as efforts to create capital market union. Equally importantly, 
it could help break the deadlock in reform areas that have become stuck, 
such as completing the banking union. 
The vision underlying these reforms has been clear for some time: 
it involves a “grand bargain”, a package of reforms, that would both 
After Brexit: Rebooting Euro Area Financial Integration - Jeromin Zettelmeyer
108
strengthen risk sharing and greatly reduce discrepancies in financial 
crisis risks across countries in the Euro area. This package would need 
to include a credible plan to reduce the exposure of Euro area banking 
systems to national sovereigns. However, this raises a problem: forcing 
banks to shed sovereign exposures would likely increase instability in the 
short term, particularly in countries with relatively high sovereign debts. 
This is the one of the reasons, and perhaps the main reason, why reforms 
to complete the banking union have gone nowhere since the European 
Commission made its initial appeal for a common deposit insurance. 
Brexit increases the risks of inaction, and may hence push the Euro 
area towards a solution. But moving forward will require more than an 
agreement on a future financial architecture that would make both sides– 
fiscally weaker countries worried about sharp rises in borrowing costs, 
and fiscally stronger countries worried about redistribution – better off. 
It also requires a path for getting there without risking a major accident. 
An example for such a path was sketched in this essay. At a time when 
Europe is caught in the middle between fear of the risks of inaction and 
fear of risks from change, a good way to reinvigorate financial architec-
ture reform would be to focus on the minutiae of how a “safe transition” 
to a better steady state can be made to succeed. 
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BREXIT, FINANCIAL MARKETS AND 
THE WIDER ECONOMY
David Miles
If you want to understand how the decision by the UK government to 
leave the European Union may play out and affect financial markets it is 
essential to understand the reason why a (small) majority voted to leave 
in the June 2016 referendum. The mood of the electorate is a key factor 
behind the negotiating stance of the UK government and will help shape 
what kind of Brexit happens. If people voted out of ignorance of the likely 
economic consequences of being outside the EU then perhaps as their 
misperceptions are removed the majority in favour of leaving will dis-
appear and the government will adjust its negotiating stance. But if the 
motives of those who wanted to leave reflected deeper concerns than the 
narrowly economic, and if those voters also recognised there was prob-
ably an economic cost, then it is more likely that the UK will end up 
outside the single market and quite probably outside the customs union.
So let us start with the motives of voters. 
I do not take the view that many economists have in the UK that 
leave-voters completely ignored the economic costs or that they are 
totally ignorant of those economic costs. This is the view that leave-sup-
porters voted out of ignorance and quite possibly a combination of igno-
rance and prejudice. I don’t believe that. I think that there was a cost 
benefit analysis which may have been applied by many people who voted 
to leave.
Indeed I think continued UK membership of the EU has always been 
a result of a calculated cost benefit analysis. It has never been a love affair. 
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On the plus side has been the benefit of being part of a free trade area, 
with no tariffs and relatively low non-tariff barriers. That is a good thing, 
and it is a big plus. But anything else you have to accept beyond what is 
needed to be part of a free trade area has been seen in the UK, I think 
correctly, with a good deal of suspicion. So in the early part of the 1970s, 
when the UK joined the EC, the main perceived cost that you paid in 
exchange for being part of a free trade area was applying the Common 
Agricultural Policy. Things have changed greatly since then. The costs 
and the benefits of being in the EU have changed, they have morphed. 
They have probably both got bigger. The costs have moved from the area 
of agricultural policy, which is much less important now, toward the 
potential difficulties for the UK of a push to “ever closer union”. 
“Ever closer union” has been the mantra of the European Commis-
sion. It is certainly something in which the President of the Commission 
has seemed to believe with a quasi-religious fervour. Now part of this is 
just rhetoric and it is a rhetoric that has recently changed. But part of the 
rhetoric reflects a desire (some see it as a need) for there to be a degree of 
centralisation of some decisions (partly fiscal) which go beyond what you 
need for a free trade area. Some rules on financial regulation, which have 
been rather harmful to the UK, certainly are more than you need for free 
trade. (I will elaborate on that in a moment.) More recently, there have 
been hints of wanting a degree of centralisation on military affairs, even 
on a common army. The recent Commission paper on social rules could 
be read as a document that maps out a path to greater cross-Europe con-
formity in social benefits. That may be largely rhetoric too. Who can be 
sure? But it is not just President Juncker who has seemed to believe that 
whenever there is a problem, the answer is “closer union”. Some senior 
figures in the European Central Bank believe that there needs to be a 
much greater degree of centralisation in many areas in order to make 
monetary union work – in banking structures and also with national 
fiscal policies. 
Now one might say that the UK can opt out of all of this stuff. Indeed 
it may be that if the UK stays in the EU it will get more and more opt 
outs and be able to avoid any further transfer of national decision making 
powers which go beyond what you need for free trade. But there is a risk 
that if you try and get more and more opt outs it comes at a cost of less 
and less influence over decisions where you have no opt-out. It certainly 
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seems to cause resentment. I think you can end up in a situation where 
you have so many opts outs, you need to ask yourself what is the point of 
being “in”. 
That is a question put rather forcefully by Mervyn King, the previous 
Governor of the Bank of England. Here is what he said in the middle of 
August of 2016 after the Brexit vote: 
 “All the other large member of the EU belong to both the Euro and 
the Schengen areas. Britain does not wish to be a member of such a 
club. Why would you want to be a member of a tennis club, if you do 
not like tennis? And indeed dislike the game, simply in order to play a 
game of bridge once a month. That is the fundamental problem with 
Britain and the other members of the EU…Can it really be in the UK’s 
long run interest to acquiesce in the creation of political union…..Across 
Europe the younger generation wants to go beyond the nation state, to 
break down barriers, and find new ways to resolve problems, that extend 
beyond national boundaries. They will find ways to do this but do not 
require the out-dated trappings of a super national entity with its own 
anthem, flag and parliament and even steps towards an army.” 
I think he makes an important point. Most of the people in the UK 
don’t want those other things – it is a road they have consistently not 
wanted to go down. If the UK were to have stayed in the EU it may have 
paid a significant price in order to avoid the possibility of being taken 
down that road. Of course there is a price to pay to avoid that risk. You 
pay a price if, in order to avoid any risk of being dragged down a road to 
closer union, you lose the benefits of being in a European single market. I 
think that cost is significant, though it can easily be over-estimated. But I 
would not want to suggest for one moment that it is a trivial cost. 
How big are such costs? That depends on what sort of Brexit hap-
pens. I suspect the most likely place the UK will get to is with a tariff free 
agreement on trade in goods. That is well short of access to the single 
market. It will mean that there are significant non-tariff barriers to trade 
and they will be particularly significant with services and will certainly 
affect financial services. There have been many studies of the size of those 
costs – measured as a shortfall of GDP some years down the road (2030) 
from the level that might have existed if the UK continued to be in the 
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EU. The studies came up with costs sometimes as high as five percent 
or more of GDP; but some estimates put the cost as low as one or two 
percent of GDP.1
If one takes the simple average of the estimates of the GDP cost they 
are about three and a half percent of GDP by 2030. No one wants to lose 
three and a half percent of GDP. It is not a trivial number. Neither is it an 
enormous number. If you thought that the average rate of growth in the 
UK was perhaps a bit under two percent a year, then losing three and a 
half percent of GDP is losing two years of growth. That is not nothing. It 
means that in the year 2050 the standard of living in the UK will only be 
as high as what you might have hoped it would be in the year 2048. Not 
trivial, but not enormous. Why isn’t it a bigger cost? Partly that is because 
a lot of the barriers to trade just don’t change whether the UK is in the 
EU or not. The physical distance between any point in the UK and any 
point in the EU will not change. It was unlikely the UK was going to adopt 
the European single currency in the foreseeable future. So the currency 
transaction costs are no different. The language issue, of course, is still the 
same.
I think it is easy to exaggerate the cost of being outside the EU. An area 
where it is exaggerated, quite substantially, is in financial services. Finan-
cial services are big in the UK. There is about 1.3 million people working 
in financial services. Financial services make up about eight to nine per-
cent of UK GDP. That is not far off the size of the manufacturing sector. 
The great majority of people working in the financial services industry in 
the UK are providing financial services to UK households and UK com-
panies; they are not exporting financial services to the rest of the EU. Most 
of the people that work in banks, nearly all the people that work in the 
pension sector, and the great majority of people in the insurance sector 
are providing services to UK households and UK companies. Financial 
exports from the UK to the EU are, on some estimates, around about 30 
billion pounds. That’s about one and a half percent of GDP. Suppose you 
were very pessimistic. You thought that because the UK was probably 
going to be outside the single market, so it doesn’t get passporting rights, 
then maybe you lose half of the exports of the financial services that we 
1 There is a summary of these estimates in a useful report by the Institute for Fiscal 
Studies: “The EU Single Market: The Value of Membership Versus Access to the UK”, 
Emerson, Johnson and Mitchell. IFS, August 2016. See Appendix C. 
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currently send to the EU. That might be around 0.75 of one percent of 
GDP. Nobody wants to lose 0.75 of one percent of GDP. But the idea that 
this means the UK would be descending in to a black hole of economic 
failure is woefully wide of the mark. 
The costs of leaving the EU are absolutely not small. They may be of 
the order of three or four percent of GDP. If that turns out to be accurate 
then it is probably two years of growth. No one in the UK could be pleased 
about losing that. 
There was an overwhelming majority of economists who took the view 
before the vote that there were net costs of the UK pulling out, and that 
those costs would be very significant. I felt, and still feel, that the confi-
dence many economists had in their estimates of the cost of being outside 
were misplaced. The UK Treasury estimated the long run cost of Brexit, 
and for some of the scenarios they considered that cost was very substan-
tial (nearly ten percent of GDP). Most of that cost reflected a view that the 
productivity of the work force in the UK would be much lower with the 
UK outside. That was partly because foreign direct investment would be 
lower. It was partly because the UK would have to start producing stuff 
that it used to import, and that we are not very good at producing; trade 
barriers might mean you end up producing things you are not very pro-
ductive at. That, plus less foreign direct investment, would make labour 
productivity lower. That is the main estimated cost of being outside the 
EU. My observation on that is that someone in the UK Treasury may have 
forgotten just how spectacularly bad economists are in predicting produc-
tivity. I say that because I have spent much of the last seven or so years in 
the Bank of England, where we struggled mightily to try and understand 
why the level of labour productivity in UK is about seventeen or eighteen 
percent lower - not five, or six or seven percent lower - than it would have 
been if the UK followed the trajectory it appeared to be on before the 
financial crisis. Thousands, possibly even tens of thousands, of hours of 
the time of economists in the Bank of England was spent trying to under-
stand that phenomenon and failing pretty miserably. That is not because 
the people weren’t smart, but because we haven’t got good models of pro-
ductivity. In the light of that I think one should take with an enormous 
pinch of salt economists’ projections of what the long run costs of the UK 
being outside the EU are when most of that cost is because of supposedly 
substantially lower productivity. 
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I don’t think, by the way, it is right to add in the costs of the recent 
depreciation of the sterling exchange rate in to the mix. That is misleading 
for two reasons. First, goodness knows whether it will be a lasting depre-
ciation (which at the time of writing is around 15% on the trade weighted 
value of sterling). Nobody has a good model of what the right level for 
Stirling should be. There is a more fundamental reason for not counting 
the terms of trade loss from depreciation, or not counting much of it, as a 
cost of leaving the EU. This is that Stirling almost certainly needed to fall 
by a substantial amount for the UK to be on the sustainable track anyway. 
The UK’s current account deficit is extremely large – it is one of the largest 
current account deficits this country has seen outside of major world 
wars. It is highly likely the exchange rate was at an unstainable level. Much 
of the decline of Stirling since June 23rd is something which would have 
had to have happened anyway. It may just have happened more quickly 
than it otherwise would. 
Overall I think the cost benefit analysis of being in or out of the EU for 
the UK is quite a close run thing. As a matter of fact I did not vote to leave. 
That is because I suspect the move towards “ever closer union” – greater 
centralisation and a Federalism that few people in the UK want – has not 
much further to go. But who can be sure. Anyway, I don’t think that hose 
that did vote to leave did something that must be based on ignorance or 
prejudice. It is not irrational to worry that EU membership comes with 
many rules that are not suited to your interests. I do not think you have to 
look very far for examples of common rules, which the UK reluctantly has 
had to sign up to, which are rather costly. Let me mention two from the 
area of financial regulation. 
The first is a truly bizarre decision that was made when new capital 
requirements, which were increased under the Basel Three agreements, 
became part of EU law. It went from being a rule to ensure that banks 
must have no less than certain levels of capital, to one where national 
regulators could not ask for more than that either. It should have been 
possible for national regulators to decide they wanted their banking sys-
tems to be safer than the minimum. But when the capital rules got to be a 
European Directive it had become a maximum harmonisation rule. This 
was, I think, because of the bizarre argument that everybody should have 
exactly the same number for acceptable bank capital – maybe because that 
is what a “closer union” needs. The UK was forced to accept that we could 
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not (except under special circumstances) set a higher capital requirement 
for UK banks than anybody else. 
Another piece of poor EU legislation was the bonus caps on the finan-
cial sector. I say that not because I think that people in the financial sector 
deserve enormous bonuses. But rather that the side effects of having limits 
on bonuses are almost certainly bad. Bonuses had rather little to do with 
the problems of the financial crash which was much more about leverage 
and capital. The UK opposed the bonus cap as well, but it has become a 
rule. 
The UK does have many opt as regards financial markets. Being out-
side the euro zone it effectively has an opt out from banking union. How 
much comfort a UK government should take from that is unclear. If EU 
banking union happens there could be a centralised deposit protection 
scheme. So the liabilities of banks that go badly wrong in one country 
would get shared out. Whether or not it is an effective opt out is somewhat 
murky. One could imagine a situation where the majority of countries in 
the EU do go down that banking union route and then are rather resentful 
of the UK not being part of that, and find ways to make it rather difficult 
for UK banks to do things that they can do with not much difficulty at the 
moment. So one should not ignore a risk to the financial sector even if the 
UK were to stay in the EU. 
The main benefit of the UK being outside the EU is that if the 
EU goes down a route of greater centralisation, which has until 
recently been the favoured direction of travel of powerful figures 
within the EU, the UK will be able to avoid some unfortunate side 
effects of that. That is a potential benefit. It is worth little if the tide 
turns sharply against “ever closer union” and stays that way. I guess 
that is likely – likely but far from certain. And of course there are 
costs of avoiding that risk – leaving the EU is costly. But economists 
have probably overestimated the cost of Brexit – and maybe that is 
particularly true for financial services. They have certainly exagger-
ated their knowledge. 
Divorce is always messy. There is never a good time to negotiate about 
a divorce settlement. When most people do it is when they are not feeling 
very warm towards the other person. On the other hand being in an 
unhappy marriage is not a great thing either. 
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CHANGING GEOGRAPHY OF FINANCE 
AND REGULATION IN EUROPE: BREXIT 
CASE STUDY
Jonathan Faull1
The word geography in the title of this book is not metaphorical. For the 
first time in its history, if you exclude the scarcely relevant precedents of 
Algeria, Greenland and Saint Barthélemy, the EU is losing territory with 
Brexit. This is particularly important in the financial world, because the 
UK is a major centre and has had considerable influence in the regulatory 
history of financial services.
For more than four decades, British influence has enhanced and been 
enhanced by the European Union.2 The Financial Services Action Plan 
(1999), subsequent legislation and the regulatory measures adopted in the 
aftermath of the 2007/8 financial crisis all bear the imprint of British input 
and many of them took particular account of the status and specific char-
acteristics of the UK, home to the City of London, outside the euro and 
the banking union. The UK played an important role in the Financial Sta-
bility Board and other Basel-based bodies which have been crucial fora for 
international coordination and agreements since the crisis broke. The UK’s 
often pivotal position owed a great deal to its unique combination among 
financial powers of EU and Anglosphere memberships.
1 Sir Jonathan Faull KCMG is Visiting Professor at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel, King’s 
College London, and the College of Europe. He writes here in a personal capacity. Text 
as at 27 April 2017.
2 For a French view, see L’influence britannique perdurera-t-elle? Revue Banque, 
10.10.2016, http://www.revue-banque.fr/risques-reglementations/article/influence-bri-
tannique-perdurera-t-elle
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We do not know yet exactly what will change because Brexit nego-
tiations have not yet started in earnest. Both the UK and the EU 27 are 
establishing their respective negotiating positions for the complex and 
time- constrained talks about to start. We have some official documents, 
some leaks and lots of speeches in London, Brussels and other European 
capitals. We have election manifestos3 and by the time this is published a 
freshly elected Government in the UK.
It seems to be clear that the UK does not want to be in the EU’s single 
market. This is said to be because such inclusion or membership is not on 
offer without the full range of the single market’s fundamental freedoms 
and disciplines, including free movement of workers, citizenship rights for 
people and the enforcement and judicial mechanisms culminating in the 
jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice. Some in Britain relish the 
prospect of dealing with the rest of the world from a new position outside 
the EU’s single market and customs union. The UK is therefore expected to 
seek close relations with and the best possible access to the single market 
but not membership of it. The same position seems to have been taken in 
respect of the customs union: close relations, but not membership.
How can we try to understand what will happen next?
We can isolate some specific British issues with the EU from those 
shared to some extent with one or more other Member States. We can 
extrapolate from what has been said and written so far in Brussels and 
other EU national capitals.
The UK’s Article 50 notification and the Prime Minister’s speeches 
accompanying it can be compared and contrasted with the European 
Council’s guidelines and the Council’s negotiation directives.
The February 2016 European Council UK settlement4 set out what the 
27 were prepared to agree and do within the scope of the treaties as they 
3 When I spoke at this conference on 27 April 2017, I did not expect the Democratic 
Unionist Party’s manifesto to be highly relevant, but it certainly is now: see Standing 
Strong for Northern Ireland, http://dev.mydup.com/images/uploads/publications/DUP_
Wminster_Manifesto_2017_v5.pdf
4 “A new settlement for the United Kingdom within the European Union”, OJ C 69 I, 23 
February 2016.”
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stood at the time (and still stand today) to keep the UK on board. Although 
on its own terms now lifeless as a result of its self-destruct provision5, it 
nevertheless contains useful statements of what all Member States agreed 
was legally possible. What they think is politically opportune now in a very 
different context is another matter.
A Commission White Paper on the Future of Europe (1 March 2017) 
presented five scenarios and initial national reactions to it can be assessed, 
but clarity about the future direction of the UK-less EU is unlikely to 
emerge until the new French and German Governments have had a chance 
to settle and talk frankly to each other in the autumn of 2017.
The 27 have stuck together during the relatively easy period in which 
the referendum result was digested, the British notification was awaited 
and the preparations for the negotiation were begun. Article 50 seems to be 
working effectively to channel national positions into one EU 27 position.
An initial focus in the UK on customs tariffs and processes ignored the 
fact that market access and frictions depend increasingly on regulation. 
This is particularly true of services provided alone or as part of a package 
with goods, but it is goods themselves. Modern economies and societies 
want to promote security, protect workers, investors, depositors, the envi-
ronment and consumers and pursue various other public policy goals. One 
way they do this is by regulating goods and services and requiring that 
those regulations be complied with by goods sold and services provided in 
their jurisdiction.
What does this mean for finance?
The single market is not fully in place. Services have lagged behind 
goods. Controversies in financial services have not been infrequent, par-
ticularly in Euro area/rest of EU relations. Solutions were always found 
5 “It is understood that, should the result of the referendum in the United Kingdom be 
for it to leave the European Union, the set of arrangements referred to in paragraph 2 
above will cease to exist.” Paragraph 4, C 69 I/2. This is perhaps the referendum’s only 
strictly legal consequence. Of course, as the Supreme Court held in Miller, “(…) that 
in no way means that it is devoid of effect. It means that, unless and until acted on by 
Parliament, its force is political rather than legal. It has already shown itself to be of 
great political significance.” R (on the application of Miller and another) v Secretary of 
State for Exiting the European Union, (2017) UKSC 5, para. 124.
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in Banking Union legislation and in the February 2016 European Council 
decision (“new settlement”), now lifeless but still an authoritative state-
ment of what was possible à traité constant.
The UK as a foreign country starts with very similar rules to the rest 
of the EU, but wishes to abandon the EU’s enforcement mechanisms and 
institutional framework. If similarity of rules is significant in determining 
market access, agreement will be needed on what happens when rules or 
interpretations change on either side.
In post-2008 financial regulation, many rules and ideas came from 
common international sources. What happens in Basel and in the G20 
depends on many factors unrelated to Brexit, such as the Trump admin-
istration’s evolving positions. As the EU 27 and the euro area get on with 
their own single market and economic and monetary union, their influ-
ence will grow as they pursue the path of integration and present a unified 
to the rest of the world in international fora.
The EU’s influence in Basel so far has come from the combination of 
one unified regulatory jurisdiction for most purposes and the strength of 
big member states, including the UK. For its influence to remain intact, the 
EU will have to compensate for the loss of the UK by convincing the rest of 
the world that it is an integrated, coordinated entity.
If proof were needed, the financial crisis and its aftermath show that 
regulatory and supervisory cooperation in financial services is both diffi-
cult and necessary. The EU is a remarkable example of such international 
cooperation and that will survive Brexit, whether or not the UK is closely 
associated with further EU developments.
Is equivalence or passporting the key to future UK-EU relations in the 
financial sector?
Let’s look as passporting. According to the Bank of England’s Pruden-
tial Regulation Authority,6 “Subject to its fulfilment of conditions under the 
relevant single market directive, a firm authorised in a European Economic 
Area (EEA) state is entitled to carry on permitted activities in any other 
6 http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/pra/Pages/authorisations/passporting/default.aspx;see 
also the British Bankers’ Association’s definition: https://www.bba.org.uk/wp-content/
uploads/2016/12/webversion-BQB-3-1.pdf
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EEA state by either exercising the right of establishment (of a branch and/
or agents) or providing cross-border services. This is referred to in Finan-
cial Services and Markets Act 2000 (as amended) (FSMA) as an EEA right 
and the exercise of this right is known as ‘passporting’. The activities that 
are ‘passportable’ are set out in the relevant EU single market directives. 
Activities that are not covered by the directives and are not ‘passportable’ 
will require the firm wishing to carry on such activities to contact the rele-
vant competent authority of that host state in order to determine whether 
direct authorisation is needed. Passporting rights only apply within the 
EEA. So, for example, they do not apply in the Channel Islands or the Isle 
of Man, as these are not EEA states. Although Switzerland is not an EEA 
state, Swiss general insurers have the right to set up an establishment in the 
EEA under the provisions of special bilateral treaties between the Euro-
pean Union and Switzerland.7 EEA general insurers also have equivalent 
rights in respect of Switzerland under these treaties. Special arrangements 
also apply in relation to Gibraltar.”
So outside the EEA and in the absence of a special bilateral treaty, the 
facilitated access to the single market known a passporting is not available 
to firms registered, licensed and regulated elsewhere. At the heart of the 
passporting regime is the “single rule book”, i.e. the set of rules regulating 
financial services laid down in EU law and, under EEA rules, extended to 
Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein.
Passporting is not the same as market access from a jurisdiction found 
to be “equivalent” or “adequate”. There are also well established EU pro-
cedures and examples of foreign countries with equivalent or adequate 
regimes in various policy areas.8 The choice of equivalence or adequacy (or 
some other word yet to be used in this context or, like passporting, to be 
invented) is open to the negotiators if they want to devise a system whereby 
reciprocal market access is made conditional on some degree of regulatory 
alignment.
7 http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/downloadFile.do?fullText=yes&treatyTran-
sId=549
8 I well remember a senior US official objecting to the “adequacy” requirement in nego-
tiations about data exchange and protection. “I can’t hear the word adequate without 
imagining the adverb “barely” before it”, he said. He was right. It’s a rather humiliating 
notion, in fact I believe simply a bad translation of the French adéquat which means 
something more like appropriate than the British sense of adequate as “just about 
enough”.
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A “Great Repeal Act” which incorporates EU law into British law 
should ensure that on day one British and EU law are convergent. Nego-
tiators will have to grapple with what happens on day two and thereafter. 
EU and UK law will diverge once the UK leaves the administrative, regu-
latory and judicial system at the apex of which sits the European Court of 
Justice. Legislatures, courts, supervisors and regulators will go their own 
way unless constrained by higher law. If there is agreement providing for 
market access and passporting as long as regulatory outcomes remain 
aligned, who will decide whether that alignment has been broken and what 
the consequences are for market access rights? That is obviously a major 
political issue for those who believe that Brexit must restore untrammelled 
British sovereignty.
The European Council Guidelines stipulate9 that “…any agreement 
with the United Kingdom will have to be based on a balance of rights 
and obligations, and ensure a level playing field. Preserving the integrity 
of the Single Market excludes participation based on a sector-by-sector 
approach. A non-member of the Union, that does not live up to the same 
obligations as a member, cannot have the same rights and enjoy the same 
benefits as a member. In this context, the European Council welcomes 
the recognition by the British Government that the four freedoms of the 
Single Market are indivisible and that there can be no “cherry picking”. The 
Union will preserve its autonomy as regards its decision-making as well 
as the role of the Court of Justice of the European Union... Any free trade 
agreement should be balanced, ambitious and wide-ranging. It cannot, 
however, amount to participation in the Single Market or parts thereof, as 
this would undermine its integrity and proper functioning. It must ensure 
a level playing field, notably in terms of competition and state aid, and in 
this regard encompass safeguards against unfair competitive advantages 
through, inter alia, tax, social, environmental and regulatory measures and 
practices. Any future framework should safeguard financial stability in the 
Union and respect its regulatory and supervisory regime and standards 
and their application. The future partnership must include appropriate 
enforcement and dispute settlement mechanisms that do not affect the 
Union’s autonomy, in particular its decision-making procedures.”
9 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/european-council/2017/04/29-euco-guide-
lines_pdf/
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The outcome of this negotiation will place the UK in a different posi-
tion from that which it had as a Member State. This is not a punishment, it 
is a reflection of the country’s new status as a foreign (“third”) country. The 
attractions of the EU for its members I come to next will not be available to 
the UK, if indeed it ever understood them to beattractions.
The fundamental attraction of the EU for its member countries 
remains strong. Former dictatorships of right and left still see the EU as a 
democratic bulwark. Former Soviet or Warsaw Pact countries still see the 
EU as part of their international identity and protection against Russia. 
Former colonies still see the EU as a strong symbol of their independence 
and international identity. Former occupying or occupied countries still 
see the EU as a peace and reconciliation project. Countries which have 
decentralised political power, whether or not with a federal label attached, 
see the EU as the umbrella which made that process possible and relatively 
painless. Countries linked to the German economy for a large part of their 
trade and production still want to be inside the meeting rooms where eco-
nomic decisions are taken with Germany. Countries which do not want the 
continent of Europe to be dominated by a single country and see the EU 
as the best way to achieve that aim will remain committed to the European 
project (they include Germany and used to include the UK). Countries 
sharing the euro as their currency or aspiring to do so will want to keep it 
and participate in the making of monetary policy in the ECB. The thought 
of abandoning the euro, re-establishing a revalued or devalued national 
currency and re-denominating everything is a major incentive to cleave 
to the status quo.10 It is noteworthy that the UK fits into none of these cat-
egories (except perhaps non-federal decentralisation), while all the other 
27 can be recognised in one or more of them. A word of caution: a British 
exceptionalism11 certainly exists, but many Member States which agree 
with many British positions have been happy to allow the UK to lead on 
them. They will now have to stand up and be counted. With the UK gone, 
the EU will change as the pack is reshuffled and new positions and equi-
libria are found.
10 A recent illustration is the difficulty faced by Marine Le Pen in the 2017 French Pres-
idential election campaign in articulating a convincing argument against the euro. 
See, e.g., Sortie de l’euro: le naufrage en direct de Marine Le Pen, http://www.lexpress.
fr/actualite/politique/elections/sortie-de-l-euro-le-naufrage-en-direct-de-marine-le-
pen_1905031.html
11 See Tilford, The British and their exceptionalism, Centre for European Reform, Lon-
don, http://www.cer.org.uk/sites/default/files/insight_ST_3.5.17.pdf
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BREXIT: A TALE OF EXIT OVER VOICE 
Brigid Laffan
‘Membership of the EU is the means by which nation states preserve and 
protect their interests and values, whereas standing alone puts those inter-
ests and values at risk’1
On the 23rd of June 2016, the UK electorate voted narrowly to leave the 
EU having joined in 1973, over 43 year earlier. The Lisbon Treaty (2009) 
made provision for the exit of a Member State under the procedures out-
lined in Article 50 (EU, TEU). The UK decision was a shock to the EU 
and a harbinger of political turmoil in the UK. The British Prime Minister 
David Cameron resigned immediately and was replaced by Teresa May 
who appointed a very different cabinet which included many of those 
who had campaigned for Brexit. The referendum outcome destabilised 
the UK because there was majority support for Remain in Scotland and 
Northern Ireland. The new UK Government took until March 29, 2017 
to deliver its Article 50 notification letter which began the formal process 
of withdrawal. This was followed by the decision of PM May to call a 
UK general election on June 8, 2017. The general election did not lead 
to the expected outcome of an enhanced majority for the Government. 
Rather, PM May found herself facing a hung parliament when she lost the 
majority won by PM Cameron in May 2015. This forced her to negotiate 
support from the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) of Northern Ireland 
which has formally agreed to vote with the Government on major issues 
including the laws related to Brexit (UK Gov, 2017). 
The lengthy timespan between the referendum and notification 
enabled the EU to overcome its shock and begin to prepare for the world 
of EU27. The heads of government met informally in September 2016 
1  Armstrong K.A., 2017, Brexit Time, CUP, 282. 
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in Bratislava to establish a road map for the future development of the 
Union minus the UK (EU, 2016). This was followed by the issuing of 
negotiating guidelines and directives in April and May 2017 (EU 2017). 
This paper analyses the key elements of the negotiating process, the issues 
to be addressed including the attitudes of the two parties and the posi-
tion of financial services in these negotiations. By definition, the subject 
matter of the paper is a moving target given the uncertainty of UK poli-
tics and the dynamic nature of the Brexit negotiations. 
Managing an Exit 
The European Union (EU) is a negotiating machine which has built up an 
impressive capacity to get agreement among its Member States on a large 
body of law and public policy instruments. It is also a formidable nego-
tiator in the international arena with over 881 bilateral treaties and 259 
multilateral treaties to its name. Following the UK referendum, the EU 
is embarking on an unprecedented negotiation to agree the departure of 
one of its largest members. This endows these negotiations with a signif-
icance that is symbolic, existential, material and consequential. To put it 
simply, these negotiations are not about creating a better future but about 
damage limitation and the attribution of loss from the perspective of the 
EU. International trade and economic negotiations are usually designed 
to being parties together and to arrive at an outcome that is superior to 
the status quo as possible. The Brexit negotiations, on the other hand, 
are about disentanglement, new barriers and further differentiation. The 
UK’s partners in the Union neither sought nor favoured Brexit. However, 
having overcome the initial turbulence associated with the vote, the EU 
went into problem solving mode and quickly set up Brexit Task Forces 
in the Commission and the Council. Michel Barnier, a former Commis-
sioner, was appointed by the EU as its chief negotiator from October 
1, 2016. The European Parliament, although not a formal negotiating 
partner, is a key player and has appointed the longstanding senior politi-
cian Guy Verhofstadt to act as its Brexit coordinator and spokesperson. 
There has been remarkable consensus on the EU side that there would be 
no informal meetings or discussions with the UK authorities prior to the 
Article 50 notification. The time between July 2016 and end March 2017 
was spent by European institutions preparing for the negotiations and 
the preparations were characterised by meticulous assessment across the 
entire gambit of EU policies of the consequences of Brexit and the issues 
associated with disentangling the UK from the Union. 
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Article 50 established the legal format for negotiations. Once a 
Member State issues an Article 50 notification, the EU responds with 
a set of negotiating guidelines agreed by the European Council acting 
without the country that intends to exit. This is then followed by an 
agreement to a set of negotiating directives prepared by the Commission 
and agreed in the Council. Article 50 made provision for the involve-
ment of the European Parliament as it must consent to the Withdrawal 
Agreement. In addition, COREPER and a specially established Art. 50 
Working Group follow the negotiations on a continuous basis. The Euro-
pean Council remains seized of the negotiations from start to finish and 
reviews, up-dates and develops the negotiating guidelines as the process 
evolves. In this way, EU institutions and the 27 Member States seek to 
manage the exit process in as orderly a manner as possible. The UK for 
its part sits on the other side of the table in that twilight zone between 
its status as a departing Member State and a third country. At time of 
writing, the UK has delivered its notification, the European Council has 
agreed on the guidelines and the Council has agreed for the Commission 
to initiate negotiating directives. The strategy of the EU27 is to be trans-
parent about all facets of the negotiations and all documents have been 
made public (EU 2017a). The first formal session of the exit negotiations 
was held on 19 June 2017 after the formation of the new UK Government.
 
Article 50 provides not just for the format of negotiations but also 
the sequencing of the substantive issues that must be addressed in the 
negotiations. Essentially the process must address three baskets of issues. 
The first basket is the disentanglement of the UK from the EU which is 
frequently referred to as the divorce settlement or withdrawal agreement. 
The second basket refers to the future relationship between the departing 
country and the EU27. The third basket addresses the transition from 
basket one to two, in other words the transition arrangements, if any, 
that will be agreed. Article 50 also makes provision for the automatic exit 
of the Member State in question two years after the notification unless 
there is unanimous agreement to extend the negotiating process. Hence, 
departure negotiations are time bound which imposes urgency on all 
those responsible for managing the process. As Armstrong pithily put it, 
‘The clock is ticking down. Time is short’ (Armstrong, 2017, 269). 
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Opening Positions 
The opening negotiating positions of the two parties were established in 
the key official documents that formally began the process. The Art 50 
notification letter represents formal UK Government policy which was 
submitted by the UK on 29 March, 2017 (UK Gov 2017a). The letter set 
out in broad terms how the UK approaches these negotiations. The letter 
is very clear about its core objective in the negotiations and that is to 
agree a ‘deep and special partnership’ between the UK and the EU, a for-
mula, which is used seven times in the short document. This is further 
elaborated as a ‘bold and ambitious Free Trade Agreement’ and an agree-
ment that includes both ‘trade and security cooperation’ (ibid). More-
over, the UK wants this agreement to be more substantial than anything 
the EU has ever offered a third country before. There is an ill-disguised 
attempt at issue linkage given the 11 references to security and 6 to trade. 
Clearly the UK thinks it has negotiating capital on security. Prior to noti-
fication, PM May had made a number of public statements that outlined 
her Government’s position such as the decision to withdraw from the 
single market and the removal of the UK from the jurisdiction of the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ). 
The letter identifies UK objectives concerning the conduct of the 
negotiations expressed as a wish to negotiate the future partnership 
alongside the withdrawal agreement, in other words parallel negotiations 
to be completed within two years. In addition, there is a desire to move 
from overarching principles to technical discussions quickly and to dis-
aggregate the negotiations into policy areas. Finally the letter contains 
a veiled threat about the security consequences of any failure to reach 
agreement. The document could be summarised as high on ambition but 
sparse on identifying what the actual content of a ‘deep and special part-
nership’ might be. Crudely it could be translated into the aim of retaining 
as much access to the single market as possible and the highest level of 
cooperation within the constraints of UK redlines. 
The EU27 response was swift and emerged as a set of negotiating 
guidelines from the European Council and directives agreed by the Gen-
eral Affairs Council. The dominant and unexpected feature of the EU27 
approach has been the unity of the Member States, which is re-stated 
in the guidelines. The commitment to acting as one has created a pow-
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erful soft norm, which will be difficult to dislodge. The EU27 define their 
objective vis à vis the future relationship with the UK as a ‘close part-
nership’ which is not as ambitious as the ‘deep and special partnership’. 
There is however a commitment to working hard and striving towards 
agreement but within limits designed to protect the interests of the EU, 
the autonomy of its decision making systems and the role of its judicial 
processes. There can be no sector by sector approach to the future agree-
ment and any agreement must balance rights and obligations and rep-
resent a level playing field. The EU27 identify the three core issues that 
form part of the divorce negotiations: citizens, the financial settlement 
and Ireland. The Commission Task Force has produced substantial doc-
uments on all three facets of the withdrawal agreement and these nego-
tiating documents have been agreed by the remaining Member States. 
The focus on citizens relates to the uncertainty caused by the vote for the 
many millions of citizens who have exercised their treaty right to free 
movement. There is a desire on both sides to address this issue as the first 
issue to be dealt with in the negotiations. The financial settlement is likely 
to be strongly contested as it relates to the post-Brexit budgetary legacy of 
UK payments to the EU. There is no agreement on the modalities for cal-
culating this or the sums involved. The third issue, Ireland, has received 
considerable attention because Ireland which will remain a Member State 
will have the only land border with the UK. Any return to a hard border 
on the island of Ireland threatens the fragile peace. 
The EU27 and the UK differ fundamentally on the sequencing of the 
negotiations. Whereas the UK wanted parallel negotiations, the EU27 
was adamant that the negotiations would be phased and that there would 
be no discussions on the future relations before sufficient agreement has 
been reached on the withdrawal agreement. Thus, the Brexit negotiations 
began with a substantial gap between the opening positions of both sides. 
Successful negotiations require agreement on a shared course of action 
and this is certainly missing.
First Round of Negotiations 
Notwithstanding the fact that PM May did not achieve an overall majority, 
the opening meeting of the Brexit negotiations went ahead as planned 
on June 19, 2017. The meeting was largely procedural with the aim of 
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agreeing terms of reference for the conduct of the negotiations. Agree-
ment was reached on the structure of the negotiations, negotiating texts, 
the frequency of negotiating rounds and other modalities of the talks. 
Working groups have been set up to address citizens’ rights, the financial 
settlement and other separation issues. In addition a dialogue has been 
established concerning the Irish border. The distinction between working 
groups and a dialogue underline just how complex and difficult the ques-
tion of the Irish border is although both sides have pledged to achieve as 
frictionless a border as possible. The border question hinges on the cus-
toms union. If the UK exits the customs union, which remains its stated 
policy, then there will have to be EU border checks and controls. The UK 
will not be granted the benefits of customs union membership without 
the obligations. There may yet be differentiated treatment for Northern 
Ireland but this would require agreement on issues of rules of origin, 
co-operation between customs authorities on both sides of the border 
and risk management to ensure that the Irish border did not become a 
smugglers paradise. 
Both sides entered the negotiations divided on substance and pro-
cess. The likelihood of getting to ‘yes’ depends crucially on the first phase, 
on creating sufficient trust and momentum to propel these negotiations 
forward. Unfortunately for the UK, it will have to do significantly more 
than the EU27 to achieve this because it is the Member State that as opted 
for exit over voice. This will be difficult because of the highly politicised 
nature of the issue in the UK, a weakened prime minister and a deeply 
divided Conservative party cabinet and party. The Labour party also faces 
Brexit challenges as it does not hold a coherent and consistent policy. 
Moreover, the UK’s traditional approach to EU negotiations makes it dif-
ficult for it to make early concessions in order to generate momentum. 
The UK has tended in the past to push EU negotiations on every detail 
rather than establishing broad trade-offs. The UK pattern is to resort to 
voting against rather than getting concessions as part of the emerging 
majority and in extremis to look for opt-outs. The UK approach has 
tended to be ‘us’ and ‘them’ rather than viewing the EU as a collective 
endeavour. The rampant Europhobia of the British tabloid press serves to 
reinforce difference rather than commonality with the rest of Europe. The 
UK’s traditional strategy will not serve it well in these negotiations. The 
UK Government has to accept that these are asymmetric in which it is in 
the role of ‘demandeur’. It has limited negotiating capital, is under time 
pressure and must use its available capital carefully. 
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An early indicator of the imbalance of forces in these negotiations was 
the question of the phasing or sequencing of the negotiations. The Min-
ister for Brexit, David Davis, threatened to make this issue the ‘row of the 
summer’ but simply caved in at the June 19 meeting. The well-established 
and well-signalled EU27 position that negotiations must take place in 
phases won the day. This was always going to be the case as the European 
Council had not given the Commission a negotiating mandate to do any-
thing other than address the withdrawal agreement and only when suf-
ficient progress is made, to begin discussions of the future relationship. 
Agreement on the future relationship if as requested by the UK, is a Free 
Trade Agreement, cannot to be concluded within the time-frame allowed 
for by Article 50 (March 29, 2019). Moreover, the European Council not 
the UK will decide when sufficient progress has been made. This means 
that the UK has a major interest in getting the European Council to this 
position. Moreover, the UK as the country on the way out and the source 
of uncertainty and disruption for millions of people and businesses must 
create the incentives for the EU27 to invest in a long-term relationship 
with it. 
Citizens’ Move Centre Stage
Creating momentum will depend crucially on the negotiations con-
cerning EU citizens. Michel Barnier, the chief negotiator, signalled at the 
centrality of citizens’ rights in his State of the Union address in Florence 
in May 2017. His wide ranging address highlighted the complexities of 
this dossier and the EU27 commitment to protecting the rights of all 
those Europeans who live in the UK or UK citizens who live in the other 
EU States. This was followed by the publication of an EU document on 
Essential Principles on Citizens’ Rights on June 12, 2017. The EU set out 
exacting principles derived from existing EU law concerning the scope of 
its demands concerning citizens’ rights. The EU’s side opening demand is 
essentially that EU citizens should retain all acquired rights. 
The UK responded with its first publically available negotiating posi-
tion on citizens’ rights. The negotiations will focus on the differences 
between the two sides which remain significant. The most important 
divergence in preference is the role of the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ). The UK document clearly states that ‘The Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) will not have jurisdiction in the UK’ (UK, 2017, 
4). This causes a problem for the EU27 as its stated aim is that ’the Court 
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of Justice of the European Union should have full jurisdiction corre-
sponding to the duration of the protection of citizen’s rights in the With-
drawal Agreement’ (EU, 2017,4). The question of judicial enforcement 
is a major issue of principle and substance for both sides and unless a 
formula is arrived at to satisfy both parties, no agreement will be pos-
sible. The issue of the ECJ is also central to the post-membership agree-
ment and relationship. There are other issues concerning citizens such 
as the cut-off date for applying for residence and the status of those who 
arrive after the cut-off date. The UK has promised that it will simplify its 
bureaucratic procedures. EU citizens will only retain their status in the 
UK if they do not leave for a period of more than two years. There are 
also issues to do with family reunification. The reality of Brexit is that 
EU citizens in the UK will experience a loss of status. The outcome on 
citizens is not just of importance to those who are affected by it but will 
have a bearing on the remainder of the negotiations. 
Broad agreement on citizens would enable the negotiations to move 
to the more difficult issues of Ireland and the financial settlement. The 
financial settlement is the most fraught issue in the first phase given the 
high salience of UK budgetary contributions in the past. Again the UK 
will have to be flexible and engage actively in identifying what is to be 
included in the settlement. Without this there will be no move to the 
second phase and no trade agreement. If on the other hand, the European 
Council could agree by the October or December EC meeting that the 
second phase should begin, then the outline of a future deal and tran-
sitional arrangements might be possible within the time frame allotted 
in Article 50. However, here again, the UK has to be realistic; its future 
arrangements and benefits will be less than it has now across a wide range 
of sectors and forms of co-operation. 
Financial Services 
The impact of Brexit on financial services is entirely dependent on the 
future relationship that is negotiated between the EU27 and the UK. 
There is uncertainty about the timing and the outcome of these negoti-
ations and notwithstanding a myriad of Brexit related analyses, it would 
be foolhardy to predict what might happen by 2020. The issues sur-
rounding financial services relate to regulatory frameworks, equivalence 
and the ultimate judgements of individual financial institutions wishing 
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to access the European market. The certainty and clarity that produces 
a good investment climate has been disturbed by Brexit. It is clear that 
financial services are of core interest to the UK as the City of London is 
a global financial centre and is Europe’s financial hub. Moreover, the UK 
has become a service driven economy. The issues that are likely to dom-
inate the negotiations on financial services are (a) the question of pass-
porting rights for financial services, (b) Euro-clearing and (c) regulatory 
frameworks post Brexit. The objective of the UK will be to retain as much 
of the Europe related business it now has but in a new regulatory envi-
ronment as it does not want to come under the jurisdiction of the ECJ. 
The Chancellor of the Exchequer in his Mansion House speech (June 20, 
2017) acknowledged that ‘as Britain leaves the EU, there are genuine and 
reasonable concerns among our EU colleagues about oversight of finan-
cial markets that will then be outside the EU jurisdiction’ but he went on 
to say that ‘avoiding fragmentation of financial services is a huge prize 
for the economies of Europe’ (HM Treasury, 2017). The sub-text of his 
argument is, on the one hand, that there are significant regulatory chal-
lenges arising from Brexit, but that on the other hand, if the UK loses its 
current status this would also harm Europe. His offer is a ‘new process for 
establishing regulatory requirements for cross-border business between 
the UK and the EU. It must be evidence-based, symmetrical, and trans-
parent’ (ibid). Just how prepared the EU27 will be to offer the UK and 
the City of London a regulatory framework that allows it to retain all 
of the EU related business that it now has is impossible to predict given 
that there is as yet no negotiating document on this issue. It seems highly 
unlikely that the EU will agree to passporting, highly accommodating 
deals on equivalence, and the euro clearing market for a third country. 
The current conditions for UK financial services are unlikely to persist 
in the post-Brexit era. This does not mean that the City will cease to be a 
key player in financial services but it is unlikely to escape some costs and 
consequences of Brexit.
Conclusions 
At the time of writing the formal process of Brexit negotiations has com-
menced and given the legal rules, the UK will leave the EU on March 29th 
mid-night Brussels time. This exit date cannot be changed without the 
agreement of all 27 Member States. Given that the process has begun, it 
is likely although not certain that the UK will depart the European Union 
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in 2019. Political turbulence and fragility in London will hamper the UK 
Government’s ability to get the necessary legislation through Westmin-
ster and any future deal will go back to Parliament. The Parliament may 
return the issue to the people so that they have voice on the terms of 
exit. The relationship between London and the devolved administrations 
is also fraught and may spring some surprises. Nor should we take for 
granted that agreement will be reached between the EU27 and the UK. 
The negotiations could stall on any number of issues over the next two 
years and in any event two years is not enough to negotiate a signifi-
cant post Brexit relationship. The UK retains the right to leave without an 
agreement and to resort to WTO provisions, which do not in any case, 
cover the entire range of EU co-operation. Such a unilateral move would 
raise the costs and consequences of Brexit in unforeseeable ways and 
would represent an extraordinary fissure in UK relations with its near 
neighbourhood. Opting for national self-determination, the formula 
outlined in the withdrawal letter in a highly interdependent 21st century 
world, is an extraordinary gamble for a once great power. Paradoxically, 
PM Cameron’s desire to take the ‘European Question’ out of UK politics 
by holding a referendum has only served to heighten its salience and the 
divisions with the UK on the issue. It is reminiscent of the ‘Irish Ques-
tion’ which dogged UK politics through the 19th and 20th centuries and 
although both islands had achieved a modus vivendi by the end of the 
20th century, Brexit also re-opens the question of Ireland. 
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CONNECTING AND DISCONNECTING 
CRITICAL FINANCIAL MARKET 
INFRASTRUCTURES : OVERSIGHT AND 
REGULATION OF CCPS AFTER BREXIT
Agnieszka Smolenska
Much like physical infrastructures such as roads or gas pipes connect scat-
tered geographical locations, the EU’s financial system is connected through 
market infrastructures (FMIs), entities which operate as nodes linking market 
actors, buyers and sellers of financial products, of which central counterparties 
(CCPs) are a prominent example. Barriers erected in the aftermath of Brexit 
will interrupt all these infrastructures – both physical and virtual. However, in 
the context of financial markets, the issue of free movement was already raised 
before the UK referendum in the context of ECB’s so-called “Location Policy”, 
challenged by the British government before the EU courts. Brexit in itself will 
not resolve the issues  related to ECB competence and EU’s internal market. In 
fact, in 2017, the perfect storm brought about by Brexit, the revision of EU’s 
financial market infrastructure regulatory framework (EMIR) and the general 
extension of central bank prerogatives in terms of financial stability objectives 
will force a profound re-examining of the traffic rules on European finan-
cial infrastructures, in particular from the perspective of a (multi-currency) 
internal market and principles of EU law.
Post-trading activities have gained in regulatory prominence since the 
Great Financial Crisis, when they have been covered by a flurry of post-crisis 
financial reform efforts, with the momentum provided by the 2009 G20 com-
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mitment and successive FSB recommendations.1 In the EU, the 2012 Euro-
pean Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR)2 seeks to specifically bring 
Over-the-Counter (OTC) derivative transactions within the scope of regu-
lation. To this end, EMIR addresses the emergence of global market infra-
structures for clearing and settlement of securities transactions by requiring 
registration and supervision of central counterparties as well as making man-
datory central clearing for particular types of asset classes. Responsibilities 
for specific tasks are placed to this end on ESMA – the EU agency for finan-
cial markets – including co-ordination of national regulation and drafting of 
technical standards. Even before EMIR was put in place, however, the ECB 
has sought to regulate CCP activity by requiring euro-denominated transac-
tions to be cleared in a Eurozone Member State as part of its general oversight 
framework. The repercussions of the judgement delivered by the EU Court 
when this policy was challenged by the UK will reverberate beyond Brexit, in 
particular in the context of proposals on CCP supervision put forward by the 
European Commission in 2017.
Central counterparties – risk mitigators or risk concentrators?
Central counterparties place themselves in the middle of a transaction between 
a buyer and a seller in derivatives markets and are a means to mitigate default, 
counterparty and liquidity risk of transaction parties  by concentrating risk 
in a multilateral setting. They combine therefore the characteristics of bro-
kerage with that of a risk management facility. Where the post-crisis financial 
reform has sought to increase the transparency of post-trading activity, inter 
alia through standardisation of certain derivative contracts and mandatory 
clearing of certain asset classes, the central clearing infrastructure became 
visible to the eye of the regulator, and has been growing in prominence ever 
since. 
In accordance with the EMIR Regulation, CCPs are now required to 
obtain authorization to offer services and pursue their activities in the Union: 
out of 17 CCPs established in the EU, almost half (7) are established outside 
1 Financial Stability Board, Implementing OTC Derivatives Market Reform, October 
2010. http://www.fsb.org/2010/10/fsb-report-on-implementing-otc-derivatives-mar-
ket-reforms/.
2 Regulation (EU) No  648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
4  July 2012 on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories, OJ L 
201, 27.7.2012, p. 1–59. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/ALL/?uri=CELEX-
%3A32012R0648.
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the Eurozone (UK, Sweden, Hungary and Poland). EMIR requires EU CCPs 
to be supervised by colleges of national supervisors, the European Securities 
and Markets Authority (ESMA) as well as relevant members of the European 
System of Central Banks (ESCB), that is central banks of issue of the domi-
nant currencies traded.3 The broad membership of these colleges reflects the 
EU-wide scope of CCPs’ activity.
The rapid growth of central clearing since the crisis - by the end of 2016, 
60% of all OTC interest-rate derivatives were centrally cleared, while the cor-
responding figure by the end of 2009 was 36% - has raised concerns regarding 
their systemic nature and in particular their relevance for the conduct of 
monetary policy inasmuch as they affect the liquidity conditions on the 
market. Here, it is the volume of transactions as well as interconnectedness 
of the parties which pose a threat to the financial system more broadly. At the 
same time, rapid changes in the operation of financial market infrastructures 
resulting from innovation (including FinTech) further bring uncertainty on 
the CCPs’ future role. This in turn raises the question of appropriate compe-
tences and tools which should be conferred on central banks, if any. In the EU 
context, a further caveat has been the concentration of CCP clearing activity 
in a particular geographic market – the UK. The European Commission esti-
mates that 75% of euro-denominated interest rates derivatives are cleared in 
the UK, the ECB holds it to be as much as 90% for certain asset classes. 
EU reform
The extent to which central counterparties can pose a systemic risk to finan-
cial stability has been recognized not only in regulation, which seeks to limit 
scope for failure by improving CCP resilience (prudential aspect), but also 
by regulatory measures oriented at strengthening crisis management tools in 
cases of CCP failure (recovery and resolution). Driven by initiatives at global 
level – including of the IOSCO and the FSB,4 since 2016 the second round 
of EU reform seeks to put in place a system for recovery and resolution of 
3 Art. 18(2)(h) EMIR.
4 See in particular recent joint reports by BIS, FSB and IOSCO on Chairs’ Report on the 
Implementation of the Joint Workplan for Strengthening the Resilience, Recovery and 
Resolvability of Central Counterparties, July 2017, highlighting in particular the global 
interdependencies in CCP markets. http://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d165.pdf.
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CCPs, extending a majority of BRRD principles to CCPs5 - as early interven-
tion measures and resolution tools, building on the particular system of loss 
absorption inbuilt in CCP activity known as the “default waterfall”.
In addition, in 2017 the European Commission has presented two pro-
posals for EMIR amendments: one oriented at improving the proportion-
ality and efficiency of the current regime,6 the second looking to improve 
supervision of CCPs both within the EU and in case of entities established 
in third countries.7 These proposals were made in the context of the Cap-
ital Markets Union initiative, where the role of central clearing is to play 
a crucial part in improving and promoting the development of EU finan-
cial markets. The second proposal in particular, made in June 2017, seeks 
to enhance EU-level supervision by ESMA of systemically important EU 
CCPs, bolstering as well the role of the central bank of issue of the curren-
cies in which assets are cleared by EU CCPs.
Why should central banks play a role not only in oversight, buy also 
in regulation of post-trading activities in this respect? Being part of the 
financial system, CCP activity and interconnectedness has implications 
for the transmission of monetary policy and broader financial stability 
considerations;8 this results in particular from their role in liquidity pro-
vision, position in the market as concentrators of risk, and also their 
5 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on a frame-
work for the recovery and resolution of central counterparties and amending Regula-
tions (EU) No 1095/2010, (EU) No 648/2012, and (EU) 2015/2365, COM/2016/0856 
final - 2016/0365 (COD) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX-
%3A52016PC0856.
6  Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amend-
ing Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 as regards the clearing obligation, the suspension 
of the clearing obligation, the reporting requirements, the risk-mitigation techniques 
for OTC derivatives contracts not cleared by a central counterparty, the registration 
and supervision of trade repositories and the requirements for trade repositories, 
COM/2017/0208 final - 2017/090 (COD) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/
ALL/?uri=COM:2017:0208:FIN.
7  Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amend-
ing Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authori-
ty (European Securities and Markets Authority) and amending Regulation (EU) No 
648/2012 as regards the procedures and authorities involved for the authorisation of 
CCPs and requirements for the recognition of third-country CCPs COM/2017/0331 
final - 2017/0136 (COD) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX-
:52017PC0331.
8  Jakob de Haan, Sander Oosterloo and Dirk Schoenmaker, Financial Markets and Insti-
tutions: A European Perspective (Third Edition, Cambridge University Press 2015) 242.
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interconnection with the banking market.9 ECB further emphasizes the 
systemic dimension of stability of the centrally-cleared repo segment of 
euro money markets. To this end, the EC proposal of June 2017 empha-
sizes the need to align the competences and responsibilities of supervi-
sors (including through EU-wide coordination) and central bank func-
tions. While the proposal enhances the supervisory role of ESMA in 
proposing the establishment of a CCP Executive Sessions of the Board of 
Supervisors to supervise EU and third country CCPs,10 it also bolsters the 
role of central banks, recognising “potential risks that the malfunctioning 
of a CCP could pose to the definition and implementation of the mon-
etary policy of the Union and the promotion of the smooth operation 
of payment systems.” The proposal requires prior authorization by the 
central banks of issue for a number of decisions taken by relevant regula-
tors, including authorisation and its withdrawal (Art. 14, 15, 20 EMIR), 
liquidity risk controls (Art. 44 EMIR) and collateral requirements (46 
EMIR).11 In the context of the Eurozone, can such competences be con-
ferred and exercised by the ECB? As EU law stands today, the 2015 CJEU 
judgement on ECB’s “Location Policy” would suggest otherwise. 
The internal market dimension and the limits to ECB 
competence
EU financial market infrastructures connect not only different markets, 
but also different currencies. Consequently they find themselves at the 
intersection of competences pertaining to monetary policy and broader 
financial system concerns: are financial market infrastructures, such as 
CCPs, equally a concern of central banks as traditional (‘cash’) payment 
systems? In the EU specific context, what is the significance of the spe-
cific tasks and competences conferred on the ESCB by the EU Treaties 
in delineating the broad responsibilities of the ECB with respect to the 
financial system in this regard? These points became the axis of conten-
tion in the 2015 judgement of the EU General Court, the significance 
of which – as will be explained below – extends far beyond the issues of 
where UK CCPs will migrate post-Brexit or how their activity with rela-
tion to EU financial market infrastructure will be regulated, delving into 
9 See: Benoît Coeure, Central clearing: reaping the benefits, controlling the risks’ Banque 
de France, ‘Financial Stability Review’ (2017) 21 97.
10  See proposed Arts. ESMA Regulation, new Articles 44a to 44c.
11  See proposed Article 21a and b.
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the very heart of discussions on the limits of competence of the ECB and 
the nature of the internal market in a multi-currency Union.12
Location Policy judgement of 2015 
On 4 March 2015 the EU’s General Court delivered a key judgement on 
the scope of ECB’s competence for oversight and regulation of finan-
cial market infrastructures, in particular the legality of certain aspects 
regarding the Eurosystem’s Oversight Policy Framework.13 The chal-
lenge brought forward by the UK concerned ECB’s policy to require all 
euro-denominated transactions above a set threshold to be conducted 
by CCPs legally established in the Eurozone with full managerial and 
operational control and responsibility exercised from one of its Member 
States – thus potentially restricting the extensive business done in the 
UK.14 The ECB’s policy sought to limit (forbid) settlement and clearing 
of euro transactions, where these may have adverse effects on payment 
systems located in the euro area inasmuch as the euro area had no direct 
control over such transactions. 
The case therefore raised the question of the scope of tasks assigned 
to the ECB under Article 127(2) TFEU, which confers on the ESCB the 
competence to promote the smooth operation of payment systems, fur-
ther detailed under Article 22 of the Statute, which provides that “[t]he 
ECB and national central banks may provide facilities, and the ECB may 
make regulations, to ensure efficient and sound clearing and payment 
systems within the Union and with other countries.” 
Among the pleas put forward by the UK government challenging the 
policy of the ECB, two are of particular relevance for the future regula-
tion of financial market infrastructures, namely those relating to ECB 
12 On the location policy judgement see in particular: Heikki Marjosola, ‘Missing Pieces 
in the Patchwork of EU Financial Stability Regime? The Case of Central Counterparties’ 
(2015) 52 Common Market Law Review 1491; Benedikt Wolfers and Thomas Voland, 
‘The Almighty ECB?: Limits to the ECB’s Competencies according to the Judgement 
of the General Court of March 4, 2015 on the Location Policy for Financial Market 
Infrastructures’ (2015) 30 Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation 670.
13 Judgement of the General Court of 4 March 2015, Case T-496/11, United Kingdom v 
European Central Bank (ECB), ECLI:EU:T:2015:133 [‘Location Policy’ judgement].
14 These requirements would also have implications for the access to Target2, see: De-
cision of the Central Bank of 24 July 2007 concerning the terms and conditions of 
TARGET2-ECB (ECB/2007/7), OJ L 237, 8.9.2007, p. 71 with subsequent amendments.
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competence to lay down a location requirement in respect to CCPs and 
the extent to which such a policy infringes provisions of EU Treaties 
relating to three out of the four EU freedoms (establishment, services 
and capital). 
While the Court recognised the ECB’s interest in smoothly operating 
clearing markets, it distinguished between oversight and regulation of 
market activity, where the latter consist of imposing uniform require-
ments such as imposing a location policy.15 Furthermore, it adopted a 
restrictive reading of the ECB’s competence with regard to regulating 
payment systems, excluding from its scope the power to regulate the 
clearing operations of CCPs inasmuch as they relate to transfer of secu-
rities16 rather than transfer of funds: it is only the latter activity which, 
per Court jurisprudence, falls within the scope of ‘payment system’ com-
petence conferred on the ECB under Article 127(2) TFEU. Additionally, 
the Court rejected the claim that competence for regulating CCPs could 
be conceived as an implicit regulatory power – an avenue which must 
be interpreted restrictively given the general principle of conferral, and 
applying only to situations where such implicit powers are necessary to 
ensure the practical effect of the provisions of the Treaty.17 Consequently, 
the ECB did not have the competence to require euro-denominated deriv-
ative transactions to be cleared in the Eurozone. The judgement however 
helpfully provided an avenue for the powers of the ECB to be extended 
to regulation of securities transactions clearing by market infrastruc-
tures such as CCPs: the Court suggested that under 129(3) TFEU the 
ECB, if it considers necessary to extend its powers, could submit a rec-
ommendation – a request to EU legislature - to amend Article 22 of the 
Statute.18 On a practical level, the judgement led to a specific ECB-Bank 
of England agreement on CCPs, in particular with regard to  enhanced 
arrangements for information exchange and cooperation regarding UK 
Central Counterparties with significant euro-denominated business.19
This restriction of the reading of the ECB’s competence is incompat-
ible with the regulatory powers which would be conferred to central banks 
15  Para. 102 Location Policy judgement.
16  Para. 97-99 Location Policy judgement.
17  Para. 105 Location Policy judgement.
18  Para. 109 Location Policy judgement.
19  See: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2015/html/pr150329.en.html.
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under the 2017 EMIR proposals. In particular, the proposed wording of 
Article 21b provides the central bank of issue with a veto right on any 
decision proposed by the competent authority – “[w]here the central 
bank of issue proposes amendments, the competent authority may only 
adopt the decision as amended by that central bank of issue”. This clearly 
goes beyond mere oversight as interpreted by the Court. Anticipating 
such controversies, in July 2017 the ECB Governing Council proposed 
an amendment to Article 22 of its Statute with the following wording: “[t]
he ECB and national central banks may provide facilities, and the ECB 
may make regulations, to ensure efficient and sound clearing and pay-
ment systems, and clearing systems for financial instruments, within the 
Union and with other countries.”20 In particular, as its Explanatory Mem-
orandum explains, “the Eurosystem should have regulatory powers to 
adopt binding assessments and require remedial action, in close cooper-
ation with other Union authorities. Moreover, where necessary to protect 
the stability of the euro, the ECB should also have the regulatory powers 
to adopt additional requirements for CCPs involved in the clearing of 
significant amounts of eurodenominated transactions.” Notwithstanding 
the ECB’s particular responsibility for financial stability in the Eurozone 
as well as the insight into market operations, the sequencing of the pro-
posals as well as the potential scope of extension of ECB competences 
raises serious concerns from the point of view of EU law, including 
principles of proportionality as well as possible implications in terms 
of restrictions of free movement in the internal market. To this extent 
the difference in the Council voting procedures under Art. 114 TFEU 
(EU-wide) and Article 129(3) TFEU (where only Member States without 
a derogation vote) is evocative of the tension which exists between the 
pursuit of harmonisation in the internal market - especially given the 
restrictive scope of Art. 114 TFEU as interpreted by the EU Courts - and 
conferring regulatory competences on an EU institution.
This is not least, as the Location Policy judgement failed to address 
the question which is likely to resonate broadly and further after Brexit: 
that is the extent to which such “location policies” could be held to be at 
odds with the internal market or discriminatory under Article 18 TFEU, 
20 See Explanatory Memorandum, Recommendation for a Decision of the European Par-
liament and of the Council amending Article 22 of the Statute of the European System 
of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (ECB/2017/18) (presented by the 
European Central Bank), 22 June 2017.
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where such a policy, inasmuch as mandatory for the relevant market 
infrastructures, could be perceived to be an obstacle to free movement of 
establishment, services and capital, especially where the legal framework 
applicable at the time explicitly allowed the CCP cross-border access to 
investment firms, market operators as well as regulated markets. 
Brexit as trigger for EU rearrangement of financial infrastructure 
traffic rules
Among its various far-reaching implications, Brexit will most certainly 
require a serious rearrangement of the EU market infrastructure for 
CCPs. The ECB estimates that in the UK are cleared 90% of euro-de-
nominated interest rate swaps of euro area banks, as well as 40% of their 
euro-denominated credit default swaps. How will these transactions be 
governed after Brexit? This will be decided by the framework of equiva-
lence regimes. But even as much attention with regard to the most recent 
EMIR revision proposal has been devoted to the two-tier system for rec-
ognising third-party CCPs, i.e. creating potentially a preferential regime 
for selected jurisdictions (such as the UK), from an internal market per-
spective the consequences of these proposals might be even more far-
reaching, in particular with regard to: (a) consequences of regulation of 
EU financial infrastructures in a multi-currency financial market and - to 
that end - defining what constitutes significant CCP market activity from 
the perspective of stability of a given currency area and the Union as a 
whole; (b) the scope for ECB to shape and define its own competences in 
regulating financial markets, in accordance with the procedure helpfully 
suggested by the General Court. 
With regard to the regulatory architecture, while the role of CCPs 
for currency stability cannot be underestimated, even if only given the 
volume of transactions, just as in the case of banking there is no con-
sensus on the desirable division of tasks between public authorities for 
supervision and oversight: across the EU the regulators of CCPs vary.21 
This indicates an open discussion as to the possible responsibilities and 
powers of supervisors and regulators, as well as the value which may 
come from decentralisation of responsibilities – in particular as the 
competences for oversight over financial stability appear to increasingly 
centralise with the central banks. While the European Commission’s pro-
21  https://www.esma.europa.eu/ncas-ccps.
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posals strengthen the role of ESMA in CCP oversight as well, the limits 
on independent scope of action of this agency imposed by EU constitu-
tional law, in particular discretionary decisions, must be borne in mind.
Furthermore, until any revision of the ECB Statute, the Location 
Policy judgement remains valid, with the limits it imposes on the ECB. 
Here, however, the precedent of the ECB proposing for an amendment to 
Article 22 of its statute should not be trivialised as it raises broad insti-
tutional questions of how far does the authority of a monetary policy 
extends and what limits should be set on the ECB’s power to define its 
own competences. While there are certainly many premises for con-
ferring further regulatory and prudential powers over CCPs to central 
banks – not least given the possibility for emergency liquidity provision 
to systemic CCPs so far rejected – such continued extension of preroga-
tives warrants a parallel reassessment of accountability and transparency 
arrangements at the very least.22
The question of extension of central bank competence into spheres 
of securities markets in the EU context, particularly where these mar-
kets have not been regulated previously, was raised predominantly by the 
UK given the sheer volume of euro-denominated transactions carried 
out in London. Where location policies are unambiguously restrictive of 
freedom of movement, the question of CCP regulation should also be 
seen in the broader context of the internal market. In a scenario where 
the regulatory landscape seems to be shifting to a world where central 
banking – and hence the link between currency and money – becomes 
ever more predominant, not just in microprudential regulation but also 
in general macroprudential policy, even post-Brexit we can expect EU 
Courts to have to grapple with the question of how far “stabilisation” reg-
ulatory policies should reach, restricting or disincentivising free move-
ment across the internal market as a whole. This is not least, due to the 
role played by the very derivatives traded on CCPs in mitigating exchange 
and interest rate risk, as well as in the light of the fact that the relationship 
between law and regulation on one side, and financial stability on the 
other is contested in itself.23
22  See Transparency International, Two sides of the same coin? Independence and ac-
countability of the ECB?, 2017. https://transparency.eu/ecb-needs-democratic-oversight-
if-the-euro-is-to-survive-the-next-crisis/.
23 See: Dan Awrey, Law, Financial Instability, and the Institutional Structure of Financial 
Regulation’’, in: Anita Anand (ed), Systemic Risk, Institutional Design, and the Regula-
tion of Financial Markets (First edition, Oxford University Press 2016).
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Conclusion
The systemic importance of central counterparties is increasingly taking 
centre stage as a key regulatory concern – as made clear by the prolifer-
ation of initiatives at both global and EU level. While CCPs have taken 
centre stage in the context of Brexit, the proposed 2017 EMIR reform of 
the regulatory framework will extend far beyond creating a new third 
country regime. Traffic rules on the financial market infrastructures will 
increasingly have to accommodate the hilly terrain of a multi-currency 
Union as well as the broader transformation of the financial system 
resulting from technological change, especially as we shift towards an 
increasingly functional approach to financial regulation – rather than 
one based on institutions. As pointed out by Zettelmeyer  in this vol-
ume,24 Brexit will bring to the foreground many tensions which still per-
sists in the architecture of financial integration in the EU – not least the 
tension between currency integration (and the consequential role of cen-
tral banks in maintaining currency stability) and an integrated internal 
market with its principles of freedom of movement of establishment, cap-
ital and services. This taking place in the EU specific context, where the 
boundaries of competence of respective actors and supervisors are set by 
the principles of EU law and the Court of Justice. 
Can financial stability across the EU financial market infrastructures 
be achieved (to the extent possible), only by limiting traffic via location 
policies? This would seem to impede the very aim which an integrated 
financial market infrastructure is meant to deliver: that is to connect 
market actors. This is all the more the case in a world where technological 
change is challenging the very concept of what is a “reliable and adaptive” 
financial market infrastructure.25 Defining what is systemic and critical 
in such a geographical and legal context in a proportionate manner will 
be crucial, and in many senses will be much more sensitive than for the 
transport and energy sectors, especially when risk-sharing or solidarity 
aspects come into play.
24 See Zettelmeyer, Jeromin, After Brexit: Rebooting Euro Area Financial Integration, pub-
lished in this book in Part 2 - Regulatory Arbitrage Across Jurisdictions.
25 On this point see in particular World Economic Forum and Oliver Wyman, Balancing 
Financial Stability, Innovation, and Economic Growth (FSIEG), White Paper, 2017. 
http://www.oliverwyman.com/our-expertise/insights/2017/jun/balancing-financial-sta-
bility--innovation--and-economic-growth.html.
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Dinner Speech 
LESSONS FROM THE PAST FOR THE 
FUTURE
Martin Sandbu1
It’s a daunting prospect to round off this year’s conference. First of all, 
because such is the range of expertise concentrated here that whatever 
I have to say, somebody present will be able to call me out and correct 
me. Second, financial regulation is not the lightest theme for concluding 
dinner remarks that are after all expected to be entertaining as well as illu-
minating. And third, the topics you have chosen for this year’s meeting 
— fintech, regulation, and Brexit, all under the heading of the changing 
geography of finance — range so broadly that they are all the more diffi-
cult to synthesise.
The best I can do is to offer a counterpoint to all that has been said 
today. In music, a counterpoint is a compositional line that constitutes a 
variation on the original theme which, when played alongside that orig-
inal melody, creates a fuller harmony. While today’s speakers have looked 
to the future, I therefore propose to start out in the opposite direction and 
look into the past. 
If you will follow, in fact, I’d like to go take you all the way back to the 
dawn of the first, or at least the most fundamental, financial technology 
of them all. I am referring to money. 
You will have heard the story given in the economics textbook: money 
was invented to overcome the inconvenience of barter. That story, it turns 
1 Edited remarks given at the concluding dinner on the 27th
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out, is completely wrong. The anthropologists tell us there is really no 
evidence at all that there barter was ever all that common, let alone that 
it spurred the development of money. There is instead a lot of evidence 
that money was invented as a way to make debt relationships more man-
ageable.2
 
The anthropological story as I understand it is as follows. Money 
came into being as a way of transforming personalised debt obligations 
between a named debtor and creditor who were known to one another, 
into tokens of transferable financial claims that were not tied to personal 
relationships. I want to dwell on this transformation because there are 
lessons to be learnt from the primordial financial technology that money 
constitutes for the topics we have been talking about today. 
By freeing financial claims from personal relationships and the cul-
tural and psychological baggage that comes with them, you also make it 
possible for financial claims to span a far greater distance than any par-
ticular personal relationship can reach. 
The word “distance” here should be understood not just as physical 
distance, but any dimension along which the participants in a financial 
relationship may be separated. They can be separated by time, by (in)
ability to communicate, by their imperfect knowledge of one another, by 
(dis)trust, by mismatched personal opportunities to enter or fulfil mutu-
ally advantageous obligations, and by any imaginable practical obstacle 
to carrying out whatever economic transaction they may ideally want to 
commit to. Such practical obstacles could be, for example, a lacking stable 
denominator of value or the absence of a reliable system of keeping tabs 
on particularly complex undertakings.
Now, the most obvious of those dimensions of distance are of course 
physical geography and time. Money payment tokens – financial claims 
not tied to specific person – makes it possible to create claims across a 
wider physical space than a single person can span and across a longer 
time than a single person can live. 
2 For a general-audience overview of this thesis, see Ilana E. Strauss, “The Myth of the 
Barter Economy”, The Atlantic, 26 February 2016, https://www.theatlantic.com/busi-
ness/archive/2016/02/barter-society-myth/471051/. 
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The broader point is that the ancient invention of transferable imper-
sonal value claims (ie money) is at the root of all later financial innova-
tions including those we have discussed at this conference. Armed with 
the concept of money, it is easy to make the leap to any kind of financial 
relationship imaginable, based on such tokens of transferable, impersonal 
units of value. The economists in the room will know about Arrow-De-
breu securities, the conceptual contract structure that specify financial 
claims conditional on any time, location, and “state of the world” — a 
term so ample that it can contain any uncertain but definable outcome.3 
Once you have money, you can theoretically have Arrow-Debreu 
securities, which means you can theoretically have any sort of financial 
relationship you might care to invent. This shows how there is something 
inherently expansive about money, and by extension about finance. Once 
financial relationships are separated from personal relationships, they 
can transcend the limits that personal relationships are contained by. 
That gives finance an inherently colonising character, not just in a geo-
graphical sense but along all these other dimensions I have mentioned. It 
will naturally encourage the creation of ever more distant financial rela-
tionships until it runs up against new limits – which are not the limits 
of personal relationships, but limits particular to finance, that is to say 
impersonal money claims.
 
What could these be? What could limit financial relationships when they 
are no longer bound by personal relations? 
One sort of limit is the kind of thing we’ve discussed today: technolog-
ical limits. In a very broad sense, we can think of technological limits in 
two ways. One is plain physical limitation. The reach of a financial claim is 
obviously limited by how far technology will actually allow you to contact 
and communicate with others. If there are civilisations on other planets, 
we are clearly not in financial relationships with them at the moment 
because we are not technologically able to communicate with them. 
3 Kenneth Arrow and Gerard Debreu, “Existence of an equilibrium for a competitive 
economy”, Econometrica (1954): 265-290. See also John Geanakoplos, “Arrow-Debreu 
model of general equilibrium”, http://dido.econ.yale.edu/~gean/art/1987-newpalgrave1.
pdf. 
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The much more interesting technological limit isn’t physical, but 
informational. We can enter into financial relationships and commit 
to and fulfil financial obligations only to the extent that it is possible to 
track, monitor, calculate and verify the monetary implications of those 
relationships. That’s a technological ability, one which is never infinite but 
also not constant. Much of technology’s role in expanding the geographic 
reach of finance is really the technological expansion of our informa-
tional ability.
So as a point of departure for thinking about these issues, I am 
offering a kind of creation story. The primordial separation of financial 
claims from personal relationships has moral and political consequences 
but also financial consequences. One of those consequences is that finan-
cial interconnectedness constantly expands as far as it can go. 
It is no surprise, then, as we walk from prehistory into history, that 
financial innovation has always been tied to real economic activity that 
also expands geographic limitations. Financial centres have typically also 
been great trading centres. The prime example is of course the location 
of this conference: Florence during the late middle ages and the Renais-
sance, together with many other Italian city states.
Given the place and theme of our meeting, let me pay respect to this 
fascinating episode in financial history. The Medici family, long the rulers 
of Florence, have a good claim to being the most famous banking family 
in history. (Perhaps the Rothschilds can give them a run for their money.) 
For a while they enjoyed what must surely have been the best banking gig 
ever, as bankers to the Holy See.4 It is no surprise that this was lucrative. 
What may be less obvious is the important geographic element to the job. 
As the papal court travelled from Rome to its other secondary seats, it 
would rely on its bankers to take care of its financial needs during those 
displacements. An important part of banking the Vatican was, in other 
words, to facilitate the establishment or maintenance of financial claims 
across significant time and space.
So that was one geographic dimension of the Medici’s business. 
Another was physical merchandise trade. The Medici traded commod-
4 “Those Medici”, The Economist, 23 December 1999, http://www.economist.com/
node/347333. 
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ities such as wool and silk, which perfectly illustrates how the informa-
tional technologies involved in maintaining a network of distant physical 
trade — ways to ensure and verify the reliability of far-flung business 
partners — allow the geographical expansion of finance, and vice versa. 
This period in Italian banking produced some extraordinary innova-
tions that continue to shape finance to this day. These were technological 
innovations – not in a physical sense like, say, digital electronics, but in 
the sense I mentioned before: advances in our information-processing 
ability, improved techniques for tracking and managing financial claims. 
Among them were new accounting practices such as double-entry book-
keeping. The Medici also mastered branch banking. Today we would 
probably call their branches subsidiaries, as they often constituted sep-
arate partnerships.
Through such innovations, it became possible to keep track of ever 
more complex chains of finance. 
There was also a concomitant increase in the skill of regulatory arbi-
trage. Because this was medieval Europe, with its religious restrictions on 
usury. You should ask yourself: how do you make money as a banker if 
you can’t charge interest? Everyone at this conference can no doubt come 
up with creative, inventive solutions. So did the Medici and their peers. 
They used, for example, bills of exchange, which created financial claims 
across geographic distance and time. You would exchange money paid in 
at one time, in one place in order to withdraw money in a different cur-
rency at a later time, in a different place. Bills of exchange are very useful 
for traders of physical merchandise. But they are also useful because you 
can always set the exchange rates so as to bake in an implicit interest rate, 
and thereby get around the ban on interest.
The innovation of the bill of exchange, in other words, allowed you 
to do well without jeopardising the eternal health of your soul. Another 
trick was what we can think of as a form of collateralised lending: issuing 
credit to merchants in return for the right to buy their stock of goods at a 
below-market price, again allowing an implicit interest charge to be built 
into the complexity of a financial claim.
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Examples such as these are obvious to contemporary financial pro-
fessionals, but somebody had to invent them. I mention them partly to 
pay tribute to Florence and early modern Italian banking. But I also raise 
them to ask whether everything we have covered at this conference isn’t a 
case of nothing new under the sun. 
We have discussed technological innovation — but we’ve had (in my 
broad sense of the word) technological innovations in finance at previous 
periods in history. They have previously led to regulatory arbitrage, just 
like they do today. They have led to the geographical expansion of finan-
cial and real economic relationships, just like they do today.
What about fintech — is that also just more of the same? In some sense 
it is. Essentially what fintech does is to increase the power of our informa-
tional technologies. It allows us to do calculate, monitor, and track trades 
and clearing much faster and in much greater quantities, and at higher 
levels of complexity than ever before. It’s a simple point of arithmetic that 
as you increase the number of dimensions or nodes in a network, you 
increase the number of possible combinations of nodes and relationships 
by much more. That is the root of increased complexity. But that word 
“complexity” should remind us of the old trope that when a quantitative 
change becomes big enough, it turns into a qualitative transformation.
Put more simply: as soon as you have progress in financial technology, 
you should expect runaway products. You should expect to play catch-up 
intellectually in order just to understand what is actually going on.
That’s a problem for regulators. It’s also a problem for participants, as 
we saw in the crisis. When you have innovative products and techniques 
for linking up new and more complex financial relationships, everybody 
loses track of what the consequences might be. That was the case in the 
run-up to the global financial crisis where virtually nobody appreciated 
the vulnerabilities and interconnections in the real economy created by 
the growth of new structured financial products.
So perhaps there is something new under the sun after all, if only 
because the quantitative change brought on by today’s innovations is big 
enough to become a qualitative change.
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Let me finish by using this glimpse into the past to engage in some 
unreined speculation about the changing geography of finance, in terms 
of what might happen in the three areas we have covered today: tech-
nology, regulation and Brexit. 
On technology I have already said that our capacity for financial com-
plexity is increasing. That is a talent to be celebrated, but that needs to be 
governed. It creates more scope both for better financial services but also 
for regulatory arbitrage. It creates more scope for self-delusion, too. 
Added to “mere” complexity is the possibility of financial transactions 
becoming self-executing — so-called “smart contracts” in which digital 
technology allows us to make do without a lot of what is now done by 
humans. I think it will be very interesting to watch the extent to which 
the execution and enforcement of ever more complex claims is soon 
enough carried out by automated technology, with no need for anybody 
actually to enact the agreement that’s set out in the contract. That would 
have big consequences for regulation.
As for regulation, what future can we speculatively imagine? If tech-
nological innovation changes the geographical scope of financial rela-
tionships, there are several things regulators could do in response. But 
doing nothing is hardly an option — the complexity of new financial rela-
tionships is dangerous since we don’t understand how it unfold in various 
states of the world. Both financial participants and “innocent victims” 
need regulation to keep up with the times. 
Regulators could respond to a geographically more expansive finan-
cial world by moving regulation “up” and expanding it geographically 
as well. That is to say, engage in more regulatory harmonisation across 
national borders. We are indeed seeing a lot of that, above all in the Euro-
pean Union but at a global level as well.
The alternative is to bring more regulation back down to the national 
level, but more effectively. One can use either technology or old-fash-
ioned legislation to limit some of the geographical expansion of finance, 
putting limits on the cross-border financial links themselves. Perhaps 
Brexit will lead to more of that in the UK.
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But a middle way is to shift from regulating a financial activity (which 
straddles borders) towards regulating the end user of the activity (who 
will be resident in nation-state). So instead of (or in addition to) regu-
lating, say, mortgages in terms of what loans banks are allowed to issue, 
you regulate your residents in terms of what sort of mortgages they are 
allowed to take out.
Regulating end users is quite doable and often has little to do with 
technology. In the runup to the financial crisis, for example, the euro-
zone countries that experienced big real estate bubbles possessed powers 
to regulate in precisely this way, even though they made too little use 
of them. If Irish regulators had really wanted to contain the mortgage 
bubble in Ireland, what stopped them? You might answer that if they had 
restricted lending by Irish banks, Irish branches of foreign banks would 
just come in to do the same lending with the same results. But you could 
then have regulated Irish mortgage holders directly instead, for example 
by banning Irish residents from borrowing more than some loan-to-in-
come ratio. (To make this enforceable the law would have had to disallow 
the securing of any non-compliant loan against real property in Ireland.) 
It is not hard to think of other possibilities.
But a much more exciting avenue for regulatory innovation is tech-
nological. Instead of regulating the financial transactions themselves you 
could start looking at regulating the technology used in those transac-
tions.5 Computer algorithms themselves could be subject to regulatory 
specifications. Here is a thought that may be veering deep into science 
fiction and yet seems burningly timely: Could we not imagine that regu-
lation itself becomes much more automated? Could we not require finan-
cial institutions to insert “virtual regulator” software programmes in 
their transaction technology, which would automatically monitor, track, 
report on and possibly stop certain types of automated transactions from 
taking place? I think we are barely scratching the surface here.6
A last possibility is that national authorities themselves start 
5 See Katherine Ellen Foley, “A pioneering computer scientist wants algorithms to be 
regulated like cars, banks, and drugs”, https://qz.com/998131/algorithms-should-be-reg-
ulated-for-safety-like-cars-banks-and-drugs-says-computer-scientist-ben-shneiderman/, 
3 June 2017.
6 See Jane Croft, “Law firms programmed for more technological disruption”, https://
www.ft.com/content/8a4d4634-29a0-11e7-bc4b-5528796fe35c, 2 June 2017.
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employing technologies in ways that crowd out private financial activity. 
A fascinating example is how central banks are beginning to contemplate 
the use of block chain. This is being thought of seriously at, for example, 
the Bank of England.7 The question being asked is whether money, which 
today exists largely in the form of deposits in private banks, could not 
instead be created and maintained as entries in a block chain distributed 
ledger. There are pros and cons around managing the money supply in 
this way, and it would be a radical step to take. But if a central bank ever 
does go down that route, it will clearly be a mortal threat to banks.
Finally, on the third issue we have discussed today — Brexit — I’d like 
to make just one argument that links it it with the other themes.
As we have seen, technological innovation —  not just in finance, 
but especially there — makes for geographical expansion. That is one 
reason why there is much more trade, and immeasurably more financial 
activity, across borders now than there was 50 years ago. The obstacles 
to cross-border economic activity have changed in the last half-century, 
too. Tariffs are no longer the main barriers to trade in goods and never 
really have been for trade in services, including financial services. What 
stands in the way of cross-border economic relations today is the degree 
to which rules and regulations diverge between nations. In the case of 
international finance, the issue is whether separate jurisdictional author-
ities and different rules apply to the end points of a financial transaction 
(and any intermediaries between the ultimate transacting parties).
This means that promoting trade in financial and other services, 
and even in goods, today involves taking part in efforts of common rule 
making. One particularly frustrating element of the Brexit debate has 
been the complete lack of recognition of this fact that being open to trade 
means accepting the need to make decisions together with others. There 
is a perception among some parties to the Brexit debate that trade open-
ness and joint decision-making are somehow opposites, so that escaping 
the rules of the EU is a way for Britain to be more open to the world.
7 See Ben Broadbent, “Central banks and digital currencies”, http://www.bankofengland.
co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/2016/886.aspx, speech given 2 March 2016; as well 
as the research questions asked by the Bank of England at http://www.bankofengland.
co.uk/research/Documents/onebank/cbdc.pdf. 
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But this perception in false. Withdrawing from collectively binding 
rules is a move away from cross-border economic openness. Now, we 
have recently seen an upsurge in nationalism and protectionism across 
the western world, most worryingly in the US — but the current US 
protectionist attitude at least has the merit of being consistent. When 
someone like Stephen Bannon wants to throw up barriers to and repat-
riate cross-border economic activity, it is part and parcel of the desire to 
be less constrained by agreements with other nations.
Most of those who argue for Brexit, in contrast, lack Bannon’s con-
sistency. So here is the thought I want to end on. There are ways to (at 
least try to) stop or reverse the growing international flows of goods and 
money, even though technology is making that ever harder. (Technology 
may also be giving us new tools to do so if we so wish). Alternatively, you 
can embrace the deepening of cross-border financial and economic links 
and try to agree common rules to govern them. You can be open eco-
nomically, or you can try to repatriate your rule making. But you cannot 
successfully do both at the same time.
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Postface 
STILL LOOKING FOR THE BANKING 
UNION’S FISCAL BACKSTOP
Pierre Schlosser1 
Europe’s economic and financial governance has been experiencing 
dramatic changes over the last years. These ground-breaking transfor-
mations have been brought about by a set of events of unprecedented 
magnitude whose nature cut across the banking, financial and sovereign 
areas. They have been commonly termed ‘euro crisis’.
The euro crisis has revealed gaps and shortcomings in the original 
architecture of Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) that 
have been partially addressed by the ad hoc layering of new rules and 
instruments and by the creation of the Banking Union in June 2012. The 
original EMU set up was indeed flawed (De Grauwe, 2013; Giavazzi and 
Wyplosz, 2015). Maastricht-designed EMU proved to be highly geared 
towards its monetary pillar, under-developed in its fiscal dimension, 
over-specified in its battery of rules and under-equipped in its arsenal 
of crisis management capabilities. Besides, EMU was established on the 
underlying notion (and cognitive framework) that all emerging risks 
potentially threatening EMU’s sustainability would come from the fiscal 
side whose alleged perilous developments were to be contrasted to the 
proclaimed anchoring power of monetary policy. 
1 This paper is based on two recent interventions given by the author, the first at a 
workshop on ‘Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union 25 years after the Creation’ 
held on 29 May 2017 in Dublin and the second at a joint EP-EUI History Roundtable 
on the Political Theory of and Economic Background to Economic and Monetary 
Union – 25 years after the signature of the Maastricht Treaty, 31 May 2017 in Brus-
sels.
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As a result, no EU institutions and instruments were in place to deal 
with risks or vulnerabilities which originated in or were largely ampli-
fied by the financial sector. As neatly captured by Sapir and Schoenmaker 
(2017:1): ‘there was no common instrument in case a sovereign faced a 
liquidity or solvency crunch. For banks, there was not even a common 
instrument for the surveillance of risk, and there was no common instru-
ment in case of a liquidity or solvency crisis. Everything was left in the 
hands of individual member countries’.
Located at the intersection of Europe’s Fiscal and Banking Unions, 
this analysis focuses on EMU’s post-crisis crisis management capabili-
ties. The question that the paper aims to provide a first answer to is the 
following: which institutional form should EMU’s banking crisis man-
agement backstop take?
The paper is organized as follows: section 1 provides a ‘Padoa-Schi-
oppan’ framing of the topic of crisis management that distinguishes 
between ‘private money solution’, ‘tax-payer money solution’ and ‘central 
bank money solution’. Concentrating on the tax-payer money solution, 
section 2 enters the core of the argument and claims that a credible crisis 
management tool is still missing in EMU. Section 3 substantiates the 
claim further and provides more details on the currently existing back-
stops. Section 4 suggests new reforms while section 5 concludes.
1. What is meant by crisis management?
It is almost impossible to travel back to the early days of EMU in Maas-
tricht without thinking immediately of Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa. A 
founding father of EMU, and man of vision, he energetically advocated a 
European supervisory framework, insisted on the constitution of a Euro-
pean payments system and defended an embedded European Central 
Bank (ECB) which – he feared – would otherwise risk suffering from 
‘institutional loneliness’ (Padoa-Schioppa, 1999). History proved him 
right on all those three accounts. 
A fourth – often overlooked – foresight is worth mentioning. In line 
with the attention that he dedicated to financial stability (Maes, 2016), 
Padoa-Schioppa was also a believer of discretionary liquidity support. 
More broadly, he captured with lucidity the unsettled institutional nature 
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of Europe’s crisis management framework. In his 2004 monograph on the 
ECB, Padoa-Schioppa underlined the following, referring to the EMU 
original architecture: ‘crisis management is the issue on which most of 
the criticism of the present arrangements has concentrated in the early 
years of the euro. It has been argued that in euroland responsibilities to 
manage a banking (or more broadly financial) crisis are neither clearly 
assigned nor openly disclosed, and that the sheer number of authorities 
potentially involved would make the efficient provision of emergency 
liquidity unmanageable’ (Padoa-Schioppa, 2004: 116). Despite the trans-
formation that the European polity has endured in recent years – in 
particular with the creation of the Banking Union, the post-euro crisis 
framework remains in line with this past fragmentation. Several liquidity 
instruments exist at the EU level, they are however spread among several 
EU actors namely the European Central Bank (ECB), the European Sta-
bility Mechanism (ESM) and the Single Resolution Board (SRB), mainly.
2. The argument: Europe still misses a credible crisis 
management tool 
Over the past nine years, much has been done to make Europe’s banking 
system more resilient. It would be foolish to argue the opposite. On 
the prudential side, stricter and more intrusive capital rules have been 
adopted with the Capital Requirements Directive IV and the Capital 
Requirements Regulation package while a new, two-level micro-pru-
dential supervisory regime has been established with the creation of 
the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). As far as banking resolution 
is concerned, the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) sets 
now clear rules on bank recovery and bank resolution and provides 
detailed provisions on loss absorption as well as on resolution tools and 
resolution strategies. Those rules are about to be strengthened with the 
adoption of the new Banking Package. Besides, the SRB has been estab-
lished as the central actor of this new resolution process. Yet, despite all 
the advances made, the existing political narrative on EMU is that the 
latter ‘is not yet fully shock-proof ’, to borrow the wording of the recent 
Commission Reflections Paper on EMU (Commission, 2017: 3). EMU’s 
crisis management capacity remains weak as the elephant in the room 
has not been addressed: who is backstopping the Banking Union and 
with which instrument? 
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If one assumes that the European Central Bank cannot be the mother 
of all crisis management forever, then one has to face the bare truth 
that Europe is not prepared to address a systemic banking crisis of large 
magnitude. First, because its existing crisis management instruments 
are fragmented among too many actors and are therefore suboptimal in 
terms of firepower. Second, because their credibility is at stake. The very 
unlikely use of the ESM’s banking recapitalization instruments (as will be 
explained further below) is a good illustration of the disconnect between 
the theoretical availability of crisis management tools at the EU level and 
the practice of too high operational burden and conditions to mobilize 
those tools. Third, because the crisis management arsenal still assumes 
the implicit support of the ECB whose shadow is cast on the whole crisis 
management system. After all, it was only with the ‘whatever it takes’ dec-
laration by Mario Draghi and the following launch of the Outright Mon-
etary Transactions that the concerns of a pervasive doom loop between 
fragile Southern European banks and fiscally vulnerable governments 
ebbed away. Fourth, because Europe’s Banking Union remains by and 
large untested. In the same way that the credibility of the Stability and 
Growth Pact was only really tested when it had to be enforced fully on 
two large Member States (France and Germany) with the known result 
for its credibility, Europe’s new Banking Union’s real life test will come 
when one of Europe’s most systemic banks based in a large euro area 
economy will be declared ‘failing or likely to fail’. 
To help us enter into further details on the weaknesses of the current 
crisis management system we will rely on distinctions provided by Tom-
maso Padoa-Schioppa (2004). The latter narrowed down crisis manage-
ment into three dimensions: (1) “the private money solution”, (2) “the 
tax-payers money solution” and “the central bank money solution”. We 
will review those three dimensions in turn.
(1) The private money solution is at the core of Europe’s contem-
porary crisis management regime. The private sector is financing the 
Single Resolution Mechanism (both its Board and its Fund) and the spirit 
and letter of the BRRD revolves around preparing the financial sector to 
severe shocks by making it mandatory for them to develop the necessary 
tools to ensure that the lion’s share of the loss-absorption is born by them. 
Yet, the contribution of a private sector involvement to crisis manage-
ment should not be over-estimated either. As Avgouleas and Goodhart 
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(2016:87) explained, currently ‘there is a danger of over-reliance on 
bail-ins when the risk is not idiosyncratic’. Given the inter-connected-
ness of financial entities, a deep private sector solution, for an example 
a deep bail-in is unlikely to occur in the middle of a cross-border and 
systemic crisis. Schoenmaker in particular explained that to the extent 
that ‘bail-in spreads the losses through the system and can thus cause 
contagion […],‘the strength of a banking system ultimately depends on 
the strength of the sovereign behind it’ (Schoenmaker, 2015: 42). This 
exposes Europe to self-fulfilling dynamics of insolvency as EMU is noto-
riously sovereign-less. 
Over the years of the euro crisis, the central bank money solution 
(2) has been relied on extensively: unconventional monetary policy 
instruments have mushroomed to safeguard the euro and Emergency 
Liquidity Assistance (ELA) has been largely mobilized by Eurosystem 
central banks. It is obvious to recognize that central banking solutions 
are par excellence a cornerstone of crisis management solutions. Again as 
Padoa-Schioppa highlighted ‘a strong central bank is an institution which 
is in the position to act in a discretionary way’ (TPS, 1996). However 
their use should be restricted to last resort situations and be subject to the 
real discretion of the central bank. During the crisis, the opposite seemed 
to be true as those instruments appeared to be increasingly of a business 
as usual nature and were used at times reluctantly by the ECB, simply 
because there was no other actor left to save the euro. So if it becomes the 
rule rather than the exception that the ECB intervenes as a provider of 
last resort liquidity, then it means that there is a risk that it is no longer 
a discretionary choice but rather an obligation. As of now, enough deli-
cate tasks have been ‘dumped’ on the ECB. Delegating even more tasks to 
the ECB in an immediate future would cause a public uproar and would 
lead to a constitutional debate on the limits and financial risks of the 
ECB’s task expansion. Surely, the possible appointment of Jens Weidman 
as a successor to Mario Draghi, despite the collegial nature of the ECB’s 
Executive Board – is likely to put a halt to the ever expanding logic that 
characterised the ECB’s action pattern during the crisis. 
As far as the design of an EU level backstop for the Banking Union 
is concerned, it thus seems to be wise to consider that ‘depending on the 
ECB alone is economically dangerous and politically unsustainable’ (De 
Geus, Enderlein and Letta, 2017:2). Similarly, one can assume that cen-
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tral banking solutions cannot include a permanent crisis management 
instrument of the scale that would be necessary to safeguard the Banking 
Union. To recapitulate: private money solutions are already relied on a 
lot in Europe and it is fair to assume that their contribution to financial 
stability is over-estimated; central banking solutions have been used a 
lot in the past and will tend to be relied on less in the future both for 
constitutional reasons and political reasons; what thus remains is the 
third component of crisis management that Padoa-Schioppa termed ‘the 
tax-payers money solution’. The problem is that the tax-payers money 
solution to banking crises remains a taboo in the current bail-in regime 
which is also the reason why the few existing EU instruments are fun-
damentally under-developed in their design. The recent public inter-
ventions to support ailing Italian banks are a timely wake-up call in that 
regard as they recall that the only operational taxpayer’s money solutions 
are of a national nature, thereby fuelling the doom loop between sover-
eigns and banks. 
My understanding is that when a serious crisis kicks in and a huge 
impact looms, then the tax-payers money solutions will be activated 
again, and we should consider the most intelligent way to engineer and 
prepare such a scenario instead of pretending this will never happen 
again. In other words, EU leaders will have to formalize soon enough an 
EU level function of last resort liquidity that can directly contribute to 
risk-absorption through liquidity intervention measures but also indi-
rectly, via a re-insurance and recapitalization function to other EMU 
actors. This way EMU would be finally equipped with a formal and mutu-
alized crisis management facility and would also be armed with an actor 
that performs the crisis intervention tasks traditionally performed by a 
sovereign and exceptionally performed in Europe by the ECB. Before 
formulating this recommendation in more detail, one should first under-
stand the existing EU banking crisis management tools on the tax-payer 
side. For this, one has to travel back to June 2012. 
3. The Banking Union’s tax-payers’ money recapitalization 
instruments
The Banking Union was created out of concern for the doom loop 
between the banking sector risks and the sovereigns, following the real-
ization that Member States’ fiscal sustainability was threatened by finan-
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cial dominance. These malicious dynamics were illustrated most tellingly 
by Ireland first and then Spain which ended up in the eye of the cyclone 
in June 2012. Following this, the Banking Union, as has been well doc-
umented by Gloeckler, Lindner and Salines (2016) ‘came about as the 
result of a situational package deal that linked the SSM to a short term 
crisis management measure, namely direct bank recapitalization (DBR) 
via the European Stability Mechanism’ (Gloeckler et al, 2016: 2). A sim-
ilar interpretation has been provided by De Rynck (2016). 
The original idea was that the doom loop would be broken by a suf-
ficiently strong and direct banking recapitalization tool which would be 
a new ESM instrument set up right after the SSM’s creation and which 
would directly address ailing banks without burdening national gov-
ernments’ balance sheet. The original euro area summit statement of 
29 June 2012 specifies the following: ‘when an effective single supervi-
sory mechanism is established, involving the ECB, for banks in the euro 
area the ESM could, following a regular decision, have the possibility to 
recapitalize banks directly’ (Euro Area Summit, 2012: 1). Meanwhile, a 
transitory instrument was created for the purpose of Spain. The so-called 
indirect recapitalization instrument, formally known as the ‘loans ear-
marked for the specific purpose of recapitalizing the financial institutions 
of its members, under a financial assistance recapitalization facility’, is the 
instrument used by the Spanish government to recapitalize its banks. Its 
added value is that conditionality is only attached to the financial sector 
and that market access problems is not a condition of the loan activation, 
its downside is that it increases fiscal deficits since loans are channels by 
governments but are also contracted by them. 
On 25 June 2012, the Spanish government requested financial assis-
tance for the recapitalization of its banking sector. On 20 July 2012, the 
Eurogroup approved such a request. 100 billion euros of financial assis-
tance were thus agreed to the Spanish government which in turn pro-
vided funds exclusively to its banking sector restructuring. Ultimately, 
only 41.3 billion euros were requested by the Spanish government and 
disbursed by the ESM. With hindsight, the ‘Spanish deal’ was a suc-
cess. As of 31 December 2016, the average interest rate on ESM loans 
to Spain was 0.9%. The Spanish government exited the programme one 
year and a half after it entered it. The loan will be fully repaid at the end 
of 2027 so in 10 years’ time. In the meantime, Spain has made 4 volun-
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tary requests (needless to say that they were all accepted) to accelerate 
repayment of the loan. Judging by the analysis of the Commission’s latest 
country report on Spain, the medicine seemed to have had a positive 
impact on the health of the Spanish financial sector: ‘the financial sector 
has continued to show a high degree of stability, supported by its ongoing 
restructuring, low funding costs and the economic recovery. The banking 
system further strengthened its capital buffers and the six largest Spanish 
banks comfortably met their capital requirements in the EBA stress tests 
of July 2016. The aggregate non-performing loan ratio fell to just above 
9% in November 2016’ (Commission, 2017: 2).
Despite this resounding success, the use of this indirect recapitaliza-
tion instrument in June 2012 was a one off and was complemented by 
another direct recapitalization instrument. One can assume that its rele-
vance has been downsized with the adoption of new rules and conditions 
on loss absorption and recapitalization (as part of the BRRD) and that 
Northern Member States will not indulge Southerners to rely on it too 
much in the future thereby pushing them to the ‘atomic’ ESM solution, 
the Macro-Economic Adjustment programme. 
The second existing back-stop instrument is the Direct Bank Recapi-
talization, which is limited to 60 billion euros given that it is a considered 
a more risky instrument. The DRI took more than 2 years to be created, 
has an incredible list of conditions required for its activation, requires 
unanimous consent and is judged by policy-makers from the field as an 
instrument that will probably never be used. This point is actually elo-
quently illustrated on the website of the European Stability Mechanism 
in its ‘Explainers’ section: ‘when the instrument was first proposed, it 
was to cut the link between troubled banks and sovereigns. However, it 
soon became clear that banking union mechanisms could achieve this 
aim without resorting to the direct recapitalisation instrument. More 
specifically, the bail-in of private investors, in accordance with the Bank 
Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD), and the contribution of the 
Single Resolution Fund (SRF), has shifted the bulk of potential financing 
from the ESM to the banks themselves, along with their investors and 
creditors’ (ESM, 2017).
The irony is therefore that the instrument that triggered the Banking 
Union will therefore probably never be used and that the one which has 
been used to temporarily – yet successfully solve Spain’s problems – will 
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probably not be used in the future either. Under the current institutional 
architecture I therefore believe that in case of very severe banking crisis, 
what is very likely to happen is that existing EU backstop mechanisms 
(the two ESM bank recap instruments) will be difficult to use because 
they are expected to come in too late to solve crises, are too small to be 
effective and overall do not address the doom loop. 
Therefore, it is likely that to address future large scale banking crisis, 
a mixture of national bank recapitalizations and of central banking 
liquidity provision will have to be relied on again. And this would then 
illustrate in the best possible way that the sovereign bank nexus has not 
been addressed. It is hence in my view better to anticipate and design 
a fiscal backstop that is capable to address the self-fulfilling dynamics 
of banking crises. Against this background, how should the Banking 
Union’s fiscal backstop be designed?
4. A two-legged reform proposal to address the drawbacks of 
Europe’s crisis management
My conclusion from the above is that the only type of crisis management 
instrument that is likely to genuinely provide confidence to market actors 
about Europe’s and the euro’s financial stability is a tax-payer money 
instrument. How should this instrument look like?2
Several contributions (Mayer and Gros, 2010; Enderlein and Haas, 
2015) suggested the creation of a European Monetary Fund and of a 
European Treasury able to provide sustained stability to EMU. Com-
pared to some time ago, the political context looks more prone to the 
discussion of this solution as it seems to become a common denomi-
nator between France and Germany (FT, 2017)3. The common thread of 
those EMF proposals is that the EMF is imagined to act as a single actor 
that financially assists sovereigns in their reform efforts. It would thereby 
regroup lending and monitoring activities currently scattered among 
several EMU actors. However, one of the lessons to draw from the euro 
crisis is that whenever such institutional consolidation opportunities in 
EMU presented themselves, they have been ignored. The Commission, 
after having been granted with the operation of the Balance of Payments 
2 Another intrinsically linked question is how to ensure that it provides value for tax-
payers’ money. However answering such a question would go beyond the scope of this 
paper. 
3 https://www.ft.com/content/8d4b3414-2756-11e7-8995-c35d0a61e61a?mhq5j=e1 
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and of the European Financial Stabilization Mechanism has been system-
atically kept in distance from all delegations of financial management as 
EU Member States were keen to keep control over the centralized funds. 
Likewise, attributing the role of resolution authority to the European Sta-
bility Mechanism was briefly envisaged during the crisis but very swiftly 
abandoned for reasons of political feasibility (back then, re-opening the 
ESM Treaty only a few months after its ratification and amending it for 
a third time was seen as too risky). As a result, financial assistance and 
crisis management instruments are now spread between the Commis-
sion, the ESM, the Single Resolution Board and the ECB. Among those 
actors however, the ESM stands out because it manages several existing 
EU crisis management instruments (this paper has covered two of them). 
This means that the ESM is also the most realistic starting point for 
reform.
• In this context, I believe that the short-term step to instil fur-
ther credibility in the EU’s current fiscal backstop should be to 
bolster and expand the capacity of the ESM. The first reform 
dimension should be to increase the real financial capacity of the 
ESM’s bank recapitalization instruments and ensure that their 
design and conditions help to break the doom loop across EMU. 
As was argued in the Five Presidents’ Report: ‘in due course, the 
effectiveness of the ESM’s direct bank recapitalisation instrument 
should be reviewed, especially given the restrictive eligibility cri-
teria currently attached to it, while respecting the agreed bail-in 
rules. A more easily accessible mechanism for direct bank recap-
italisation would boost depositor confidence by keeping dis-
tressed sovereigns at arm’s length in the governance of restruc-
tured banks, and it would break the sovereign-bank nexus at 
national level’ (Five Presidents’ Report, 2015). This solution is 
close to what De Geus, Enderlein and Letta (2017) have coined 
‘ESM+’. The general purpose of such a capacity increase would 
be to ensure that the ESM has sufficient firepower to withstand a 
large banking crisis in Europe; one that would involve Europe’s 
largest financial institutions, including the three largest French 
banking groups. The second reform dimension is not a new idea 
but requires further elaboration: it would consist in attributing 
the task to the ESM of backstopping the Single Resolution Fund. 
It has been formulated in the past by the Five Presidents’ Report 
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and by the IMF notably. This scenario is also mentioned by the 
more recent Reflections Paper on EMU by the European Com-
mission (Commission, 2017: 19) and therefore seems to appear 
as the most operational and politically acceptable solution. One 
can question however whether such a bridge will prove sufficient 
to instil credibility in the system.
• Symmetrically, I am convinced that political realism shouldn’t 
however prevent us from exploring a third, even more ambitious 
long-term solution to the EMU’s sustainability: the artificial cre-
ation of the functional equivalent of an EU sovereign. Instead of 
being a replica of the International Monetary Fund whose func-
tion is to directly interface with borrowers, its role would be to act 
as EMU’s re-insurance facility (Schlosser, 2016), providing both 
limited recapitalization support and thus shock-absorption to 
the ESM’s crisis management instruments, thereby de-risking the 
euro area’s banking system and sovereigns. In other words, the 
role of this re-insurance facility would be to enhance the real fire-
power and capacity of existing EU institutions and instruments 
rather than replacing them or taking them over. Put differently, 
the current EMU eco-system made up of fragmented elements 
(EC, SRB, ECB, ESM) would stay intact. What would change 
however is that whenever additional recapitalization would be 
required, a common pool of funds could be accessible on short 
notice to ensure that the instruments’ firepower is sustained and 
guaranteed. If such a scheme proves efficient to support the sta-
bility of banks in EMU, then the next step – along similar lines 
but with much higher implementation barriers – would be to 
use this re-insurance facility as a backstop to other existing or 
future mechanisms who currently risk suffering a lack of ex ante 
mutualisation. The European Deposit Insurance Scheme as well 
as the European Investment Bank – as has been mentioned in 
the Commission’s White Paper in its most ambitious scenario – 
could represent other actors that the re-insurance facility could 
backstop. Lastly, a central actor who could benefit from it is the 
European Central Bank, which, precisely because of the absence 
of an EU or EMU treasury, suffered from a Padoa-Schioppian 
‘institutional loneliness’ during the crisis. Compared to other 
OECD central banks whose long-term sustainability is implicitly 
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provided by the Treasury of the country in which they are based, 
I argue that the ECB could only take on limited credit risk as it 
knew that in case it exposed its balance sheet to too high risks, 
its recapitalization would prove problematic as it would have to 
occur through national channels. On 16 December 2010, the 
ECB Governing Council had autonomously decided to increase 
its subscribed capital from 5.76 bn € to 10.76 bn €. The latter 
number is the figure foreseen as maximal cap by Council Reg-
ulation No 1009/2000 which means that the capital leeway that 
the ECB had at its disposal was exhausted. In other words, any 
further capital increase to the ECB during the crisis would have 
had to be subject to qualified majority in the Council. 
Needless to say, all EU Treaties would therefore need to be amended 
to accommodate for those changes which would bring in quite some 
headaches to EU lawyers. Yet, the EMU as a whole would benefit from 
it, institutional actors would too, in particular the ESM (directly) and the 
ECB (indirectly). 
5. Conclusions 
This paper has argued that, in spite of the creation of the Banking Union 
and its constitutive set of rules, instruments and actors, Europe’s financial 
stability is not safeguarded because the continent over-relies on private 
and central banking crisis management mechanisms. In other words, 
while the new regime foresees several recapitalization instruments, it 
still misses a credible and operational EU fiscal backstop. Judging by the 
existing institutional outlook of the Banking Union it is thus fair to con-
sider that Europe still believes in rule enforcement as its principal line of 
defence against future banking crises. The continent is therefore trapped 
in a conundrum: it has proven unable to move from a rules-based regime 
to a regime based on common capacities to manage common risks. 
However, if political momentum gathers pace on the creation of a 
new joint capacity to support EMU’s resilience, then chances are high 
that the ESM would be the central actor supporting this capacity. Why? 
Because the modification of the ESM Treaty appears to be the easiest 
thing to do politically, in particular compared to the two functional alter-
natives: the revision of the EU Treaties on the one hand and the adoption 
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of yet another intergovernmental agreement on the other. This is quite 
ironic: the ESM Treaty revision was precisely the political option that was 
dismissed four years ago when the SRM was about to be established. 
Today, a revision of the ESM Treaty lends itself neatly to a targeted 
institutional engineering. Why exactly? First, because the number of 
Member States involved is only 19 Member States, compared to 27 (or 
28) at the EU level. Second because negotiations can occur under more 
controlled and predictable political conditions insofar as the ESM Treaty 
has been ratified in all euro area Member States through the parlia-
mentary channel (with the ‘help’ of the Pringle Case Law for Ireland). 
Although the shadow of a referendum will hover around Ireland, gen-
eralized parliamentary ratification significantly increases the chances of 
success of the whole enterprise. Those reasons speak in favour of privi-
leging the ESM as the beacon of Europe’s fiscal backstop, as rightly antic-
ipated by Enderlein and Vannahme (2014). Should a treaty revision be 
out of the cards, some elements of the ESM design can even be modified 
without Treaty change: for example, capital increases at the ESM can be 
performed through the simple activation of the procedure foreseen by 
article 10 of the ESM Treaty which specifies that the Board of Governors 
(i..e. Eurogroup finance ministers are entitled to ‘change the authorised 
capital stock and amend article 8 and Annex II accordingly’). 
A more centralized approach will bring up challenges. Connecting 
the dots of Europe’s currently highly fragmented fiscal regime will be 
arduous but perpetuating the current status quo will come at a cost 
too. Risks of inconsistencies and distorted incentives loom large. This 
was demonstrated in the recent rescue case of Northern Italian banks 
as contradicting signals came from the enforcement of the parallel but 
connected resolution and state aid regimes. Another connection point 
between the grand idea of the ESM becoming EMU’s last resort re-in-
surer and the fiscal framework is the distribution of the burden-sharing 
of such a mechanism which is unlikely to be shielded away from partici-
pating Member States’ fiscal performance. 
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In that regard, one could be even more imaginative in establishing 
further connections within the existing EMU fiscal regime. The way the 
ESM is financed could be amended for example. As things stand4, the ESM 
is financed via national contributions whose volume are determined on 
the same basis as the ECB’s contribution key, i.e. the contributor’s share 
in the overall EU population and GDP. A possible reform would consist 
in moving away from those structural and generic variables and head 
towards more cyclical and politically loaded indicators, such as the fiscal 
performance or the performance of the contributing country’s banking 
sector. Such inflections could be considered as the counter-parties to 
insert in the North-South package deal that such a reform would be part 
of. Some will say that this is unrealistic. And it is probably true. However, 
it is not more unrealistic than the current conventional expectation of 
a full enforcement of the Stability and Growth Pact’s Excessive Deficit 
Procedure. After all, isn’t it time to stop pretending that the SGP has any 
future at all?
4 Further details can be found in article 42 of the Treaty establishing the Euro-
pean Stability Mechanism.
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INTRODUCTION
The  financial  world  is  undergoing  a  profound  technological  change.  The  advent  of  innovative
technologies is unsettling the industry’s modus operandi which will soon enough disrupt the current
practices  of  both supervisors  and central  banks.   Big  data,  block-chain  and the proliferation of
distributed ledgers are only a few illustrations of a wider financial technology industry build-up –
known as FinTech – which will revolutionise the global financial infrastructure.
As a result of this, the geography of finance is evolving at a rapid pace. In this new context of digital
transformation  and  innovation,  how should  regulation  respond?  Is  regulatory  arbitrage  and  the
reliance on more decentralised regulatory regimes a possible solution or is the top-down central model
resilient  enough  to  sustain  these  changes?  Can  regulators  turn  these  new  challenges  into
opportunities?
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PROGRAMME
09.15 - 10.15 Registration and Welcome Coffee
10.15 - 10.30 Welcome by Elena Carletti | Bocconi University, BAFFI CAREFIN and Florence
School of Banking and Finance
10.30 - 12.00 Session 1: The New World of FinTech
Chair: Franklin Allen | Brevan Howard Centre, Imperial College
Eva Micheler | London School of Economics
Andrei Kirilenko | Imperial College London
Stuart Hoegner | Bitfinex
 
12.00 - 13.00 Chair: Elena Carletti | Bocconi University, BAFFI CAREFIN and European
University Institute
Keynote Lecture:  Jean-Pierre Landau | Sciences Po Paris
 
13.00 - 14.30 Lunch
 
14.30 - 16.00 Session 2: Regulatory Arbitrage across Jurisdictions
Chair: Mitu Gulati | Duke University
Yannis Manuelides | Allen & Overy Llp 
Lachlan Burn | Linklaters
Jeromin Zettelmeyer | Peterson Institute for International Economics
16.00 - 16.30 Coffee Break
 
16.30 - 17.45 Session 3: A Case Study: BREXIT
Chair: Joanna Gray | Birmingham University
Simon Gleeson | Clifford Chance
David Miles | Imperial College Business School
Jonathan Faull | Former Director General European Commission
Brigid Laffan | Director of the Robert Schuman Centre
17.45 - 18.00 Concluding remarks by Brigid Laffan | Director of the Robert Schuman Centre
18.00 - 21.00 Reception and Dinner at Villa Schifanoia
Dinner speaker: Martin Sandbu | Financial Times
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